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Introduction 
Carlyle A. Thayer 
In September 1990 the Departments of Human Geography, Political 
and Social Change, and Pacific and Southeast Asian History, and 
the National Centre for Development Studies of the ANU' s 
Research School of Pacific Studies hosted a landmark international 
conference on the theme 'Doi Moi: Vietnam's Renovation - Policy 
and Performance' (see Forbes et al., 199 1 ). This meeting was so 
successful that it sparked the idea to emulate the model of the 
annual Indonesia Update. The Vietnam Update as it was originally 
conceived, consisted of a review of the major, economic, social and 
political developments over the previous year and the exploration 
of a specially chosen theme. 
In November 1991 the first Vietnam Update was held on the 
theme of human resource development. Papers delivered at this 
conference were not published in an edited collection. This volume 
contains the revised papers delivered to the second Vietnam Update 
held in November 1992 on the theme 'the law in Vietnam'. The title 
of this book, Vietnam and the Rule of Law, was adapted from the 
original title of Mme Ngo Ba Thanh's paper, 'The 1992 Constitution 
and the Rule of Law'. 
The papers delivered at Vietnam Update 1992 fall into three 
categories. The first consists of the papers delivered by Adam 
Fforde, Suki Allen and Carlyle Thayer which provide an overview 
of major economic, public health and political developments in 1992. 
The second category comprises papers by Ngo Ba Thanh and Levien 
Do which deal with the 1992 state constitution. The third category 
includes the papers by John Gillespie, Nguyen Qui Binh and Irene 
N0rdlund which discuss specialist aspects of the law in Vietnam. 
Vietnam's reform process is usually dated to the landmark Sixth 
National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party held in 
December 1986. It is now clear, based on recent research, that the 
impetus for economic reforms dates back to the late 1970s. Calls for 
political reform were first expressed in public in 1981  in the lead up 
to the Fifth National Congress held in March 1 982. Comparatively 
little was accomplished in this area until after 1986. 
The speed and scope of changes since 1 986 has been quite 
startling. Within three years Vietnam had all but dismantled its 
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central planning apparatus and had thrown open its doors to foreign 
investment. According to Adam Fforde 'if, as one can argue without 
much difficulty, the Vietnamese economy has been essentially a 
market economy since 1989, then the leadership is the sole example 
in the world today of a ruling communist party that has abandoned 
the central-planning methods derived from Stalinist Russia' (Fforde 
1 993:293) .  
What then was the situation in 1992, 'year four' of the 
Vietnamese market economy? Fforde raises three principal questions 
in his discussion: What do current economic trends indicate for the 
state of the country when large-scale foreign assista nce 
recommences? What do current trends indicate for the medium-term 
rural development outlook? And would the Vietnamese polity be 
able to cope with the immense strains of market-orientated 
development without an accompanying political evolution? 
Fforde provides his readers with a concise summary of the main 
economic trends in the first half of 1 992. On the positive side 
Vietnam experienced the rapid growth of private and state capital, 
the inflow of foreign investment, the strong development of the 
private sector, especially in the retail trade, soaring oil production, 
and the growth of marine, agricultural and forestry exports. 
On the negative side, the state sector continues to be supported 
by cheap credits and tax breaks. This serves to stoke inflationary 
pressures and to distort interest rates. In rural areas Fforde notes 
that the 'new deal' promised by the party in its Decree No. 10 
decollectivizing agriculture has failed to materialize. As a result 
rural credit and market stabilization remain weak, while the terms 
of trade facing peasant farmers have deteriorated. 
Fforde devotes most of his analysis to the prospects for weaning 
state enterprises from their dependency on cheap credit. In his view, 
the poli tical influence of the state business sector is a major 
constraint on the development of strong institutions that are needed 
for rapid and stable growth. Fforde also foreshadows other 
potential problems in the countryside and upland areas. Land use 
conflicts in the Mekong Delta, for example, have implications for 
foreign investment in land property. 
Fforde ends his discussion on a generally positive note in 
answering his original three questions. Economic trends, he argues, 
indicate that the state's capacity to absorb resources in future is 
'rather good'. As for medium-term rural development, the outlook is 
also assessed as 'good' if, and Fforde enters several caveats, the 
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state can develop rural incomes. Finally, Fforde flags the emergence 
of a relatively autonomous technocratic group and concludes that 
market-orientated reforms have already resulted in substantial 
political evolution. 
Suki Allen is a medical doctor with practical first-hand 
experience in Vietnam, particularly in the provinces of Vinh Phu 
and Ha Tuyen, where she carried out a survey of women's health in 
the late 1980s. In addition, Allen also bases her analysis on data 
provided by Vietnam's Ministry of Health, non-governmental 
organizations and international agencies such as the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF. 
Allen notes that Vietnam, as a developing country, 'has in fact 
achieved considerable improvements in the health status of the 
population over the last three decades, to the extent that many 
health indicators are comparable to those of higher income 
countries . However, there are also areas where the effects of the 
poverty and international isolation of the last two decades are 
easily seen' . The major portion of her chapter is devoted to a 
detailed discussion of figures assessing Vietnam's current health 
status and incidence of disease. Malnutrition remains a major health 
problem, while malaria and dengue fever are the main causes of 
morbidity. 
Allen also reviews the impact of doi moi on the public health 
sector. She singles out four major reform measures which were 
introduced in 1989: introduction of user-service fees, legalization of 
private practice, direct sale of drugs on the open market, and the 
liberalization of the pharmaceu tical industry. Of particular 
interest is her assessment that Decree No. 1 0, which eroded the role 
of the agricultural cooperative, led to a 'low point for health 
services ... in the 1980s', and that recovery is only now underway as a 
result of changed training, management and financial policies. 
The final overview paper was delivered by Carlyle Thayer, a 
political scientist. His analysis is divided into two parts. The first 
discusses the resolution of eight major contentious issues raised 
during the course of amending the 1980 state constitution. These 
issues are: the role of the Vietnam Communist Party in society; the 
doctrine of separation of powers; restructuring of the central state 
apparatus; human rights; reform of provincial government; the role 
of National Assembly deputy; the question of property and land 
ownership; and oversight and control of defence and security 
matters. 
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In the second part of this overview paper, which contains the 
bulk of his analysis, Thayer discusses the electoral process leading 
up to elections for the National Assembly (ninth legislature) held 
on 19th July 1 992. This section includes a discussion of the new 
electoral law (which requires that every seat be contested and 
which made provision for independent candidates to stand for 
election), candidate selection procedures, and the election results. 
Thayer's analysis of the election results is both qualitative and 
quantitative. He provides a detailed discussion of the results in 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the failure of the two independent 
candidates, and the special case of Mme Ngo Ba Thanh. Thayer 
notes that the 1 992 elections produced some surprises, especially in 
Ho Chi Minh City where three incumbents and four of six party­
endorsed candidates lost. The shock loss of Mme Ngo Ba Thanh is 
placed within the context of centre-local tensions. 
Thayer attempts to tease out patterns from the voting results. He 
finds, for example, that the percentage vote received for winning 
candidates declines as one moves from north to south. This leads him 
to hypothesize 'that the figures reveal that the party machine 
tended to influence the results in the northern provinces to a greater 
extent than in the south'. In looking at the backgrounds of successful 
candidates (central, provincial and local level), Thayer finds that 
'regional military and central-level officials received a higher 
percentage of the valid vote than provincial, local and religious 
deputies' and that 'the success of the mili tary and its popularity 
holds extremely well at all levels - central, regional, provincial 
and local ' .  The least successful  candidates were those from 
provincial and local levels with backgrounds in state enterprises, 
mass organizations, government service and the local public health 
system. 
Whatever the variation in vote received, the party's grip on 
power in the new National Assembly was not al tered . Nearly 
ninety-two percent of deputies were party members. When the ninth 
National Assembly met to elect state leaders under the terms of the 
1 992 consti tution, the highest positions of state power, in the 
government and in the organs of the National Assembly, were filled 
by members of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Vietnam 
Communist Party. 
Detailed analyses of Vietnam's 1 992 state constitution are 
provided by Mme Ngo Ba Thanh (during 1 987-92 head of the 
National Assembly's Judicial Committee) and Levien Do, a solicitor 
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with the Sydney firm Mallesons Stephen Jacques. Mme Thanh 
introduces her paper by noting differences between Western concepts 
of law and Vietnamese concepts arising from local customs and 
traditional rules of ethics. This theme is also examined in the paper 
by John Gillespie. She argues that it was Ho Chi Minh who first 
introduced into Vietnam the notion of 'a state governed by the rule 
of law'. 
Despite the adoption of a state constitution in 1 946, and the 
subsequent promulgation of a new state constitution in 1980, 'law has 
not become the state's main instrument for economic and social 
administration and for the protection of the people's right to 
mastery'. In Mme Thanh's view, it was not until the policy of 
renovation was adopted in 1986 that the 'rule of law' was adopted 
as a party objective. 
At the 1 986 Sixth National Party Congress, the then Secretary­
General Truong Chinh stated in the introduction to the party's 
Political Report: 
The management of the country should be performed by law 
instead of simply by moral concepts. The law is the 
institutionalization of party lines and policies and a 
manifestation of the people's will; and it must be applied 
uniformly throughout the country. To observe the law is to 
implement party lines and policies. Management by law 
requires attention to be paid to lawmaking. It is necessary 
to step-by-step supplement and perfect the legal system so 
as to ensure that the state machinery be organised and 
operated in accordance with the law (Hanoi Domestic 
Service, 15 December 1986). 
The Sixth National Congress ratified Vietnam's program of 
renovation, the main plank of which was to shift from a centrally­
planned to a multi-sector economy. Following the congress, as noted 
by Mme Thanh, the party's line was institutionalized by the 
adoption of two domestic investment laws, a Law on Private 
Enterprise, and a Companies Law (with provisions for a Limited 
Liability Company and a Shareholders' Company). In brief, 
'private enterprises have been relegitimated and given equal rights 
with other enterprises under the law'. Of equal significance, was 
the 1987 Law on Foreign Investment which was promulgated in early 
1988. 
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The Political Report to the Sixth Party Congress also called for 
reform of party-state relations, and reform of people's councils at all 
levels including the national level. In 1987, under the influence of 
the renovation process, Vietnam conducted elections to the National 
Assembly (eighth legislature). Restrictions on candidate selection 
were eased and this resulted in the highest ratio of candidates to 
seats in the nation's history (even higher than in 1992). In the past 
candidates were proposed by the local party secretary with little or 
no popular input. In 1987, reform-minded members of the party put 
pressure on middle-level party cadres to end their resistance to 
change. The pre-selection rules were altered so that candidates 
could be proposed at public meetings. All candidates were required 
to post their biographies in public. 
Deputies elected to the Eighth National Assembly proved to be 
vocal and on occasion independent. According to Nguyen Xuan Oanh, 
a deputy to the Eighth National Assembly, 'every session is ... a 
grilling for the Council of Ministers. It is doing its job of overseeing 
the Government'. In one notable incident in mid-1988, deputies 
challenged the party Central Committee's nomination for the post 
of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Government ministers were 
also accused by name of mishandling a food crisis and of failing to 
slow the country's raging inflation. Various pieces of legislation 
were amended or delayed; a law on the press was amended twenty­
seven times before adoption. 
At the end of its tenure, the Eighth National Assembly had 
passed more legislation into law than all previous national 
assemblies. According to Mme Ngo Ba Thanh, the Eighth National 
Assembly 'passed twenty-five laws and forty-nine ordinances 
(Council of State), to respond to the need for managing the country 
through the Rule of Law. The Government passed some seventy by­
laws aimed at concretizing the Law on Foreign Investment' .1 
The mandate for the reformist-minded Sixth National Congress 
expired in 1991 when, according to party statutes, the Vietnam 
Communist Party held its Seventh National Party Congress. The 
Political Report to this congress declared (Communist Party of 
Vietnam 1991:92): 
1 There is a discrepancy between the numbers of laws and ordinances cited 
by Mme Ngo Ba Thanh and the numbers given in the party's Political 
Report to the Seventh National Congress; see below. 
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As shown by experience over the past few years, in order to 
renovate and enhance the political system, and to build up 
and exercise socialist democracy, the key lies in a clear-cut 
delinea tion of the functions of the Party on the one hand 
and those of the State and people's organizat�ons on  the 
other and a resolu tion of the relationship among them; a 
resolute struggle against bureaucratism and violations of 
the people's right to mastery, coupled with criticism and 
overcoming of deviations. 
Following in this direction, there have been decisions and 
measures to change the organization and mode of operation 
of State bodies . Law-making activities have been stepped 
up. Over the past four years (up to the end of 1990), twenty­
four laws and thirty-three decrees were promulgated by 
the National Assembly and State Council. The sessions of 
the National Assembly have given a clearer expression of 
democracy and the rights and responsibilities of people's 
deputies. The National Assembly's supervisory functions 
have been strengthened and made more efficient. 
The Council of Ministers and people's committees at various 
levels have taken initial steps in renewing their mode of 
operation, performed better the work of governing and 
managing the State by means of the law, and succeeded in 
solving many major economic and social problems ... 
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Later in the Political Report, in the section entitled 'Main 
Orientations and Tasks, 1991-95 Period', point eight (of ten) stated: 
To exercise socialist democracy is the substance of renewing 
and perfecting the political system. This constitutes both a 
goal and a driving force in the renewal process. 
An important condition for promoting democracy is to build 
up and perfect the legal system, to strengthen socialist 
legislation, and to elevate the peoples' intellectual level, 
their level of awareness of the law and their sense of law­
abidance ... 
A number of tasks should be satisfactorily done: 
To amend the Constitution, to strengthen socialist 
legislation. To continue to construct and amend the legal 
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system concerning the economy, culture, society, criminal 
matters, civic affairs, administration, civic duties and civil 
rights, etc. To improve the skill of State bodies in making 
laws, to rapidly issue regulations on construction priorities, 
to promulgate and organize the implementation of the law 
with a view to helping the State manage in all respects the 
life of society through the law. To carry out legal education 
on a regular basis and foster among the people a sense of 
living and working in accordance with the law. 
• To improve the organization and operation of the National 
Assembly and People's Councils so that they can perform 
their functions properly. To renovate deputies' 
qualifications and the rules and regulations for activities 
regarding National Assembly and People's Council 
elections. 
To modify the organizational structure and mode of 
operation of the government; to attach importance to 
collective discussion while upholding the individual 
responsibility and authority of the heads of government 
and ministries in management and executive work. 
To redefine the functions and tasks of province and district 
and village levels, so as to restructure the organization of 
each level; to uphold the autonomy and responsibility of 
the localities; at the same time ensuring uniform guidance 
by the central government. To build strong administration 
at village and urban-ward level. 
To improve the effectiveness of law-enforcement bodies. To 
renovate the operations and organizations of the 
Procurator's Office and People's Courts. To ensure the 
necessary conditions and means for them to safeguard the 
law and fulfil their tasks .... (pp. 136-137). 
Following the Seventh Party Congress, political life in Vietnam 
focused on substantial amendments to the 1980 state constitution. 
Three separate drafts were produced before the fourth and final 
draft was adopted on 15 April 1992. Mme Ngo Ba Thanh, in the 
second half of her paper, places the process of constitutional 
amendment within the larger context of Vietnam's program of 
renovation. She chooses to do so by comparing changes in the 
wording of various articles of the 1980 constitution with the 1992 
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constitution. For example, the 1980 constitution defined Vietnam as 
a 'state of proletarian dictatorship'. This was amended to read that 
Vietnam was 'a state of the people, by the people, for the people'. 
The role of the Vietnam Communist Party and its mass 
organizations, the Vietnam Fatherland Front . and Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions, was likewise re-defined. The party 
was no longer 'the sole force' leading state and society but 'the force'. 
A new clause was inserted which required that the party and all of 
its organizations 'shall operate within the framework of the 
constitution and the law'. The role of the Vietnam Fatherland Front 
was no longer the 'firm prop of the state' but the 'political base of 
people's power'. The Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions was no 
longer defined as a 'school of communism' but 'the socio-political 
organization of the working class and the toiling· people'. 
Mme Thanh flags three other amendments. Under Article 12 the 
State was required to exercise administration of society 'by means of 
the law and shall constantly strengthen socialist legality'. In 
Article 50, Vietnam for the first time provided for human rights in 
the political, civic, economic, cultural and social fields. This had 
important implications for commercial activity, as Mme Thanh 
pointed out. Finally, Article 72 included the presumption of 
innocence to those appearing before a court. 
Levien Do's paper is a carefully focused examination of several 
major issues resulting from the amendment of the 1980 constitution. 
Do first examines changes in Vietnam's political structure, noting 
the powers accorded to the National Assembly as 'the highest organ 
of state authority in Vietnam'. He observed that 'the National 
Assembly will play a important role in the running of the country 
now that the VCP has placed itself under the authority of not only 
the Constitution ... but also the law'. 
Do then discusses new organs created by the 1992 Constitution 
caused by the abolishment of the Council of State and Council of 
Ministers: National Assembly Standing Committee; Prime Minister 
and Government, and State President. The Standing Committee will 
act for the National Assembly on matters entrusted to it or when the 
assembly is not in session. It replaces the Council of State. Collective 
leadership has been jettisoned and replaced by a 'single leader 
government', that is, a prime minister who heads a cabinet-style 
government. This replaces the Council of Ministers. Finally, a new 
position, the State President, has been created and endowed with 
substantive (rather than ceremonial) powers. 
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Do also discusses the role of the VCP under the new constitution 
in a manner which parallels the discussion in the papers by Ngo Ba 
Thanh and Carlyle Thayer. He includes a new issue in his discussion 
of the constitution and Vietnam's foreign relations. Do notes that 
references to French colonialism, American imperialism and Chinese 
hegemonism have been dropped, signifying a change in attitude 
from international isolation to a more active engagement with the 
outside world (for example the adoption of a multilateral foreign 
policy). 
Vietnam's amended constitution now recognizes five economic 
sectors including the private sector. This is discussed by Do in his 
final substantive section. The 1980 state constitution stated that the 
'the state holds a monopoly on foreign trade and all other foreign 
economic relations with foreign countries'. This is no longer the case, 
particularly after the adoption of the Law on Foreign Investment. 
Do further notes that the 1992 Constitution expressly sanctions joint 
ventures with foreign partners (Article 22) and offers a guarantee 
that 'foreign investment-funded enterprises shall not be subject to 
nationalization' (Article 25). 
In his conclusion, Do calls the new constitution 'a great step 
forward' but cautions that it is 'still the first of many needed'. He 
sets as preconditions the development of a reasonably reliable legal 
infrastructure, a workable bureaucratic system, and consistency in 
policymaking, before foreigners will invest 'without any 
reservation'. 
· 
The third category of papers presented to Vietnam Update 1992 
are concerned with specialist legal matters. John Gillespie provides 
an overview of the development of commercial legal rights in 
Vietnam. He commences his discussion by asking, 'in the pursuit of a 
"mixed market" economy ... is the interplay between private and 
state rights in Vietnam sufficiently dynamic to allow the emergence 
of novel and innovative business practices?' This question arises from 
differing conceptions of 'private legal rights' between western 
traditions, where moral and legal rights are seen as separate, and 
Vietnamese tradition. Gillespie argues, 'in Vietnam the distinction 
is not as acute (as in the west), as legal rights have traditionally 
only existed as appendages to an overriding moral obligation owed 
to the central political authority and family'. These differing 
conceptions may be overcome by 'a convergence of economic cultures' 
as Vietnam develops a mixed market economy. 
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One of the key barriers to the availability of property rights in 
Vietnam is the development of what Gillespie terms an 'amorphous 
hybrid' legal system. On the one hand, the state retains ownership 
over land, while on the other hand it recognizes private ownership 
of the means of production. This has led to a situation where private 
legal rights flourish in some settings but not in others where they 
are subject to state regulation 'almost to the point of extinction'. 
According to Gillespie, state regulation is most severe when private 
activity impinges upon state planning objectives. 
Gillespie identifies party ideology, as reflected in the legal 
system, as another barrier to the availability of property rights in 
Vietnam. In Vietnam a distinction is made between 'commercial 
land' and 'non-commercial land'. Administrative restrictions limit 
access to commercial land. For example, applicants for commercial 
land must obtain 'business registration' status from local authorities. 
This entails convincing the authorities of the need for the proposed 
commercial activity. Family traders are not eligible for 'business 
registration' and thus cannot avail themselves of adjudication and 
enforcement procedures in the event of a contractual dispute. Other 
restrictions concern the need to seek approval from local authorities 
to transfer certificates of ownership of buildings erected on 
commercial land. 
Gillespie concludes his discussion by noting that 'in the last few 
years, the spectacular enactment of a plethora of commercial 
legislation, outwardly at least, substantiates the rhetorical 
adoption of a rights based legal system, and this process will only 
accelerate as more foreign investors enter the economy and domestic 
enterprises become internationalized.' 
But going against this trend are prevailing popular attitudes 
which Gillespie presents in the form of two propositions. The first is 
that in Vietnam the total good is preferable to the good of an 
individual. The state is perceived as the custodian of the total good, 
and this has led to the widely-held belief that 'if there is no law 
that permits a business activity, then that activity cannot lawfully 
be carried out.' The other proposition is that government, and 
therefore law based on discretionary power, is better than rule of 
abstract law. 
In Gillespie's view, 'on balance, the differences between the 
treatment of commercial rights in Vietnam and non-socialist Asia, or 
more particularly, the West, outweigh the similarities'. Vietnam 
needs time to modify and adopt western legal norms to the realities 
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of commercial practice. The reform process is likely to be slow and 
incremental. Gillespie argues that a balance is needed between state 
and private interests and that excessive state intervention will 
inhibit commercial innovation. 
Nguyen Qui Binh is the author of two separate papers here, one 
dealing with real estate laws in Vietnam and the other dealing 
with the corporate income tax structure. The first paper provides 
background information on the 1987 Land Law and the 1991 
Residential Housing Law and argues that as a result of socio­
economic development both laws have become outmoded and in need 
of amendment. As a result of Party Decree No. 10 (August 1988) 
farmers were permitted to possess some of the means of production 
and cooperatives were allowed to allot the right of land use. This 
led to a variety of disputes over land and a divided party on the eve 
of the Seventh National Congress. 
According to Binh there were three separate views regarding 
the question of land: 'the first advocated that land is a national 
resource (and) should belong to the people; the second urged ... the 
reverse; and the third proposed a share of such ownership between 
the state and farmers'. The Seventh Congress resolved that all land 
belonged to the people but land could be alloted for long-term use. 
This was included in the 1992 state constitution. Other contentious 
matters, such as inheritance and mortgage of the right of land use, 
were left for later resolution by the government. 
In July 1993, after Nguyen Qui Binh wrote his paper, the 
National Assembly (eighth legislature, third session) adopted a 
new Land Law. This law permits foreign organizations and 
individuals to rent land in Vietnam. Anyone who works the land on 
a stable basis will be issued a land utilization certificate by the 
state. Farmers who grow short-term crops will be granted 
certificates for 20 years, while those who cultivate long-term crops 
will be given 50 years. The terms of access are renewable, which 
means that the right of access may be inherited, transferred, sub­
leased or used as collateral for a bank loan. The new Land Law took 
effect on 15 October 1993. 
Binh's second paper explores the anomalies and inconsistencies 
in Vietnam's corporate tax structure. Binh notes that 'Vietnam still 
does not at all possess a unified tax on corporate-source income. 
Corporate earnings that are derived from different sources are taxed 
differently, by different pieces of legislation (or laws), at different 
rates varying according to business sectors and industries'. This 
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judgment is based on Binh's review of various pieces of legislation, 
such as the Law on Business Profit Tax, the Foreign Investment Law, 
and the Agricultural Tax Law. The lack of a unified system has led 
to problems of tax equity and various types of discrimination, such as 
between shareholders and wage earners, between v�rious business 
sectors, and between foreign and domestic enterprises. 
Binh argues that the primary purpose of Vietnam's tax policy is 
to attract investment and the main means of doing so is a low tax 
regime on corporate incomes. However, existing regulations are full 
of loopholes and inconsistencies. For example, no specific tax rate is 
set out for each natural resource group (for example oil and gas, 
minerals, precious stones). Tax rates are left to the discretion of 
governmental authorities. Indeed, Vietnam lacks a tax 
administration body with complete authority to supervise lower 
levels. Tax officials at the local level are responsible to provincial 
authorities. Further, tax liabilities incurred by foreign investors are 
negotiated directly between the foreigner and the local authority. 
Binh asks 'if it is necessary for Vietnam to maintain a differing 
tax rate structure as a sort of incentive instead of using other 
methods; or whether a system with a single and moderate tax rate 
for all domestic and foreign enterprises would be far more efficient'. 
Binh concludes his paper with a reasoned plea for reform. Quite 
clearly he favours the second option plus increasing the tax rates 
applied to foreign enterprises so that they equal rates paid by 
domestic companies. In Binh's view, 'the policy option which is seen 
as practical in the Vietnamese case is to adopt a gradual approach 
and to reconcile both the short- and long-term requirements in a 
longer-run process of reform'. 
Irene N0rlund's paper on the creation of a labour market in 
Vietnam rounds out the discussion of specialist legal issues. N0rlund 
contrasts the conditions of workers under Vietnam's centrally­
planned economy with conditions produced as a result of Vietnam's 
market-orientated reforms. By the late 1980s, constitutional 
guarantees of employment, education, training, rest, social insurance, 
retirement benefits, and sickness and disability cover had been 
eroded. 
N0rlund's main concern is to evaluate the efficacy of steps taken 
by the government to safeguard the social welfare of workers in a 
multi-sectoral market economy. She compares Vietnam's 1980 state 
constitution with that adopted in 1992 and concludes, 'the state is no 
longer taking the same responsibility for workers' life' as before. 
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She also examines the provisions of the 1990 Ordinance on Labour 
Contracts and the Law on Trade Unions (1990). Under the former, 
life-time employment has been replaced by labour contracts. 
N0rlund finds evidence that the latter contains provisions which 
will permit the establishment of independent unions which can 
defend the interests of the worker. But she is sceptical that this 
will come about. In her view, 'unions are a part of the political 
system and their obligations have not basically changed from what 
they were before'. N0rlund also reviews the provisions contained in 
the 1990 Regulations on Labour for Enterprises with Foreign-Owned 
Capital. 
Nmlund concludes that quite fundamental changes have taken 
place in Vietnam with respect to the labour market. But in 1992 
'there was no sign of increased activity on the labour market in order 
to defend the workers interests, and it seems as if the new 
legislation was mainly of a superficial character'. 
The Vietnam Update 1992 conference ended with a panel session 
in which some of Australia's leading law specialists doing business 
in Vietnam were represented. The panel consisted of David Laidlaw 
(Maddock Lonie and Chisholm), Bill Magennis (Phillips Fox), 
Brian Weir (Freehill Hollingdale and Page) and Noel Fabri (BHP). 
David Laidlaw opened the panel discussion by addressing the 
question of dispute resolution in Vietnam. In his assessment, 
Vietnam has a very limited established mechanism for orderly 
dispute resolution, either at the domestic level or with disputes 
involving foreign entities. The mechanisms for enforcement of 
arbitral awards are even more limited. The Foreign Trade 
Arbitration Committee, the non-government arm of Vietnam's 
Chamber of Commerce, offers a mechanism for arbitration of 
disputes involving foreigners. But the Committee will not operate 
without the consent of the parties concerned. Also, and more 
importantly, there is no mechanism for enforcement that does not 
involve the goodwill of the parties. At the domestic level, State 
Economic Arbitrators have established jurisdiction in domestic 
disputes but they do not have jurisdiction in disputes involving a 
foreign entity. So, if a dispute arises between joint venture partners 
one of whom "is a foreigner, the State Economic Arbitrators have no 
jurisdiction. The avenues for enforcement of awards are by no means 
clear. 
Laidlaw spoke next about some of the methods that have been 
used to resolve disputes. He mentioned that some major investors 
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have moved to protect themselves by obtaining agreements with 
their partners. When disputes arise they will be arbitrated in an 
international forum. As a result, a number of major investors have 
felt more secure about going into Vietnam. Many of these investors 
also felt that the scale and focus of their investments meant they 
could be confident that the Vietnamese government would protect 
them should disagreements arise. 
According to Laidlaw, the careful 'second-tier' investor with 
more limited resources, and whose focus is primarily commercial, is 
understandably concerned at the absence of readily identifiable 
mechanisms which will protect the investor's economic rights and 
enforce contract obligations. These concerns act as a significant 
disincentive for this type of investor. There is a realistic 
appreciation in Vietnam that the absence of a commercial court 
system does pose obstacles to second-tier investment. Steps are being 
taken to reconstitute the Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee into a 
formal international body. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce has 
stated that the reorganization has been approved 'in principle' and 
will be implemented in future. However, there is still no mechanism 
for the enforcement of the arbitral awards by that committee. 
Plans are also underway to remould the State Economic 
Arbitrators into an economic court with jurisdiction to hear all 
commercial disputes arising in Vietnam, including the 
administration of insolvency and bankruptcy laws. The Ministry of 
Justice was reported to be preparing a draft ordinance for 
enforcement of arbitral awards for submission to the National 
Assembly. According to Laidlaw, until these initiatives are 
properly implemented, the second-tier investor will be required to 
make an unreasonable commitment of hope and trust along with 
capital when investing in Vietnam. In this sense, the absence of an 
orderly dispute resolution process operates as a serious impediment 
to widespread second-tier investment in Vietnam. 
Laidlaw also raised a new question, the provision of aid for 
legal training. Vietnam needs to develop a sound legal 
infrastructure. The great majority of Vietnam's lawyers are 
untrained in commercial law and few have any first hand experience 
of developed market economies. Australian firms have taken an 
initial step by offering internships. Laidlaw offered the opinion 
that 'Australia, through its bilateral aid program, has an 
opportunity to off er a carefully coordinated legal training program 
which will establish a basis for lasting legal links with Vietnam.' 
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Bill Magennis, the second panelist, began by discussing the 
question of foreign investment. According to him, about 475 licences 
have been issued, of which approximately 400 were 'alive'. These 
investors promised a total of US$3.7 billion in investment funds; but 
in reality only US$900 million had actually been committed, a 
significant portion of which was in the oil industry. In his opinion, 
Vietnam had a good foreign investment regime and it was very 
similar to the one that applied in the People's Republic of China. 
Vietnam had adopted over one hundred pieces of legislation, far 
faster than its northern neighbour. In Vietnam, he noted, the 
Vietnam Inves tment Review actually criticizes the regime and 
things which happen in Vietnam. This could not happen in China. 
Magennis then discussed restraints on investment. The first was 
'fear', fear on the Vietnamese side. There were two types of fear in 
his view. The first was a fear of parting with information. Getting 
information in Vietnam is difficult. Magennis spoke from personal 
experience in his dealing with the State Committee for Cooperation 
and Investment. His firm and the SCCI signed a contract to publish 
legislation relating to foreign investment. About fifty pieces of 
legislation were published. Initially Magennis thought he would 
have been flooded with Vietnamese versions of legislation to 
translate into English. But this was not the case. Why? Because of 
the inherent fear of parting with information, the Vietnamese were 
not forthcoming. 
During question time, Magennis was asked about the role of self­
regulation in Vietnam. He answered that a state-owned enterprise 
or a private Vietnamese company which wanted to borrow capital 
from a bank would have to provide certain data. No bank would 
lend money until a company provided a set of accounts, a balance 
sheet, and profit and loss statement. In other words, the bank would 
seek information and any company wanting a loan will be forced to 
hand over information. This is at micro-level. 
At the macro-level Vietnam is providing more information, he 
acknowledged. This applied to the current state of investment in 
Vietnam; Vietnamese legislators were asking investors about their 
problems. Every problem that has been mentioned at this Update 
has come to the attention of Vietnamese legislators and 
administrators, he commented. 'They know all about it. It is on 
agenda for them to do something. There are ideological battles 
because there are sixty-seven million people, of whom one hundred 
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thousand run the country. They are not all of the same mind', 
Magennis added. 
Another aspect of fear is that while Vietnam is very keen to 
develop a market economy they fear being 'taken down' by 
foreigners. According to Magennis, the Vietnamese know when they 
do not know something and they fear being taken advantage of. 
They are reluctant to accept 'a good deal' when they are not sure 
what the foreigners motivations are. 
According to Magennis, another restraint is ideological conflict 
within Vietnam. There is no 'Vietnam Inc.' Magennis pointed to 
north-south conflict, where government organizations in the south 
act independently of direction from the central government. He gave 
as one example the question of privatisation. It was publicly 
announced that five companies would be privatized. This did not 
occur, in his view, because some people who were scared of 
proceeding managed to stop the process. 
According to Magennis the same applied to the Land Law. He 
recalled that a workshop was held in Hanoi in May 1992 where 
drafts of the land law were tabled. Vietnamese participants 
presented a range of views. Some of the participants were clearly 
ideologues of the old school, and they argued that 'land belongs to 
the people and nothing would be done with it'. This attitude was 
reflected in some of the drafts. 
Magennis suggested that perhaps the biggest restraint of all is 
the mortgage situation and the right to use land. He doubted that 
any bank would grant a mortgage and lend on the strength of a so­
called land-use document. 'That means forget Vietnam unless you are 
going to pay for it out of your own pocket, or you were going to pay for 
it based on security you provided to your lender outside Vietnam', he 
said. 
Magennis concluded his presentation by noting that capital 
investment was needed in state-owned companies. On the basis of 
his discussions with senior investment officials and the chief legal 
adviser of the SCCI (Professor Luu Van Oat), Magennis estimated 
that perhaps US$4 billion in gold and foreign currency lay 'under 
the mattress' or 'buried in backyards' in Vietnam. Vietnam would 
need to develop a banking infrastructure, a stock exchange and 
develop a psychology of trust by the people in these institutions 
before such funds would be invested. 
The third speaker, Brian Weir, offered a comparative 
assessment of Vietnam's legal system based on his experience in 
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Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. He began by pointing out 
that many of Vietnam's problems could be found elsewhere in the 
region and this had not necessarily inhibited foreign investment and 
trade. He also acknowledged that there was a wide administrative 
discretion in relation to the enforcement and administration of most 
of Vietnam's laws. It was not difficult to get a legal judgment or 
administrative decision, but it was most difficult to be certain that 
one's contract would be enforced. 
Weir also noted that there were problems with land ownership. 
But this too must be put into context. In his view, Vietnam had come 
a long way in a short period of time and was catching up fast with 
its neighbours. 'It will not be long before its legal system is every bit 
as good as the legal system that we see in Indonesia and Thailand', 
he stated. By way of example he noted the 'spectacular enactment of 
commercial legislation' in Vietnam. He recalled that four years ago, 
when he first went to Vietnam, he could count on one hand the 
number of laws that were relevant to commercial activity. By way 
of contrast, there is now an entire volume published on laws which 
apply to foreigners. There are probably three or four volumes which 
relate to specifically domestic commerce in Vietnam, he said. 
Weir noted that there are always risks when people make 
investments and that you cannot be sure that a contract will be 
enforced. At the moment, he said, enforcement has not been tested in 
Vietnam. 'In Indonesia, the first advice I would ever give to a 
foreigner if he got into trouble is do not bother going to court', he 
added. 
Weir then compared the system of land ownership in Vietnam 
with Indonesia. He offered his opinion that he did not think it was 
essential for Vietnam to convert the entire country into some sort of 
land ownership system overnight. Indonesia had not done so. It still 
retained one of the most archaic land use systems that one could ever 
read about, he commented. Indonesia still had an almost non­
existent mortgage rule in relation to a lot of land use. But what 
Indonesia had managed to do was to focus on commercial uses of land 
and find a way to make that land useful commercially. The 
Indonesian land title systems worked in urban areas, and it worked 
in relation to factories. Weir concluded that Indonesia was probably 
a better model for Vietnam to look at than the Torrens land title 
system, which would carve up the country into title blocks. 
During the Update Conference David Marr asked the question: 
are Australian investors going to be like carp, happy to swim in 
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muddy water, or will they look for clear water? By way of 
conclusion Brian Weir answered this question in this way: 'Banks do 
not lend in muddy water and boards and directors of major 
Australian corporations do not invest in muddy water. If you want 
investment from banks and major corporations you will have to have 
a legal system in Vietnam which allows these investors to make 
justifiable commercial decisions. Muddy water encourages a lot of 
carpetbaggers. By and large, most Australian companies either need 
money from their banks or they need to justify the investment to the 
board of directors.' 
During question time Weir responded to a query about self­
regulation. According to him, the fact that there are no laws in 
Vietnam does not mean you have an unregulated society. Vietnam is 
a highly-regulated society, and the people have a psychology that 
unless the law says you can do something, there is a general 
perception among the bureaucracy that you can not do it. In his view, 
Indonesia was similar to Vietnam except it was a few years ahead. 
Vietnam's problem is similar to what Indonesia experienced. Four 
years ago the government began telling people 'you can do whatever 
you want to do unless there is a law which says you can not' . That 
message caused a psychological shift in the minds o f  the 
bureaucrats. 
According to Weir, 'That's one of the big changes where you talk 
of Vietnam moving to a rule of law, and it has to occur 
predominantly at the bureaucratic level. The average free­
wheeling Vietnamese businessman, and there are a lot of them, are 
prepared to do anything they can. But there is a problem of getting 
things from the State Bank and other bureaucracies, because there is 
a need to see something in wri ting that allows them to give 
permission before they give their consent.' 
The last speaker, Noel Fabri, briefly addressed the issue of 
legal practice in Vietnam's petroleum sector. Investment, he noted, 
takes place under the Foreign Investment Law through negotiation 
of what is called a business cooperation contract, or more 
specifically a production sharing contract. 
A production sharing contract is a comprehensive document 
entered into between a private investor and Petro Vietnam, the 
national oil company. The production sharing contract establishes 
the legal regime by which investment takes place. It is the system 
based on both private and public law between the two parties. A 
production sharing contract is only a framework document and needs 
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to be supplemented by government regulation and by adequate 
domestic and international mechanisms which guarantee the 
investment by a foreign investor. 
According to Fabri, there is a need for a petroleum law, for a tax 
regime to control the tax on petroleum products, and for 
environmental regulation. Finally, Vietnam will need to examine 
all the international conventions which are in place and decide to 
which it should become a party. Vietnam has taken the bold step of 
signing a number of bilateral investment treaties and these are very 
important to foreign investors. 
The papers delivered to the 1992 Vietnam Update conference, as 
well as the presentations made by invited panelists, clearly 
indicate that the objective of transforming the Vietnamese state 
into a state under the 'rule of law' is a long-term one. Vietnam cannot 
uncritically import foreign models and apply them to its socio­
economic setting. Vietnamese policy-makers must first take into 
account not just current international practice, but a variety of other 
factors including Vietnamese culture and psychology. Laws imported 
into Vietnam must be grafted onto administrative and legal 
traditions formed on the basis of village custom, Confucian practice, 
French colonial rule and Soviet notions of 'socialist legality'. This 
will require a gradual, step-by-step approach. 
The process of transforming Vietnam into a state under the rule 
of law is intimately related to the process of socio-economic 
renovation now underway. Vietnam, despite its undoubted success in 
developing a multi-sector market economy, remains a poor 
developing country. It lacks both the human and capital resources to 
transform dramatically its capacities to make law, to enforce the 
law and to adjudicate disputes. However, Vietnam's circumstances 
are not unique, as the experience of other Southeast Asian states 
indicates. Vietnam, as noted by participants at the Update, has 
moved faster than some countries when they were at a comparable 
state, and is rapidly closing the ground on others who have had a 
head start. 
PART 1 
SOCIO-EC ONOMIC SETTING 
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The Vietnamese Economy in 1992: 
Development and Prospects 
Adam Fforde 
Introduction 
Nineteen ninety-two is 'year four' of the Vietnamese market 
economy, if we date t hat beast from the abolition of 
central-planning in 1989. About this there should be more debate. 
After the rather esoteric 'transitional model' of 1981-89, however, 
Vietnam's post-1989 economic opportunities and constraints are not 
so different from those of other mixed economies. 
Economic performance in 1990 and 1991 was mixed. Inflation 
returned and the monetary system remained weak. Both of these 
problems were to do with the use of cheap credits and tax breaks to 
support the state sector. Whether this was done as part of a 
deliberate strategy to buy time and ease adjustment costs, we do not 
yet know. Certainly by the end of 1991 large numbers of lossmaking 
state units had been closed or shifted to other forms. The two-tier 
banking system remained hamstrung by the need to respect the needs 
of the state sector. The expression in market terms of this were the 
government-imposed distortions of interest rates: lending rates to 
the state sector were fixed lower than savings deposit rates, and 
lower than those charged to other sectors. The impact of this 
priority upon rural development was also bad: the 'new deal' called 
for by the Vietnam Communist Party's Decree No. 10, which 
effectively decollectivized the Mekong Delta and savagely cut the 
powers of cooperatives elsewhere, was not seen. Rural credit, market 
stabilization etc remained very weak. The domestic rice price has 
see-sawed, and terms of trade facing farmers have deteriorated (see 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 and Appendix B). 
Under the surface, however, private capital and autonomous 
state capital was developing rapidly. Joint ventures were emerging, 
often as the 'spontaneous privatization' (sometimes overt, 
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sometimes not) of the state sector. Retail trade became dominated by 
the private sector. Foreign capital started to come in rather large 
volumes (perhaps $500million in 1991), adopting joint venture forms 
similar to domestic capital. Regional investors, therefore, did far 
better since they could find ways of reducing risk at acceptable cost. 
Vietnam's integration into the world economy accelerated. With 
the borders basically open - smuggling was extensive - Vietnam's 
comparative advantages could be easily exploi ted. Trade with 
China blossomed, integrating north Vietnam into the powerful 
development processes occurring in the south. Ho Chi Minh City 
started to expand textile and other light industrial exports. Marine 
agricultural and forestry exports grew. And oil production soared 
(reaching around 40 per cent of Vietnamese exports in early 1992). 
The expectation was for these trends to strengthen and form the 
basis for rather rapid, if chaotic, growth. The political influence of 
the state business interest was seen as a major constraint upon the 
emergence of the strong institutions that would be needed for rapid 
and stable growth. This pointed to political tensions. 
Three main questions were provoked by these changes: 
• what do these trends indicate for the state of the country when 
large scale assistance recommences? 
• what do current trends indicate for the medium term rural 
development outlook? 
• would the Vietnamese polity be able to cope with the immense 
strains of market oriented development without an 
accompanying political evolution? 
Let us come back to these at the end of the discussion. 
Economic development in 1992 
Economic development in 1992 has so far followed the broad pattern 
forecast. Appendix A gives a summary in note form of the most 
important events. Economic analysts are now much more optimistic 
than before about the government's capacity to deal with the issue 
of the efficiency of the state sector and the speed of growth of the 
private sector in the capital-scarce north. On the other hand, the 
forecasts for export growth in 1992 appear unlikely to be borne out, 
partly because of underreporting to avoid controls. Cash crop exports 
remain in some areas below expectations. Evidence for deepening 
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rural problems in certain regions - especially the uplands - is 
mounting; land use conflicts in the deltas are a knotty problem that 
is difficult for the government to address, and which impact upon 
the important issue for foreign investors of land property. 
A very broad conclusion to be reached about 1992 so far, however, 
is that in the short- to medium-term, the problems facing the 
economy are to a great extent now no longer systemic. Instead, it is 
the weakness of market growth, and the slow development of the 
rural economy, that are the main issues. These are not things that 
can be addressed rapidly by government action. 'Normal' macro­
economics largely explains the problems of the second half of 1992, 
and especially the slowdown in output growth. However, the 
pattern of growth confirms that the state sector has to a very great 
extent been 'weaned' from its last remaining source of subsidy -
cheap credit. 
Against this background the evolving pattern of regional 
development remains of great interest. In a still largely rural 
country, it is the villages upon which much of the power structure 
should depend. In the second section we look at a number of long-term 
features : the retail  market and variations in  educational  
participation and attainment. Economic analysts are increasingly 
bullish about the north's long-term prospects as the economic system 
continues to improve and the favourable basic fundamentals 
therefore able to express themselves more forcefully through the 
operation of market forces. That this should occur when the prime 
minister and the economic chief (Vo Van Kiet and Pham Van Khai) 
are both southerners is striking. 
Weaning the state sector 
Economic growth in the first half of 1992 showed an extremely 
interesting turn of events, and a rather unexpected success in the 
reform process. 
There are good arguments for noting the importance - generally 
against the national interest - of the state business interest in the 
Vietnamese political economy (see Fforde 1 993). Supported by 
subsidized credits and tax breaks, through 1989-91 the sector was 
receiving around 90 per cent of credits from the state commercial 
banks. Farmers were crying out for loans, yet received almost 
nothing, forcing them to borrow at high rates on the informal 
market. Despite an overall policy thrust that sought to shift the 
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sector to a 'level playing field' basis, moves in this direction were 
proving very difficult. Attention was focussed upon systemic reforms, 
initially of the state banking system, and then of state enterprises. 
Neither of these ventures had turned out successfully, not least 
because the high existing level of subsidy meant that the interests 
of key actors were opposed to such changes. 
The run-up to Tet in early 1992 saw US dollar and gold dealers 
caught in a classic 'bear squeeze' (see Figure 1 .2) .  Rather than 
falling sharply in the weeks before Tet, the dong started to increase 
in value, forcing speculators to unwind 'short' positions and tipping 
expectations against the dollar and gold. 
The government continued to sell dollars and gold through the 
first two quarters. This, added to a reduction in imports and 
continued export growth, resulted in an average level of the dollar 
through the first half of 1992 some 40 per cent below that of the 
second half of 1991 (see Figure 1). 
A large number of state enterprises entered 1992 with new 
equipment and reorganized management structures. This drew upon 
the successful 'trial by fire' of 1989-91, which saw many close down. 
Many state enterprises were also benefitting from spontaneous 
privatization and foreign joint ventures . Their goods were 
increasingly competitive on both price and quality grounds.  They 
therefore planned to increase output substantially in order to capture 
market share. However, through the second half of 1991 the rise in 
the US dollar (some 40 per cent compared with the first half year) 
had eroded margins. This had, to some extent been offset by 
subsidized credit. 
To 'wean the state sector' , the authorities therefore found that 
through the first and second quarters cash flow and profitability 
greatly improved. This enabled the state sector to increase its tax 
and levy payments and also pay off part of its outstanding unpaid 
debts. The improvement in margins from the fall in the dollar 
greatly helped this. However, much of this financial flow was 
effectively diverted from the state sector to the state budget, 
without (and this is probably the crucial point) encountering much 
resistance. The baby was thus given hot chocolate to encourage it to 
let go 
At the same time, ginger was applied in a number of ways. The 
exchange rate used for calculating equipment depreciation charges 
was devalued, thus increasing the cost of state capital to state 
enterprises. Furthermore, as the rate of inflation declined real 
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interest rates charged to the state sector rose sharply. Early in the 
third quarter interest rates were reduced, but they were still - and 
this is very significant - kept very positive in real terms. The 
reason given was the need to increase national savings mobilization. 
As the first half year finished, the rapid growth of the first two 
quarters was running out of momentum. Demand had not grown fast 
enough, either in export markets, or domestically. Stocks therefore 
started to rise, and complaints were increasingly made about the 
high levels of smuggling and competition from imports. The latter 
discussions were related to the tum-around in relations with China 
as well as the confusion in Cambodia. However, there has been no 
significant shift towards a strong trade protection. Indeed, a trend 
towards a low revenue tariff designed to ensure high collections is 
more likely. That is certainly the advice the Vietnamese are 
getting from the World Bank and others. 
It is in this light that the sharp slowdown in Ho Chi Minh City 
in the third quarter should be seen. Just why domestic demand had 
been growing so slowly is rather complicated, but the point seems to 
be that the appreciation of the dong created favourable 
circumstances for the government to 'wean the state sector', which 
found itself going into the second half year facing weaker markets 
and positive real interest rates, but with continued output growth. 
The analysis of the budgetary and financial position of the 
government in the first six months shows how the situation had 
stabilised compared with 1990 and 1991 . 
The conclusion to be reached, therefore, is that the failure of the 
equitization and corporatization drives to make any significant 
headway so far hides a remarkable success in attacking the most 
important remaining source of subsidy to the state sector - cheap 
credit. This success appears to have been partly deliberate and 
partly accidental, but certainly assisted by the favourable effects 
upon state sector cash flow of the appreciation of the dong and the 
rapid output growth of the first two quarters. It should also be put 
beside the large scale development of joint ventures 'under the 
table', in some cases amounting to the effective privatization of 
state enterprises -according to some guesses, at 50 per cent in the 
south and 30 per cent in the north. 
Looked at over a longer time horizon, it appears that the period 
1989-92 has, as in other 'Young Tigers' been years of a rapid learning 
process prompted by a crisis lit by severe aid cuts (South Korea and 
Taiwan). In this process, the government and the Party seem to have 
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drawn upon the experience of the 1980s and especially the costs and 
dangers of interfering with the free market. Whether this analysis 
is correct or not will be easily gauged by observing what happens to 
the real rate of interest charged to state enterprises. It should stay 
positive. The recent experiences with the electricity price rise 
suggest that much has already been learnt about how to assess cries 
for assistance from the state sector. 
The success in 'weaning' the state sector from subsidized credit 
opens the way for the government to address a number of issues that 
have been 'on the agenda' for some time. Here the apparent recovery 
in tax revenue growth in the first two quarters is another important 
sign, for without resources little can be done. 
The appreciation of the dong during the first two quarters was 
unexpected. Figure 1 .2 shows how the rate peaked at just under 
14,000 and then stabilized around 1 1,000 by mid-year. This had two 
main consequences . The fall was not fast enough to give a 
year-on-year appreciation ( see Figure 1 . 1 ) , but on a 
quarter-on-quarter basis the shift between the final quarter of 1991 
and the first quarter of  1992 was dramatic (see Figure 1 .3). Rather 
than the depreciation of nearly 30 per cent they had experienced in 
the final quarter, traders found the dong appreciating by some 8 per 
cent. Since expectations were for a continued decline, this meant that 
US dollars were around one third cheaper than expected through 
the first half of 1992. This had normal effects upon the price 
competitiveness of exports and imports. Secondly, however, it had a 
sharp impact upon the demand for Ml-type monetary assets, 1 which 
in Vietnam include US dollars and gold as well as domestic currency. 
As demand for US dollars and gold declined, demand for dong 
increased, reducing the inflationary impact of the fiscal deficit. In 
this way general macro-economic stability was enhanced at the 
same time as the systemic reforms progressed - a similar pattern to 
1989 (and of interest if people want to reflect on the events of 1985). 
1 MI refers to basic currency (cash) plus trading bank deposits, that is 
demand (cheques) deposits. 
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Employment and wages 
It is striking to note that real wages have kept up. The overall 
supply demand balance for labour in the main urban centres have 
been such as to prevent any major shift against t.he interests of labour. Real incomes have been rising, and on the whole employment 
creation has matched job losses in the declining state sectors. 
However, as output growth slowed in early 1992, and bearing in 
mind the slower than expected pace of light industrial export 
growth, government worries remain. Appendix B shows the current 
levels of wages in a number of areas - northern rates are already 
well below those in the south. It was reported that one effect of the 
power cuts in Ho Chi Minh City in the second quarter was to push 
Chinese garment industry capital up to the north, where they were 
apparently surprised by the potential offered, and the lower wages. 
This led to some renegotiations when they returned south once power 
supplies improved. 
Farmers ' woes 
Figures 1 .4 and 1 .5 show how the position of rice farmers has been 
hit. Appendix C shows the fall in their terms of trade compared 
with the middle of 1992. However, domestic prices are now around 
25 per cent below world market prices, making exports profitable at 
the 10,000-1 1 ,000 exchange rate level. 
Retail sales 
The Vietnamese retail sales market grew very rapidly in 1 990-91 . 
This was partly because there were important asset shifts from gold 
and dollar hoards into durable goods, but also because much of the 
rapid expansion of petty production was recorded as retail sales. It 
is interesting to note the regional distribution, and also the limited 
size of the market. Figures 1 .6 and 1 .9 show this. It implies that 
both foreign investors and Vietnamese businesses will depend 
greatly upon export markets for any rapid development that occurs. 
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Regional educational differences 
Figures 1 . 7  and 1 .8 point to the wide differences in educational 
participation and attainment throughout the country. These show 
that the north - including the mountain regions which face great 
difficulties - has higher rates of schooling than the south, even Ho 
Chi Minh City. In some provinces of the Mekong Delta around one­
third of primary school pupils fail their matriculation exams. 
Conclusions 
The weaning of the state sector in early 1992, if sustainable, will 
have profound effects upon the evolution of the Vietnamese 
political economy. In allowing government attention and resources to 
concentrate upon more important and deserving areas -especially 
agriculture and the private sector, and in reducing the attraction of 
the state form to private capital seeking joint ventures it is highly 
positive. 
In returning to the questions asked at the start, therefore, one 
can sketch out the following replies: 
what do these trends indicate for the state of the country when 
large-scale assistance recommences? They suggest that the 
capacity for absorbing resources, from around 1993 (once the state 
wage reforms have been pushed through), is rather good. 
what do current trends indicate for the medium term rural 
development outlook? If the state can now adopt significant 
efforts to develop rural incomes, mainly through infrastructural 
and market support, combined with getting local monopolies off 
the backs of farmers, then the outlook is good . Rural 
differentiation is an issue that will depend upon two factors 
amongst many: the speed of non-agricultural job creation, and 
the measures taken by the Vietnam Communist Party to develop 
viable local political institutions. 
would the Vietnamese polity be able to cope with the immense 
strains o f  market oriented development without an 
accompanying political evolution? The existing political 
evolution is substantial, and the emergence of a relatively 
autonomous technocratic group is starting to become arguable 
(Wade 1 990). 
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Append ix A 
Tlte first six mo11tlts of 1 992: the most important el•ents 
G eneral econ o m ic sta bi l ity ; growth st i l l  rather s low - G D P  up around 6-7% on 
the yea r in t h e  fi rst six months  - much of th i s  reflect ing recovery in agricu lture after 
early 1 99 1  ha rvest fa i lu re. Polit ical evolution on trend to 'better government' supported by 
revealed Com m un ist Party support for shift in developm ent priorities away from focus upon 
state sector. Fai lure of 'corporat isation' drive rather unim portant as piecemeal measures to raise' 
efficiency of state sector bear fru it .  
Contin ued h i gh level o f  foreign inward in vestment  - around S 250-300 mn in total 
disbursements in the s i x  months - near 2 % of G D P  . .  
Inflation m u ch slower. Average monthly price rise :  2 . 1 % - year on year rate down 
to 3 6% by June ( 1 99 1  average: 4. 5%); average year-on-year rise for first two quarters: + 48%. 
Vietnamese Dong appreciated, contrary to expectations, rising from around 1 2 ,500 to below 
1 1 ,000 (previous trough : near 1 4 ,000, November 1 99 1 )  - average appreciation year-on-year in 
first half: + 40%. Therefore a loss of competitiveness. 
Domestic demand w ea k  - retail sales up around 5% in \'Olume terms - and not yet 
replaced by stable export m arkets. Output gro�·th high in fi rst two quarters but slowing 
into second h alf. 
Strong recovery in agricultu ral output: up around 1 6% on the year. Rice harvest for 
the year now forecast at nearly 2 1  mn tonnes, up 1 .2 mn tonnes - 6% - on 1 99 1 .  Rice exports 
in first two quarters around 600,000 tonnes - m ainly from stocks. Domestic rice price fall ing,  
farmers h it by m argin squeez.e. Mekong delta rice production flat . 
Industrial growth medium paced and well-balanced : strong growth in oil and large 
government projects; total reported industrial growth around 1 7% year-on-year. Centrally­
managed State sector: 30% ;  locally-managed - 5%. Wide regional differences : Hanoi + 1 9% ;  
Ho C h i  M inh City + 1 4% ;  Haiphong + 3 3%; Quang Nam - Da N ang + 1 0%. P rivate sector, 
especially in north, surting to show rapid growth: Hanoi up around 30% on the year . 
Foreign trade disappointing: exports only up around 1 0% on the year despite a 45% 
volume growth in oil  exports and a doubling of rice exports (total trade data probably an 
underestim ate) and im ports slowing shaq>ly (down around 2 0% on the year) - reported trade 
surplus for first six m onths of around S 1 50 mn. 
Fiscal position much improved: state revenues growing far faster than inflation (up 
around 1 30% on the year in value terms) and also quicker than state spending (up around 1 0% 
on the year in value term s). Fiscal deficit before interest payments therefore declined to an 
estim ated S 80 orn - around 1 % of GDP. 
Refo rm s :  m ajor step forward with ending of subs id ised cred i t  to state sector. 1 11 1 crc s t  
rates cut  in third quarter but st i l l  posit ive in real term s 
The Vietnamese economy in 1 992 
Append ix B 
Farmers ' margin squeeze, 7191 to 7192 
Paddy 
7/9 1 - 1 ,800 d/kg 
7/92 - 1 , 1 00 d/kg 
Price fal l :  - 39% 
Inputs :  
Petrol  
7/9 1 - 2,800 d/litre 
7/92 - 2 ,5 50 
Price fal l  - 1 1 % 
Urea 
7 /9 1 - 2 ,700 -2 ,800 d/kg 
7/9 2 - 2 ,200 d/kg 
Price fall : - 20% 
Some Wage Levels 
(Vietnamese Factories) 
37 
Ordinary engineering workers: 70 - 1 00,000 dong/month; in factories earning high profits, this 
usual ly rises to 1 50-200,000 dong. Similar wages are paid in meta l l urgy , power and electronics. 
Textiles and clothing workers (low ski l ls) :  1 00 - 1 50,000 dong m the nonh and centre; in the 
south this can go to 1 50 -200,000 dong. 
Construction workers: 5 -7 ,OOO dong/day for low skilled workers; for ski l led workers this rises 
to 1 0 - 1 2 ,000 dong and for the most skil led 1 5 -20,000 dong/day .  
For food processing workers (especially beer and tobacco), for those i n  trade and service 
industries involving foreigners wages rise to 400- 700,000 dong/month. The key workers can cam as 
much as, or more than 1 mn dong/month. 
Wages in factories doing pulling-out and contract work for foreigners usually earn 300-500,000 
dong/month. 
The minimum wage for Vietnamese workers in joint ventures 1s U S  S 30-38 a month. 
Source ADUK! Pty Ltd. 
App endix C 
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The economic crisis of the 1980s and the reform process ini tiated at  
the Sixth Party Congress in 1 986, known as doi moi, has been well 
documented and discussed. The effects of these changes on the 
health sector will be the focus of this paper. 
Background 
The health sector is organized at four levels - central , province, 
district and commune. Generally speaking, each level is financed by 
the people's committee of the same level , which also exerts varying 
degrees of pol itical influence and control .  The nature of the 
relationship between the di fferent levels of the health service and 
between the health service and the people's committee continues to 
change with the ongoing introduction of economic and management 
reforms. The current situation is a transi tional phase which varies 
from one province to another and wi th time. Suffice to say, at  this 
stage, that provinces are largely self-funding and are sometimes 
able to operate with a surprising degree of independence. Only about 
1 0  per cent of total health expendi ture derives from central level 
funds and most of this is spent on central level institutions and 
hospitals .  Additionally, the vertical national programmes, such as 
the immunization programme, are centrally fu nded and poor 
provinces which cannot meet the calculated 'norms' for health 
expenditure receive some subsidy from the centre. This  process goes 
some way towards smoothing the differences between provinces in 
resource a vailabil i ty for heal th, bu t does not by any means 
eliminate the differences . For example, Ho Chi Minh Ci ty, which 
raises the largest proportion of cen tral government revenue, has four 
Health and the current situation and recent changes 39 
times the average per capita expenditure on health while some 
provinces (not by any means the poorest) spend less than half the 
average (see Table 2 .1 ) .  
Table 2.1: Provincial Health Budget Per Cap ita (1990) 
Province Dong per capita Province Dong Per capita 
Minh Hai 3,900 Kien Giang 2,800 
Hau Giang 3,500 Cuu l..ong 2,400 
Ben Tre 3,200 Tien Giang 4,600 
An Giang 1,700 Dong Thap 3,800 
Long An 3,900 Vung Tau-Con Dau 8,500 
Dong Nai 3,300 Tay Ninh 4,000 
Song Be 4,400 Ho Chi Minh City 13,800 
Lam. Dong 3,600 Dae Lac 4,100 
Gia Lai - Kon Tum 7,500 Thuan Hai 4,400 
Khanh Hoa 3,800 Phu Yen 4,000 
Binh Dinh 3,600 Quang Ngai 3,1 00 
Quang Nam Da Nang 6,1 00  Thua-Thien Hue 2,1 00 
Quang Tri 4,900 Quang Binh 3,200 
Nghe Tinh 3,1 00 Thanh Hoa 2,400 
Ha Nam Ninh 2,500 Thai Binh 1 ,200 
Hai Hung 3,000 Ha Son Binh 3,200 
Hai Phong 5,1 00 Ha Noi 4,600 
Ha Bae 1 ,900 Vinh Phu 2,900 
Quang Ninh 5,400 Son La 4,500 
Bae Thai 3,300 Hoang Lien Son 3,400 
Lai Chau 5,500 Lang Son 4. 000 
Cao Bang 4,200 Ha Tuyen 3,200 
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About 80 per cent of total heal th expenditure is spent at province 
and district level . Management and organizational changes at these 
levels are currently under way which profoundly effect the control 
and channelling of funds between district and province. The commune 
level, which is the main provider of both curative and preventative 
health services to the communi ty, is supposed to be entirely funded 
by local (i .e. communal) resources .  Since this is considered 'outside' 
state funds, is not subject to the 'norms' and controls of the other 
levels and is not reported to the central level, details of health 
expenditure at this level vary considerably but have been estimated 
at 10 to 20 per cent of total health expenditure. Before Decree No. 
1 0, which rad ical ly changed the role of the agri cul tural 
cooperative, the commune supported an extensive social sector 
ranging from creches, schools and cultural activi ties to large numbers 
of healthworkers at both the commune heal th station and in the 
work brigades ( 'brigade nurses ' ) .  With the virtual demise of the 
cooperati ve structures, the commune was unable to continue to 
support that level of expenditure, most brigade nurses returned to 
ful l  time agriculture; heal th station staff were also compelled to 
take on other income generating activi ties as their salaries were 
consistently postponed for lack of funds. Eventual ly, in 1 989, the 
central government directed, in Decree No. 1 23, that the 'state' (i .e. 
province or district) would pay the salaries of three healthworkers 
in each commune (with provision for extra heal thworkers in large 
communes).  The commune would continue to be responsible for all 
other expenses including equipment, drugs and buildings. 
Health status and disease 
It is striking that Vietnam, as one of the poorest countries in the 
region, has in fact achieved considerable improvements in the 
health status of the population over the last three decades, to the 
extent that many health indica tors are comparable to those of 
higher income countries . However, there are also areas where the 
effects of the poverty and international isolation of  the last two 
decades are easily seen. Health indicators such as infant mortality 
(45 / 1 ,000 births)  and l ife expectancy at  birth (65 years) are 
comparable to those of middle-income countries of the region 
(National Census, 1 989. This is at least in part due to the extensive 
and comprehensive health network established in the north during 
the 1 950s and 1 960s and extended to the south after reunification 
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(see Table 2 .2 ) .  This also gives Vietnam health service provision 
indicators well above the norm for its  i ncome level (eg. one 
doctor /2,694 people compared to one/9,460 in Indonesia, 166 health 








Tab le 2.2: The Health Ne twork 
No. of hospitals 
/million pop. 
5 . 1  
4 .2  
1 3 .8 
20.1 
1 2 .2 
1 1 .9 
No. of Health St . 
/million pop. 





Source: Ulrich Vogel, The Whole of Vietnam Can Be Considered as One Well­
Designed Project -Some Reflections on Primary Health Care Experiences in 
Vietnam, 1 945-1 985.  University of  Swansea, Master thesis, 1 987; and 
Ministry of Health. 
Table 2.3 Literacy by Age and Sex 
Per Cent Literate 
Age group Male Female Total 
10-14 94 93 94 
15-24 94 93 94 
25-34 96 93 94 
35-44 96 90 92 
45-54 94 79 86 
55-64 89 61 74 
65+ 73 31 48 
To ta l 93 84 88 
Source: National Census, 1989. 
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An additional factor contributing favourably to some health 
status indicators mu st be the high l evel of ed ucation of the 
population, especially women (88 per cent of the total population is 
literate, the figure for women under 45 years is more than 90 per 
cent) as well as the considerable steps taken to improve the sta tus 
and position of women over the last 40 years (see Table 2.3). 
However, other statistics indicate that for all the achievements 
there are areas where aspects of health are well below tha t 
expected and a lso wh ere heal th status and services are 
deteriorating. The most striking of these is nutri tion, where, in spite 
of the dramatic improvemen ts made in food production and 
household income since the Sixth Party Congress of 1986, surveys 
stil l  show high levels of malnu trition amongst children (45 per cent 
of children malnourished, weight-for-age, 56 per cent height-for­
age), which may also be increasing (see Table 2 .4) .  For a proportion 
of these children, malnutrition starts before birth with 20 per cent of 
infants born weighing less that 2,500 kg in 1 990. It is worth noting 
that the predominate form of malnutri tion is not acute malnutri tion 
(i .e .  'starvation' ) or wasting manifest in low weight-for-age bu t the 
chronic effect of prolonged undernutrition manifest in stunting or low 
height-for-age. Both types will have detrimental effects on health 
and i ntel lec tual d evel opmen t .  Defic iencies o f  v i tamin A 
(ultimately causing blind ness), iron (resul ting in anaemia) and 
iodine (causing goitre and cretinism) are also common in certain 
sectors of the population . There is no na tional nutri tion programme 
and both grow th-moni toring of children and antenatal care for 
pregnant women are rare. Most communes lack both the equipment 
and training to carry out these essential routines. 
The main causes of disease are, as expected, infectious diseases; 
in particular malaria (which is currently increasing sharply), 
followed by diarrhoea and respiratory infec tions . The World 
Health Organization reports a 200 per cent increase in the number of 
reported dea ths from malaria in the last five years and add that 
the actual number of deaths is probably ten to twenty times greater. 
Malaria is not yet the main problem in much of the country but is 
increasing and spread ing from pockets in the mountains and 
highlands, border areas, sou th coastal areas and where there are 
large popula tion movements such as demobilising soldiers and 
migration to and from the new economic zones. Another potentially 
fatal mosquito-borne disease which is increasing in some areas is 
dengue fever; efforts to control mosquitoes and reduce the chance of 
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being bitten would combat both diseases. Water-borne diseases such 
as gas tro-enteri tis, dysentery, hepa ti t is, intestinal parasi tes, 
typhoid and cholera take a considerable toll of health status, 
particularly of children. The problems of malnutri tion in children 
mentioned above are compounded by frequent episodes of diarrhoea 
and heavy parasi te loads causing anaemia. 
Table 2 .. 4: Percentage of Children (Under 5 Years) Malnourish ed 
1 9 82-1 985 1 986 -1 987 1 988-1 989 
Age % malnourished % malnourished % malnourished 
Group Weight Height Weight Height Weight Height 
(mnths) for age for age for age for age for age for age 
0 - 1 1 2 1 . 7  21 .5 1 9 .6 28 .2 24.5 4 1 .3  
12 - 23 59 0 61 .3 45 . 3  50 .0 43.8 5 7 . 9  
24 - 35 62.0  64 .7  50 .4 55 .4 5 1 .4 5 5 . 1  
36 - 47 56.9 68 .3 46 .9 56 .8 49 .8 6 0 .0 
48 - 59 55.0  71 .8  47 .1  55 .6 50 .3 64 .5  
0 - 59 52.2 59 . 7  41 .8 49 . 1  45.0 56.5 
Source: National Institute of  Nutrition, and various surveys. 
There is considerable need for further efforts to improve the 
quality of water and sanitation. Less than half the urban population 
has access to piped water; less than 10 per cent of the rural 
population has access to what is considered a safe and adequate 
water supply. The widespread practice of collecting and using 
human excreta on vegetable gardens and for fish-raising increases 
the exposure to fecal pathogens as well as making safer methods of 
disposal more difficult to introduce, due to the economic effects of 
the loss of organic fertilizer. Currently about 1 0  per cent of the rural 
population has a safe and hygienic latrine and 23 per cent of the 
urban population is connected to a sewage system. 
Control of population growth is a government priority and an 
economic necessi ty as population density, particularly in the Red 
River delta, reaches unsustainable level s with ever-decreasing 
alternatives available for out-migration. The popu lation growth 
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rate for the whole country was calculated at 2.1 per cent between 
1979 and 1989 (National Census 1989). Although the total fertility 
rate has fallen considerably (from 5.1  in 1 979 to 3.8 in 1 989) (see 
Tahle 2 .5 )  further falls in population growth rate will be hard-won 
due to the lag effect of the large numbers of women entering their 
childbearing age. The government aiqls to achieve a natural rate of 
population increase of 1 .7 per cent. Whether this is achieved or not, 
the addition of a further thirty million people to the 64 .4 million 
population over the next twenty-five years is inevitable and 
presents a daunting challenge. 
Profound limitations of the population programme are manifest 
at district and commune level . In areas outside the major ci ties, 
modern methods other than IUDs are rarely available; menstrual 
regulation and abortion are increasingly u sed as contracepti ve 
methods, to the detriment of women's heal th and health resources. 
Isolated examples of local initiatives at province level show that 
with effective distribution of and informa tion about alternative 
contraceptive methods the pa ttern of use of other methods changes 
ra pi dly .  
I t  should be mentioned here that, on the whole, the qual ity of 
both health workers and health facilities at all levels is very low; 
this has probably been fall ing off since 1975 when the cost  of 
improving health service provi sion in the south after reunification 
placed immense pressure on resources for health.  This was followed 
by the wi thdrawal of foreign aid by most Western countries and 
China in 1 978-79 and the economic crisis of the 1 980s which saw 
resources and the real value of salaries dwindle further. These 
economic factors are all likely to have reduced the level of 
investment in human and ma terial resources ( training and 
retraining, equipment, transport etc . ), the full effect of which would 
not become evident until the middle and late 1 980's .  These factors 
predate the introduction of doi moi, to which many people attribute 
the deterioration of heal th services . In fact, many of the current 
problems in the health sector such as lack of refresher training, 
deteriorating quality of healthworkers, lack of equipment and drugs 
and rundown buildings were present in 1988 and have since improved 
in some regions. There is additional evidence to suggest that in some 
areas at least, commune-level health services and conditions are 
now percei ved by both heal thworkers and commun i ty 
representatives as improving, suggesting that the trough has been 
reached and improvement is under way, in some provinces at least. 
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These tend to be the provinces which have addressed the retraining 
and management issues in good time. 
Table 2.5: Population Figures for Selected Provinces 1989 
Province Total Population Population 
Population Growth Rate Density / km2 
Mountain & Midland 10,068,000 2 .9 
Lang Son 61 1,000 2 .6 75.06 
Bae Thai 1 ,030,000 2 .6 1 58 .58 
Vinh Phu 1,807,000 2.9 395 .1 5 
Red River Delta 13,576,000 2.3 
Ha Noi 3,056,000 2.3 1426.7 
Hai Hung 2,445,000 2 .4 958 .07 
Thai Binh 1 ,632,000 1 .8 1050.87 
Central Coast (N) 8,573,000 2 .2 
Thanh Hoa 2,993,000 2.6 268. 1 4  
Nghe Tinh 3,583,000 2.4 159.07 
Central Coast (S)  6,655,000 2 .0 
Quang Ngai 1 ,042,000 1 .6 1 78 .06 
Phu Yen 642,000 2 .3 1 26.63 
Central Highlands 2,491 ,000 5 .8 
Gia Lai-Kon Tum 876,000 4 .3 34. 1 3  
North-east South 7,797,000 2.8 
Ho Chi Minh City 3,924,000 1 .9 1 ,878.41 
Song Be 938,000 3 .9 97.89 
Mekong Delta 14,171 ,000 1 .9 
Long An 1 ,1 20,000 1 .8 257.83 
An Giang 1 ,774,000 2.0 518 .26 
Hau Giang 2,681 ,000 2.0 434.87 
Minh Hai 1 ,555,000 2.6 203.1 1 
Whole country: 64,412,000 2 . 1  195.2 
Source: National Census, 1989. 
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Liberalization of the health sector 
The main measures introduced by the Council of Ministers in 1 989 
were: 
1 .  Introduction of fees for users of health services, with a long list 
of exemptions including children, war invalids and other 
handicapped people, families of healthworkers and very poor 
families if certified as such by the commune people' s 
committee. 
2 .  Legalization o f  private practice, including 'a fter-hours' 
private practice by state healthworkers using public health 
faci l i t i es . 
3. Direct sale of drugs on the open market to individuals as well 
as to heal thworkers and facil i ties . 
4 .  Liberalization o f  the pharmaceutical industry . 
5 .  Extent o f  the private sector and direct drug sales. 
Private practice does not seem to have become as popular as had 
been anticipated by many observers. Several surveys in bo th rural 
and urban areas have consisten tly shown tha t the commune health 
centre is still the most common place that health care is sought (see 
Table 2 .6) .  Private practice accounts for two to 1 5  per cen t (the 
higher figure is for the city of Hai Phong) of consultations; however, 
what is striking is the consistently high proportion (46-67 per cent) 
of people who self-treat with drugs bought in the market without 
consultation. 
This can be contrasted wi th a comparable figure of one per cent 
for a survey done just before the legalization of market drug sales 
(small quanti ties were available but il legal), 1 991 ). It seems that 
u nsupervi sed direc t drug sales have been substi tuted for 
consul tations, rather than priva te practice. This is both expensive 
and detrimental to personal health as inappropriate drugs are often 
sold in the wrong quantities and doses, side effects can be severe, 
particularly for children and the elderly, and it is said that there 
are a large number of fake drugs on the market. The practice also 
redu ces health service u ti liza tion when opportunistic health 
education, screening and preventative activi ties can be undertaken. 
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Table 2.6: Surveys on Health Seeking B ehaviour 
A. Three Districts in Vinh Phu, Thanh Hoa & Ha Tinh Districts 
1990 
What do they do if any member of their family falls ill?' 
Action Income Bracket 
Low Middle High To tal 
per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Nothing 8 6 6 6 
Buy medicine 40 56 67 55 
Traditional Drugs 61 1 2 2 
Call Physician 43 3 3 3 
To Health Centre 41 34 22 33 
To Hospital 1 0 0 0 
To Private Clinic 1 0 0 0 
Sou rce: Minis try of Health, Baseline Survey for the Bamako 
Initiative. 1 99 1 .  
B :  Household Survey of Three Wards in Hai Phong (Urban Area), 
1990 
Action taken by family when someone is sick. 
Action 
Buy medicine for self-treatment 
Consult private doctor 
Go to health clinic 
Go to polyclinic 
Go to district hospital 




1 5  
7 
7 
1 2  
3 
1 00 
Source: Ministry of Health, Strategy for the Protection of the 
Population 1 990-2000. 1 990. 
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C. Phu Luong District, B ae Thai Province, 1992 
With specific illness in the last two weeks, what did Phu Luong 





To commune health service 









Buy drugs/ traditional medicine 

















Source: Hanoi School of Med icine, Health Population and Socio­
Economic Conditions in Phu Luong District, Bae Thai Province. 1 992.  
Conclusion 
There is a scarcity of data and information on conditions in the 
health sector prior to 1 988. However, it seems likely from the trend 
in health indicators and what  li ttle evidence there is that the real 
crisis or low point for health services came in the 1 980s, following a 
period during the 1 960s and 1 970s of considerable improvement in 
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health care for most people in the north and after 1 975, in the south. 
The last three decades have seen a dramatic improvement in infant 
mortality rates and l i fe expectancy at birth as well as the 
establishment of an impressive heal th service network. The quality 
of care and physical resources deteriorated through the 1980s and 
may now be starting to recover through the implementation of 
retraining and management strategies for integrated primary 
health care, as well as the effective use of revenue (eg . user fees and 
drug fund profits) . The introduction of private practice and user fees 
has not changed health seeking behaviour as much as has the 
availability of drugs on the market, which is now the most common 
initial response to episodes of illness. Malnutri tion remains a major 
health problem even though real incomes and food production have 
both increased in the last three years . Infectious diseases associated 
with poor standards of wa ter su pply and sanitation as wel l as 
mosquito-borne diseases (malaria and dengue fever) are the main 
causes of morbidity, with malaria showing a steep recent increase 
associated with drug resistance and high death rate. 
3 
Recent Political Developments: 
Constitutional Change and the 1992 Elections 
Carlyle A. Thayer 
Introductionl 
Since at least 1986, Vietnam ha s been embarked on the path of 
political reform. This has led to increased freedom of expression, an 
attempt to revitalize mass organizations, a continuous campaign 
against  corrupt party officials, and a ttempts to improve the 
efficiency of state organs under a new system of law. As the current 
slogan puts it, paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln, Vietnam aims to 
create a state 'of the people, for the people and by the people' .  
Vietnam's reform efforts slowed noticeably in 1 989, with the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 
1 990, Vietnam banned discu ssi on of poli tical pluralism and 
dismissed its foremost inhouse advocate from the party's Politburo. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam's lead ers appear agreed on the need to 
continue economic renovation by continued internal reform and by 
opening Vietnam's door to the outside world, especially the free 
market economies of the Asia-Pacific region. 
In 1 992 political reform efforts focussed on two major areas : 
constitutional reform and Na tional Assembly elections. These will 
discussed in this chapter. 
Amending the state constitution 
The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe sparked debate 
within Vietnam about the causes of this unexpected turn of events. It 
1 Based on Thayer 1 992a, Chapter One. 
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also sparked intense discussion about the role of the Communist  
Party in Vietnamese society. Official interpretations concerning the 
collapse of communist regimes range from the 'strategy of peaceful 
evolu tion',  which blames the machi na tions of Ame ri can 
imperialism, to the corruption of top party leaders. The political 
debate in Vietnam was circumscribed by party officials who, in 1 990, 
banned public discussion of such issues as pluralism and multiparty 
democracy. 
The Seventh Party Congress (June 1991 )  conceded some ground to 
party cri tics in the matter of poli tical reform. But the congress 
rejected out of hand any criticism of the leading role of the Vietnam 
Communist Party (VCP) in society and the ultimate goal of building 
socialism in Vietnam. The congress acknowledged the need for 
gradual political reform and moved to manage the process carefully. 
Since the Seventh Congress the amendment of the 1 980 state 
consti tution has been the central focus of political reform efforts and 
public discussion in Vietnam. The 1 980 constitution has been 
amended only twice since its adoption. In December 1 988, the 
preamble was modified to drop hostile references to China and the 
United States. In June 1989, the National Assembly amended and 
supplemented seven minor articles. At the same time the National 
Assembly set up the Committee to Amend the Constitution (Uy Ban 
Sua Doi Hien Phap) under the chairmanship of the head of the 
State Council, Vo Chi Cong, to consider fundamental constitutional 
reform. 
The Committee to Amend the Constitution held eleven plenary 
sessions in the period up to July 1991 . It produced two confidential 
drafts, the first of which was considered by a special meeting 
comprising National Assembly deputies, high-ranking and 
medium-level cadres of all ministries, sectors, committees and mass 
organisations at the central and provincial levels, special zones and 
cities directly subordinate to the central government. The second 
draft was submitted to the ninth session (eighth legislature) of the 
National Assembly, which recommended that a third draft be 
prepared and issued to the public for discussion after which the 
Committee to Amend the Consti tution would prepare a final draft 
for adoption. 
The third draft of the constitu tion was released i n  late 
December 1 991 . After a period of several months' public discussion a 
fourth draft was prepared and submi tted to the eleventh session of 
the National Assembly which met in March 1 992. This draft was 
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subject to such close scrutiny, heated debate and amendment that the 
National Assembly had to extend its session by several days before 
the draft constitution (amended) could be adopted. This was done on 
15 April 1 992. The same session of the National Assembly also 
promulgated an electoral law and a law on the reorganization of the 
National Assembly. 
Contentious issues 
During the course of public discussion, it was clear that there were at 
least eight major contentious issues. The first concerned how the role 
of the Vietnam Communist Party in society should be described . At 
issue was the wording of Article 4 in the 1 980 Constitu tion, which 
described the VCP as 'the only force leading the state and society.' 
The third draft altered this by dropping the word 'only', so Article 
4 now reads the VCP 'is a leading force of the state and society' . The 
amended Article 4 also added as the next sentence, '[a] ll party 
organizations operate within the framework of the Consti tution and 
law' . At the eleventh National Assembly an attempt was made to 
al ter this last sentence to specify that all party members were 
subject to the law. This was rejected on the grounds that it was 
redundant as all party members were Vietnamese citizens and were 
subject to law anyway. The only other change to Article 4 was to 
expand the clause which sta ted that the pa rty fol lows 
Marxism-Leninism by including 'The Thoughts of Ho Chi Minh'. 
The second contentious issue concerned the doctrine of 'separation 
of powers' (executive, legislative, judicial) as found in the American 
Constitution. This was rejected at the outset by the VCP and the 
Committee to Amend the Consti tution. Advocates of the doctrine of 
the separation of powers were charged with attempting to weaken 
if not undermine one-party rule. The final version made clear that 
the National Assembly 'is the people's highest representative 
agency and the highest organ of state power of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. It is the sole constitutional and legislative 
agency . . .  The National Assembly exercises i ts supreme right of 
supervision over all operations of the state (Article 83) . '  In other 
words, the executive and judicial branches are not independent and 
are subordinate to the National Assembly. 
The third contentious issue involved the restructuring of the 
central state apparatus and the highest leadership bodies. This 
issue was disputatious because it  involved principles, pragmatism 
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and personalities. With the inauguration of doi moi in 1986, if not 
before, it was clear that Vietnam's state machinery was cumbersome 
and inefficient. The system of col lective leadership wa s no t 
working, as no one took individual responsibility for policy failures. 
In addi tion, too many senior party officials held dual o r  
overlapping positions i n  the government. This led to a paralysis i n  
state policy-making due t o  unclear lines o f  authority when a party 
member interfered in the running of the state bureaucracy. 
By the time the third draft of the constitution was drawn up, a 
consensus had emerged that the collective leadership system within 
the Council of Ministers was not working and should be replaced by a 
'one leader system' . A variety of options were considered before the 
Committee to Amend the Constitution opted for a prime ministerial 
system. The Council of Ministers was abolished and replaced by a 
prime minister and cabinet-type government. The prime minister 
was to be elected by the National Assembly and given the 
responsibility of appointing ministers, subject to National Assembly 
approval . The cabinet government was considered 'an executive 
organ of the National Assembly' and responsible to it. 
However, given constitutional changes in the Soviet Union and 
the various powers adopted by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Vietnamfs 
constitutional reformers had second thoughts about giving too much 
power to any one individual . Vietnam opted to balance the powers 
of the prime minister by creating the position of the prime minister 
by creating the position of state president with constitutionally 
designated powers . The president, who is head of state, is to be 
elected by the National Assembly and responsible to it .  The 
president will act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
chairman of the National Defence and Security Council .  He also 
will have the power to recommend dismissal of the prime minister, 
the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the chief procurator of the 
Supreme People's Organ of Control. Previously, Vietnam's Council of 
State was the collecti ve presidency of the country, with its 
chairman serving as a largely ceremonial head nf state. The Council 
of State has been abolished and replaced by a National Assembly 
Standing Committee, which will take charge of legislative affairs 
when the National Assembly is not in session. The position of 
chairman of the Standing Committee offers a potential third check 
on the powers of the president and prime minister. 
The fourth area of contention concerned human rights. Reformers 
noted that the 1 980 constitution made no mention of human rights 
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per se, and that its provisions for civil rights (freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, association and worship, for example) were formal 
and not observed in everyday practice. In the compromise which was 
hammered out, human rights were interpreted broadly, but were 
counterbalanced with an enumeration of the obl igations of 
citi�nship. Attempts to underline the importance of human rights 
by bringing the article forward in the constitution did not succeed. 
The third draft of the constitution stated that 'all human rights 
are res pected and protected .' In the version which was finally 
adopted (Article 50), this was amended to read, 'all human rights in 
the poli tical, civil,  economic, cultural and social fields are 
respected and manifested as citizens' rights stipulated in the 
constitu tion and law.'  Article 58 gave citizens the right to 
ownership and inheritance, while Article 68 guaranteed that 
Vietnamese citizens were free to travel both within Vietnam and 
overseas - 'as stipulated by law' . 
The fifth area of contention concerned provincial government, its 
organization and relationship to the central government. According 
to one non-communist technocrat, '[i ]t's a myth that we have a strong 
centralized government in Vietnam. Power has been decentralized to 
forty-eight provincial governments. You have forty-eight li ttle 
kingdoms . . .  ' (Bello 1 992) .  In an effort to overcome this, Vietnam' s 
reformers called for a thorough restructuring of Vietnam's system of 
local government. 
Previously local government was in the hand s of people's 
committees. These committees were the standing bodies of popularly 
elected people's council s .  In practice the local party machine 
controlled and ran the people's committees with little reference to 
the people's councils .  Reformers called for the breaking up of 
existing provinces into smaller units, to accord with the province 
structure existing prior to unification. They also called for people's 
committees to be renamed administrative committees. These were to 
be subordinated to the central government by giving the Prime 
Minister the right to appoint and to dismiss the chairman of the 
local committee. 
The 1 992 constitution reduced the size of local government while 
retaining its previous nomenclature. Although the prime minister 
was given the right to dismiss local leaders, he could only appoint 
them on the recommendation of the local people's council .  The 
National Assembly, which had approved a number of changes in 
provincial boundaries in 1 99 1 ,  decided not to proceed with the 
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further subdivision of existing units (see Appendix B which lists the 
new provinces). 
The sixth area of contention concerned the question of how to 
create a professional National Assembly deputy. The issue here was 
that the role of National Assembly deputy was not a full-time one 
(Nguyen Dien 1992:6-7). All deputies occupied two or· more positions 
in government, including directorships or board memberships in local 
state enterprises. There were huge demands on an individual's time, 
not to mention possible conflict of interest.  In the course of  
consti tutional debate, i t  was decided to reduce the number of  
deputies from 496 to  395. A certain proportion, to  be determined by 
law, were to be selected as full-time specialists based on specified 
criteria. These professional full-time deputies were to take charge 
of managing the affairs of seven National Assembly committees 
charged with responsibility for some aspect of Vietnamese society 
and external affairs . 
The seventh area of contention concerned the question of private 
ownership, and pri vate land ownership in particular. Party 
conservatives successfully fended off calls to legalize private 
ownership of land. The constitution, while recognizing private 
ownership of the means of production, only granted the right of 
access to land and the right for this access to be inherited. At the 
same time, the constitution stipula ted that 'legal property of 
ind i viduals and organiza tions shall not be subjected to 
nationalization' (Article 23).  
The eighth area of contention concerned oversight and control of 
defence and security matters. Reformers successfully argued for the 
creation of a National Assembly Committee on National Defence 
and Security, similar to other committees with responsibility for 
domestic affairs (public health, education, etc.) .  At the same time, 
the conservatives retained the previously ex isti ng Na tional 
Defence Council, now renamed National Defence and Security 
Counci l .  The new president will chair this council and has the 
power to nominate its members. 
Elections to the National Assembly (ninth legislature) 
On 19 July 1992, thirty-seven million Vietnamese voters went to the 
polls to elect 395 deputies to the ninth legislature of the National 
Assembly. This assembly is now serving a five-year term that 
commenced September 1 992 . This assembly has been given the 
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i mportant task of carrying out  the reform of Vietnam's 
administrative structu re u nder the newly amended state 
constitution, and to develop the foundations for a political system 
governed by law. This is no mean task, as the Vietnam Communist 
Party exercises virtual unchallenged power and its influence 
pervades all institutions in society. 
The July 1 992 elections were conducted under an electoral law 
which specified that each el ectoral  unit had to possess more 
candidates than places. For the first time independent candidates 
were permi tted to run. Prior to the elections, the Vietnam 
Communist  Party determined the broad composition of the ideal 
National Assembly. This included representation for party and 
government institutions, the military, mass organizations, ethnic 
groups (see Table 3.1 )  and 'social forces' making up Vietnamese 
society. The VCP then turned over responsibility for the vetting and 
selection of candidates to the Vietnam Fatherland Front. 
Each of the 601 candidates had to pass through a complex 
vetting process in order to qualify. Once the broad composition of the 
ideal Na tional Assembly had been determined, organizations 
comprising the Fatherland Front, such as those for women, youth, 
veterans, trade unions, scientists, etc., began to negotiate and lobby 
to secure representation. This occurred at national level, where just 
under 100 places were reserved for central level officials, and also 
at provincial and local levels .  Under the terms of the electoral law, 
all candidates had to support Vietnam's socialist orientation and 
policies of socio-economic renovation. 
During this period each prospective candidate had to present 
himself /herself to a meeting at their residential area and another 
meeting at their work place. These meetings scrutinized each 
candidate's application and curriculum vitae before voting on their 
suitability to stand for election. The Fa therland Front then 
determined which candidates qualified for the final list; thi s 
involved changes to the original list. 
According to official figures provided by the Office of National 
Assembly and State Council, the final candidate list included: 538 
party members (89.5 per cent) and 63 non-party members ( 1 0.5 per 
cent). One hundred and nineteen incumbents stood for re-election. 
There were 1 33 female candida tes (22 per cent) and 1 03 ethnic 
minority candidates ( 1 7  per cent). The candidates as a group were 
more highly educated than any previous National Assembly, with 
21 9 holding a higher university degree (48 per cent). Finally, the 
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list of candidates included four Buddhist monks, four Cathol ic 
priests and four persons from the private economic sector. 
Table 3.1 
National Assembly candidates by ethnic bacl<ground 
Ethnicity N =  
Ba Na 3 Kho 2 
Ca Tu 1 Kho Mu 3 
Cao Lan 2 Khome (Khmer) 1 1  
Cham 2 Kinh (82 .7%) 497 
Chau Ma 2 Mrong 2 
Chau Ro 2 Muong 7 
Dao 8 Nung 5 
E De 5 Rae Lay 1 
Gia Rai 1 San Diu 1 
Giay 2 Se Dang 1 
Gie Trieng 1 Stieng 2 
Ha Nhi 2 Tay 15 
Hmong 8 T h a i  9 
Hoa (Chinese) 1 Tho 1 
Hre 1 Van Kieu 2 
Kadong 1 
Total: 601 
The campaign period lasted roughly a month. Voting lists were 
prepared and made public. Candidates were encouraged to meet 
with the voters in their local areas. Electoral councils established 
at each level of administration took charge of propaganda 
activities designed to educate the voter on procedures to be followed 
on election day. Candidates' biographies were posted in prominent 
locations. The day before the elections were held, street parades 
and motorcades once again publicized the importance of getting out 
the vote. 
M eeting s between voters and cand i da tes foc u s sed 
overwhelmingly on local issues. Candidates were repeatedly a sked 
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what they would do if elected to improve living standards, to lower 
corruption, and to end smuggling. 
On election day, voting began at 7 am and concluded twelve 
hours later. Voters came to the polls with their entire families and 
presented their voter registration card to official s  manning tables 
with the voters' lists .  Once names and details had been checked, the 
voter was given a ballot with the names of each candidate. The 
voter then voted in secret at a booth shielded by curtains. Voters 
cast their ballots by striking off the name(s)  of the candidate(s) 
they did not wish to elect. They then deposi ted their ballot in a 
sealed wooden box. As the voter exited, his/her voting card was 
s tamped by officials. After the close of polls, local citizens were 
chosen as observers to watch the breaking of the seal on the ballot 
boxes and the official counting of votes. These were the procedures 
set out in the electoral law. They appear to have been observed by 
officials as there were few complaints of irregularities subsequently. 
Voters interviewed by the author, who observed the proceedings 
as an 'official reporter' (phong vien) , predictably offered a range of 
opinions on the elections. Some stated they would favour the 
younger candidates. Others said they would vote for religious 
figures, because they were deemed to be independent. Vietnamese 
intellectuals said privately tha t 'all had been settled in advance', 
or that the election campaign had been 'boring' . Others confessed to 
having difficul ty in decid ing which candidate among the list of 
highly qualified candidates to strike out .  This contrasted with 
official media reports which proclai med the elections 'a festival of 
democracy' and 'the most democratic election ever' . 
The election results 
Two days after the election the resul ts for Hanoi were announced,2 
followed by the results for Ho Chi Minh City and Hai Phong the 
fol lowing day.3 The results for the entire country on a province-by­
province basis were published in a series in Nhan Dan running from 
2 'Voice of Vietnam Network' in Vietnamese, 21 July 1992. 
3 'Voice of Vietnam Network' in Vietnamese, 22 July 1992. 
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22 to 29 July.4 After a second round of elections,5 the final official 
figures were released (see Table 3.2).  
Tab le 3.2 
Official voting results 
No. of electoral units 
No. of deputies elected 
No. of candidates 
No.of registered voters 
No. of actual voters 
Voter turnout 
No. of valid votes 






99. 1 2 %  
36,837,427 
99.03%6 
The announcement of detailed election results followed the same 
format. Figures were given on a province-wide basis and included : 
the number of seats to be filled, the number of candidates, the 
number of registered voters, the number who actually voted, the 
percentage turnout, and the number of candidates elected . 
Immediately after this, the results of each electoral unit within the 
province was given. This included the names of the successful 
candidates along with the percentage of valid votes received. No 
data was given for unsuccessful candidates and no other details of 




National results were also published in the army's newspaper, Quan Doi 
Nhan Dan, and major city dailies such as Hanoi Moi and Saigon Giai  
Phong. Provincial newspapers provided local results. 
The elections failed to produce a result in Hoa Binh province's second 
electoral unit and in Thanh Hoa province's sixth electoral unit; runoffs 
were held on August 9, 1992. 
Differing figures have been released . The Electoral Council gave the figure 
for the national eligible voter turnout at 99.12 per cent, while Vu Mao, of 
the Office of National Assembly and State Council, gave a figure of 99.08 
per cent. See 'Voice of Vietnam Network' in Vietnamese, 5 August 1992. 
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If official figures are correct, 0.97 per cent or 358,1 65 of the votes 
cast were invalid. According to Vietnamese sources consulted by the 
author, a high percentage of these invalid votes were cast by the 
intelligentsia in protest at what they perceived to be a limited 
choice of candidates. This was reportedly true in residential areas 
surrounding universities and research institutes in Hanoi. 
There has been some speculation that the figures for the 
percentage of voter turnout may not be accurate (eg.  according to 
official figures 99.23 per cent of eligible voters turned out in Hanoi) .7 
Nevertheless, an examination of the official figures, even with 
their limi tations, offers some interesting findings. In the words of 
one veteran Vietnamese journalist, the election produced 'some 
surprises at who were not elected, and some non-surprises' . An 
overview of these figures will be discussed separately below, after 
examining the results in a few selected provinces and municipali ties. 
Hanoi results 
Hanoi voters interviewed by the author prior to the election said 
they would vote for younger candidates who held high 
qual ifications.  The results seem to confirm thi s .  Thi rty- two 
candidates contested twenty places. Ten of the twenty winners held 
university degrees, and this was seen as part of a move to bring 
younger, skilled technocra ts into the system.8 The highest vote 
getter was Professor Ton That Bach, a surgeon in his forties (and also 
son of the famous surgeon Ton That Tung, descended from the Nguyen 
royal family). He received 91 .96 per cent of the valid votes cast.9 
7 Jacques Bekaert (1 992) noted that voting was not compulsory and that a 
break down by district was not given. 
8 Biographic details have been taken from, 'Danh Sach Nhung Nguoi Ung Cu 
Dai Bieu Quoc Hoi Khoa IX Theo Tung Don Vi Bau Cu Trong Ca Nuoc,' 
Nhan Dan, 24 July 1 992 . This list includes three PhDs in science, two 
Master of Science degrees, two MA degrees, two engineers and one 
professor whose qualifications are not listed . Another source states that 
fourteen of the twenty deputies held a university degree. Reuter dispatch 
from Hanoi, The Nation, 23 July 1 992. 
9 'Ket Qua Bau Cu Dai Bieu Quoc Hoi Khoa IX Tai Thu Do Ha Noi,' Hanoi 
Moi, 22 July 1992 .  
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According to a party official interviewed by a veteran Western 
journalist, 'This was a very spontaneous vote, as Professor Bach is a 
very good man, totally dedicated to the well being of  the 
population. He is a man of great moral integrity' (Bekaert 1992). 
Another official source interviewed by the same jo:urnalist stated, 
'The vote for Professor Bach is a great lesson. It shows that people 
respect those who are honorable. It is a lesson for the party's 
leadership'  ( ibid .) .  Such appears to be the case as well with 
Buddhist Superior Monk Kim Cuong Tu, who, despite his 78 years, 
was successful because voters felt he was a man of integrity and 
independent-minded.If there were any surprises in the Hanoi 
results, it was that party Secretary General Do Muoi, 75, failed to 
top the list of popular candidates. He received only 80.29 per cent, 
well behind Professor Bach. This meant that nearly one in every 
five voters crossed Muoi's name off the ballot.1 0 Losers in Hanoi 
included the heads of five city enterprises (including the head of 
Sel Electronics, a successful private firm),11  four local government 
cadres, one local union representative, the deputy principal of a 
general school, and the head of a city hospital. 
Ho Chi Minh City results 
The greatest election surprises occurred in Ho Chi Minh City, where 
thirty-six persons, including eleven incumbents, ran for twenty-four 
seats. Three incumbent deputies were defeated,12 and four of the six 
candidates endorsed by the Municipal Fatherland Front Committee 
also lost. These included:  the deputy secretary of the city 
Communist Youth Union, a member of the city War Veterans' 
Association; the vice chairman of the city Peasants' Association and 
the chairman of the city Federation of Trade Unions. Other losers in 
Ho Chi Minh City included three directors of state-owned 
1 0 AFP dispatch from Hanoi, Business Times, 22 July 1992. 
1 1  Sel's director was one of only four private businessmen who stood for 
election. See: Reuter dispatch from Hanoi, in The Nation, and The Straits 
Times, 23 July 1992. 
1 2 Ngo Ba Thanh, Nguyen Hieu Liem (director of the Phuoc Long city 
agricultural service) and Nguyen Anh Tuyet (deputy secretary general of 
the city Association of Architects). 
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companies, a city government cadre, and the director of the city 
Institute of Social Sciences. The shock loss of Mme.  Ngo Ba Thanh, 
one of only two centrally endorsed incumbents to lose, will be 
discussed separately below. 
Of the twenty-four successful candidates, seven were identified 
as holding university degrees, including three PhDs, one MD, one 
Master of Science and two MAs. Unlike Hanoi, the party' senior 
officials, Politburo members Vo Van Kiet and Phan Van Khai, 
topped the voting l ist with 88 .02 per cent and 87.01 per cent, 
res pectively . 
Other winners included the deputy secretary of the city Party 
Committee, head of the ci ty People's Council, the director of the 
city Public Security Office, the commander of the city Military 
Command, the chairman of the ci ty Fatherland Front Committee, 
the head of the city Women's Union, the editor of Saigon Giai 
Phong (the city party newspaper), a Buddhist monk, and a Catholic 
priest. 
The case of Mme Ngo Ba Thanh 
Perhaps the greatest election surprise was the defeat of incumbent 
Mme Ngo Ba Thanh. Mme Thanh is a non-party Western-educated 
lawyer who is well known in Australia and internationally for her 
role in the Third Force movement which opposed the Saigon 
government prior to 1 975. In recent years, Mme Thanh has become 
prominent for her role as head of the Judicial Committee of the 
National Assembly. 
Mme Thanh ran for re-election in Electoral Unit No. 4 of Ho Chi 
Minh City which included Districts 5 and 1 0, an area with a high 
percentage of ethnic Chinese. Four candidates contested three seats. 
In addition to Mme Thanh, these included premier Vo Van Kiet, a 
Chinese businesswoman, Ly Kim Mai, and Professor Chu Pham Ngoc 
Son, head of the city Union of Science and Technology. 
Officials on the Ho Chi Minh City Electoral Committee told the 
author that they recommended Mme Thanh contest a safer 
constituency but that she insisted on running in Electoral Unit No. 4 .  
During the electoral campaign Mme Thanh confided to colleagues 
that she faced a tough fight. She publicized the fact that she had 
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been endorsed not only by the central level but by the Party Central 
Committee itself. 1 3 This proved a double-edged sword. 
Voters in Ho Chi Minh City complained that Mme Thanh had 
absented herself too o ften and had lost touch with the day-to-day 
realities of her constituency. She was perceived as currying favour 
with the authorities in Hanoi to the detriment of her relations with 
local authorities . Disagreements arose on a number of issues, such as 
how to deal with a housing scandal and legal protection for the 
accused . Mme. Thanh's threats to clean up corruption by local 
government officials after the election turned them against her. 
They feared she would get even tougher after the election. Ngo Ba 
Thanh charged that rumours were spread in her electoral unit 
highlighting her deficiencies and that voters were told to cross her 
name off the ballot. 
While Mme Thanh sometimes criticized the party, she 
supported its economic reforms and defended i ts opposition to 
pol i tical pl ural ism.  Th i s  angered the more reformist  and 
independently-minded voter. After the election, one Hanoi civil  
servan t involved in the electoral proceedings said people voted 
against Mme Thanh because she failed to fulfil a promise to create a 
better legal system.1 4 
Diplomats stationed in Hanoi were surprised by Thanh's defeat. 
One Western diplomat said Mme Thanh had been favoured by the 
party and her defeat was a technical mishap due to the presence of 
too many popular candidates in one constituency. According to a 
veteran party member there was another explanation, 'Her defeat is 
a victory for the [party] mafia' (Bekaert 1 992). Mme Ngo Ba Thanh 
· was edged out by Ly Kim Mai. According to one of the successful 
candidates from this constituency, Mme Thanh successfully carried 
one of the two electoral units but was overwhelmingly defeated in 
the other, an area containing a large number of Hoa (ethnic Chinese) 
people. 
Immediately after the results were announced, Mme Thanh went 
on BBC World Service to air her grievances and to charge that fraud 
had been committed . Mme Thanh lodged a formal complaint to the 
1 3 Interview with a successful non-party candidate from Ho Chi Minh City. 
1 4 Kathleen Callo, Reuter d ispatch from Hanoi, 23 July 1 992, reprinted in 
The Nation, 24 July 1 992. This view was expressed to the author in 
interviews conducted in Ho Chi Minh City. 
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Electoral Council .  Her complaint was later di smissed by the 
Council, which declared tersely that it had found 'no evidence of 
fraud' .  
lnd1>pendent cand idates 
Forty-three persons attempted to regi s ter as independent 
candidate s . 1 5" Several independent candidates who initially met 
the legal requirements to run were pressured to drop out or were 
disqual ified on technical grou nds .  Other potential independent 
candidates, such as the prominent non-party intellectual Phan Dinh 
Dieu and the radical critic (and expelled party member) Duong Thu 
Huong, were dissuaded from running. 
During the vetting process only two independents qualified and 
were put on the ballot:  Tran Van Minh, director of a state 
import-export company in Ha Tinh; and Dinh Tan Phuoc, deputy 
head of a primary school in Quang Ngai. One Japanese journalist 
tried to follow the campaign trail of these two remaining 
independents. In Quang Ngai he was told it was a 'bad idea' to come 
because there were 'no candidates campaigning that day' . In Ha 
Tinh province the journalist was able to see candidates, but only 
under the watchful eye of plainclothes security men. Later, a 
long-time senior party member stated, 'Yes, there was a certain 
degree of harassment against independent candidates' ( Bekaert).  
Not surprisingly, both independent candidates lost. 
15 Officials in the Office of the National Assembly and State Council refused 
all requests for complete details on these independent candidates. About 
half came from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The others appear to have 
been scattered throughout the country, particularly in the north-central 
provinces. 
Recent political developments 65 
What the figures show 
This discussion of the National Assembly election results may be 
extended further if we take the official figures at face value and 
relate them to the composition of candidates who ran and to the 
deputies actually elected. The author used the official biographies 
to classify candidates into one of five major categories: central level 
officials; province level officials; local officials; regional mili tary; 
and religious representatives . These categories may be defined as 
follows: 
Central holding posts at central party, central state, central 
military or national-level association or institution. 
Provincial - holding posts at province party, province 
government, province military, or province-level 
association or enterprise. 
Local holding posts at district level or below in party, 
government, mili tary, security or local-level 
association or enterprise. 
Military commander of a military region comprising several 
provinces, excludes central, provincial and 
local-level mili tary posts. 
Religious any national, provincial or local figure identified by 
a post in a Buddhist or Catholic religious body. 
Table 3 .3 below sets out the electoral success rate for each of 
these five categories. This table shows that the vast majority of 
candidates came from the provincial and local categories (83 per 
cent), and that the provincial category represented nearly 63 per 
cent of all cand idates. Yet the results also ind ica te that a 
disproportionate number of mili tary and central candidates were 
successful . Religious candidates did well, and the loss of one seems 
problematic. 1 6  The failure rate for provincial-level candidates was 
1 6 The sole unsuccessful religious official was Rev. Luong Quang Due, 
parish priest of Hung Nghia parish, Hai Hung village, Hai Hau district, 
Nam Ha province. 
66 Carlyle A .  Thayer 
just over a third, while well over a half of local-level candidates 
were unsuccessful. 
Table 3.3 
Success rate for candidates grouped by classification 
Not elected Elected Total Candidates 
N % N % N % 
Military 0 0 7 1 00 .0 7 1 .1 6  
Central 3 3.5 83 96.S 8 6  1 4 .31  
Religious 1 1 2 .5 7 87.5 8 1 .33 
Province 1 3 3 35 .2 245 64.8 3 78 62.90 
Local 6 9  56 .6 5 3  43.4 1 22 20 . 30 
Total 206 34 .3  3 9 5  6 5 . 7  6 0 1  1 00 
Table 3.4 
Percentage of valid votes received by classification 
Clas sification N= % Vote 
Regional Military 7 87.17 
Central 83 85.61 
Average 78. 1 1  
Provincial 246 76.65 
Local 53 72 .65 
Religious 7 72.25 
Total 395 
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Table 3.4 sets out the percentage valid vote received by 
successful candidates in each of the five categories . The average 
successful candidate received 78 . 11  per cent of the valid vote cast. 
These figures show that regional military and central-level 
officials received a higher percentage of the valid vote than 
provincial, local and religious deputies. Regional military figures 
appear to be the most popular. 
The five basic categories may be further subdivided into party, 
government, military, mass organization/ association, dual (party 
and government), public securi ty, public health, government cadres, 
enterprise and 'other' as shown in Table 3.5. See Table 3.6 for an 
illustration of how this scheme was applied to unsuccessful 
incumbents. 
Table 3.5 (which illu strates success rates for candidates by 
category) and an analysis of the percentage of valid votes received, 
reinforce the previous observations about the popularity of the 
military. The success of the mili tary and its popularity is exhibited 
at all levels - central, regional, provincial and local . Candidates 
holding dual party-government posts, performed well at central and 
provincial levels . At local level, however, the party's success rate 
drops sharply ( 100 per cent at central level and 83.7 per cent at 
provincial level) to 57. 1 per cent. 
Least  successful at both provincial and local levels, are 
candidates belonging to the categories of state enterprise, mass 
organizations, government cadres and officials in the public health 
sector. Least successful are members of local organizations. Of the 
seventeen candidates representing local organizations who were not 
elected, eight were members of the Women's Union, seven were 
members of the Fatherland Front Committee and two were members 
of the Peasants' Association. 
If electoral populari ty is measured in terms of the percentage of 
valid votes received, the resul ts reveal the popularity of all central 
level ca tegories (go vernme nt, mi l i ta ry, pa rty and ma s s  
organization) and the popularity o f  dual provincial elites, and 
provincial representatives of the party, military, public security, 
government and 'other' sectors. 1 7 
1 7 The 'provincial other' category includes members of art troupes such as 
renovated traditional opera, folksong and popular opera. 
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Table 3.5 
Candidates grouped by electoral sub-classification 
Elected Not Elected Total candidates 
N % N % N % 
Central 
Party 1 9  1 00 . 0  0 0 .0  1 9  1 0 0 
M ilitary 6 1 00 . 0  0 0 .0  6 1 0 0 
Government 3 8  97.4 1 2 .6 3 9  1 0 0 
Organizations 2 0  90.9 2 9 . 1  2 2  1 0 0 
Province 
Military 1 2  1 00.0 0 0 .0  1 2  1 0 0 
Dual 7 1 00 .0  0 0 .0  7 1 0 0 
Government 4 3  93.5 3 6.5 4 6  1 00 
Party 3 6  83 .7 7 1 6 .3 43 1 00 
Public Security 7 77.8 2 22 .2 9 1 00 
Other 3 75.0 1 25 .0  4 1 00 
Public Health 4 66 .7  2 33 .3 6 1 00 
Organ izations 3 5  63 .6  20  36 .4 55 1 00 
Government cadres 6 8  53 .5 5 9  46 .5 1 2 7 1 00 
Enterprise 20 39 .2  3 1  60 .8 5 1  1 00 
Local 
M ilitary 1 1 00 .0  0 0 . 0  1 1 00 
Public security 1 1 00.0 0 0 . 0  1 1 00 
Party 8 57.1  6 42.9 1 4  1 00 
Government 1 3  52.0 1 2  48.0 25 1 00 
Enterprises 1 1  50 .0 1 1  50 .0 22 1 00 
Public health 4 50.0 4 50 .0 8 1 0 0 
Government cadres 4 33.3 8 66 .7 1 2  1 0 0 
Organ izations 6 26 .1  1 7  73 .9 23 1 0 0 
Other 
Regional military 7 1 00.0 0 0 . 0  7 1 0 0 
Religious 7 87.5 1 1 2 .5 8 1 0 0 
Education 1 5  44 .1  1 9  55 .9 3 4  1 00 
Total 395 65.7  206 34.3  6 0 1  1 00 
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Table 3.6 
List of Eighth National Assembly incumbents who lost their seats in the 
July 1992 National Assembly eections 
Name EC Position Organization 
Ngo Ba Thanh CG chairman National Assembly Judicial 
Committee 
Duong Xuan An CMO vice Vietnam Confederation 
chairman of Workers 
Tran Quang Dung PE director Beer and Soft Drinks Factory 
Nguyen Hieu Liem PE director Animal Husbandry Enterprise 
Tran Mai Huong P EN principal School for the Gifted 
Dao Tan Loe PGC head Province Science 
and Technology Committee 
Truong Nghiep Vu PGC chairman Province Office Fatherland 
Front 
Doan Tan Nang PGC deputy Province Electricity Service 
director Province Nationalities 
Ho Van Dieu PGC chairman Committee 
Nguyen Anh Tuyet PMO deputy-secretary City Architects' Association 
general 
Le Thi Thanh Mai PMO chairman Province Women's Union 
Duong Huu Ciao PMO vice chairman Province Federation of Trade 
Unions 
Sang Van Mao PMO deputy Province Fatherland Front 
Committee 
Chau Kim Seng LG chairman District People's Council 
Huynh Thi Huong LGC head Gty Service Education and 
V ocationalTraining 
Ho Van Bay LMO chairman District Association Peasants' 
Tran Thi Sua LP secretary I District Party Conunittee 
chairman 
Notes: 
EC - electoral classification: CG - central government; CMO - central mass 
organization; PE provincial (state} enterprise; PEN - provincial education; 
PCC - provincial government cadre; PMO - provincial mass organization; LG -
local government LGC - local government cadre; LMO - local mass 
organization; LP - local party. 
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Provincial party officials are much more popular than their 
local counterparts, and those occupying dual party-government posts 
at provincial level are more popular than any category, including 
the military at regional and central levels .  At local level , the 
military is the most popular of any category. 
In terms of least popular it is striking that most local categories 
fall below the national average of valid votes received . Local 
enterprise and local party rank the lowest. At provincial level, 
educators, public health workers, heads of state enterprises, mass 
organizations and government cadres rank below the average. 
Wha t  is of interest is that the secretary general of the Vietnam 
Communist Party, Do Muoi, did so poorly in comparative terms. His 
80.29 per cent of valid vote received, while above the national 
average for successful cand idates (78. 1 1  per cent), is  nearly one 
standard deviation below the mean for Central Committee members. 
Among the sixty Central Committee members, Do Muoi ranked 52nd 
from the top (see Appendix 4. A). Five of the nine members of the 
Politburo fell in the bottom half of Central Committee members in 
terms of percentage of vote received. These are, in descending order, 
Vo Van Kiet, Phan Van Khai, Le Phuoc Tho, Do Muoi and Bui Thien 
Ngo. Top vote-getters among the Politburo, in ascending order, were: 
Vu Oanh, Le Due Anh, Nong Due Manh and Doan Khue. Khue is a 
general and minister for Defence . 
Appendix 4.B sets out the average percentage vote received by 
winning candidates by province. Provinces are identified as being in 
the north, centre and south. Of interest is that when provinces are 
listed in rank order on the basis of the average percentage of valid 
vote received by winning candidates, the list moves geographically 
from north to south. Most northern provinces rank above the average 
(exceptions are Hai Hung, Ha Bae, Hai Phong and Hanoi) ,  while 
southern provinces fall below the national average (exceptions 
include Kon Tum and Quang Binh in the centre and Minh Hai in the 
south).  
On the basis  of  earlier work by the au thor, it  has been 
established that party membership is unevenly distributed. Party 
membership is higher in the north than in the south. The former 
Nghe-Tinh province has the most party members. A sociologist 
interviewed in Hanoi on the eve of the elections stated that with 
respect to the northern rural provinces, it was his belief that the 
local voter would follow the wishes of the party machine. Jacques 
Bekaert, who observed the elections first-hand, concluded that the 
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election campaign also spelled the need for more work to develop 
'the Vietnamese way to democracy'(ibid.)  Finally, one post-mortem 
concluded: 
Nevertheless not everything has been accomplished as 
wished . Voters of various social strata did not give an 
equal heed to the elections. One important reason was the 
lack of time for adequate preparations and explanations to 
the electorate. It is also to be frankly recognized that a 
number of localities had not fully grasped the spirit of 
renovation in the organization of the elections this time 
and had proceeded in a routine way, resulting in rather bad 
effects on the voters ( 'A Great Festive Day,' Vie tnam 
Courier 34 August 1 992:4) .  
On the basis of fragmentary data, it might be hypothesized that 
the figures in Appendix 4.B reveal the party machine as influencing 
the results in the northern provinces to a greater extent than in the 
south. The conserva tism of northern provinces and the role of the 
party machine may explain the very high percentage votes received 
by candidates from these areas. 
Table 3.7 presents data on the the top four Central Committee 
members who scored one standard deviation above the mean, all 
located in the north. By the same token, elections in municipalities 
directly subordinate to the central government (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hai Phong) and sou thern provinces were relatively less 
influenced by the party machine. Cities tended to have higher 
education levels. In the provinces the party machine was relatively 
weak. The percentage winning vote for candidates from these areas 
is lower and appears to be more dispersed among the candidates. 
Indeed, the Central Committee candidates who ranked last in 
popular vote also scored below the average vote received by winning 
candidates in their home province. 
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Table 3.7 






Central Committee candidates who scored above one standard deviation 
Nguyen Duy Quy 
Nguyen Manh Cam 
Do Van An 





98 . 72 
98 .01 









l l th 
Central Committee candidates who scored below one standard devia tion 
Do Quoc Sam Hai Phong 76 . 74 74 .99 35th 
Nguyen Van Chinh Tien Giang 75.58 70 .35 45th 
Phan Minh Tan Dong Thap 72. 20 69 .2 1  48th 
Truong My Hoa Ho Chi Minh 62. 70 69 .90 47th 
Nguyen Van Tu Dong Nai 62. 06 68.39 49th 
Le Xuan Trinh Quang Nam 58.46 72 . 1 3 4 1 st 
"Three municipalities and fifty provinces. 
The Ninth National Assembly 
According to official figures,1 8 the composition of the 395 deputies 
elected to the Ninth National Assembly consist of: 
party members 
non-party 
intellectuals, university graduates 





1 8 Party membership figures were provided by Vu Mao, Voice of Vietnam 
Network in Vietnamese, August 5, 1 992; all other figures are from: 'Cuoc 
Bau Cu Dai Bieu Quoc Hoi Khoa IX Da Dien Ra Tot Dep Trong Khong 
Khi Ngay Hoi Lon Cua Nhan Dan Ca Nuoc,' Nhan Dan, 21 September 
1 992 . 




members of Fatherland Front/ mass organizations 
religious representatives 




members of the armed forces 
educational sector 
artists or writers 















These categories are not mutually exclusive and may vary from the 
categories employed by the author in earlier sections. 
On 1 9  September 1 992, Vietnam's newly elected National 
Assembly met in Hanoi to elect state leaders under the terms of the 
amended state constitution. The leadership of the party over the 
state apparatus was reinforced with the selections made. Nearly 92 
per cent of deputies were party members . The highest positions of 
state power, in the government and in the organs of the National 
Assembly, were filled by members of the Politburo and Central 
Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party. 
As early as the fifth national party congress in March 1982, the 
Central Committee criticized the 'chaotic overlap between party 
and state institution' caused by the appointment of these 'dual-role' 
elites. This situation seems to have been perpetuated. 
The party's grip on power was revealed in the choices made. Le 
Due Anh, Vo Van Kiet and Nong Due Manh were elected unopposed 
as president, prime minister and chairman of the National 
Assembly's Standing Committee, respectively.1 9 These men rank 
second, third and tenth (out of thirteen) on the ruling Politburo. 
Nguyen Thi Binh was elected Vietnam's first female vice president. 
She is a member of the Central Committee. 
1 9 Anh was elected unanimously, Kiet was unopposed and received a vote of 
98.48 per cent, Manh received 384 of 392 votes cast or 97 .96 per cent. 
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Pham Hung, also a Central Committee member, retained his post 
as chief justice on the People's Supreme Court. Le Thanh Dao (not a 
Central Committe member) was appointed chief prosecutor of the 
Supreme People's Organ of Control. 
In the new government which was announced after the elections, 
only two changes were made to the portfolios held by previous 
min i s ters .20 Several state commissions and committees were 
upgraded to ministerial-level rank.2 1 Of the thirty-four 
ministerial posts filled, all but four were held by members of the 
party's Central Committee, or 88.2 per cent. 
With one exception, the National Defence and Security Council 
is composed entirely of Politburo members. Party dominance is only 
slightly less pronounced in appointments made to other organs of the 
National Assembly. Of the thirteen members of the Standing 
Committee, eight were also members of the party's Central 
Committee, or 6 1 .5 per cent. The dominance of the party Central 
Committee on the seven National Assembly Committees, was least 
marked, with only three (43 per cent) being headed by Central 
Committee members . 
Conclusion 
This paper has addressed only two major areas of political change: 
1 992 constitutional reform and elections for the 9 th National 
Assembly. It is clear from field work conducted in Vietnam that the 
main impetus for reform and change in Vietnam is coming from 
within the Vietnam Communist Party itself, both as a reaction to 
events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but more particularly 
as part and parcel of the internal processes of doi moi begun in 1986. 
20 The ministers of Health (Pham Song) and Energy (Vu Ngoc Hai) were 
replaced. 
21 The heads of the State Committees on Cooperation and Investment, 
Population and Family Planning, Care and Protection of Children, Ethnic 
Minorities and Mountainous Regions, and State Planning were upgraded 
and given ministerial rank. The State Science Committee was upgraded to 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment. The Ministry of 
Culture, Information and Sports was renamed the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, and the Ministry of Trade and Tourism was shortened to 
Ministry of Trade. 
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The most recent leadership changes represent a careful balancing 
of interests. The appointment of a woman as vice president and an 
ethnic minority (Tay) member to the post of chairman of the 
National Assembly's Standing Committee are not only symbolically 
important but significant in their own right. Vietnam needs to draw 
upon the talent of its women, who represent over half of the 
popu l a t i o n . 2 2  Ethnic minorities need to be brought into the 
development process both economically and politically if Vietnam 
wishes to avoid the ethnic antagonisms which have appeared 
elsewhere . 
More importantly, the three top leaders - Do Muoi, Le Due Anh 
and Vo Van Kiet - represent the north, centre and south 
respectively .23 They also represent different sections of the party. 
Do Muoi has his base in the party apparatus, Le Due Anh holds 
sway in the military and security sector, while Vo Van Kiet 
represents those in favour of opening up to the outside world and 
creation of a market economy. All would appear to agree that 
economic reforms must continue and that political reforms must be 
adopted gradually. 
What then of the new National Assembly? Clearly i t  is 
dominated by the party, yet when compared with previous national 
assemblies it is a younger and better educated body. On the basis of 
the performance of deputies at the fi rst session of the ninth 
National Assembly, it is likely these younger, better educated 
individuals will play an increasingly constructive if not vocal role 
in shaping legislation in the fu ture. While all major legislati ve 
programs will be vetted by the party in secret, the open debates of 
the National Assembly will serve as a check, if only a minor one, on 
policies of the Vietnam Communist Party. 
Vietnam's communist regime is not in danger of being overthrown 
from within by a disgruntled peasantry or ou traged working class 
responding to appeals by emigres from abroad . It i s, however, beset 
by cri ticism from Vietnam's intelligentsia both within and outside 
the party (see Thayer 1992b:359-364) .  The regime has tarnished its 
image through corruption, mismanagement and occasional policy 
22 The Women's Union was active in the recent elections in lobbying for 
increased representation. 
23 Bae, trung, nam, cung mot nha - 'north, centre, south, all under one roof' 
(all one family). 
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failures .  It can no longer rely on history (past struggles against 
foreign intervention and past dogmas) to legitimate fully its leading 
role. Success in managing economic development is vital if the 
party's critics and the broad masses are to be kept on side. Economic 
success, which involves opening Vietnam's door to the outside, must 
also be accompanied by the full implementation of the poli tical 
reform measures now under consideration. 
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Appendix 4.A 
Voting results in the 19 Ju ly 1992 election to the ninth National Assembly: 
Central Committee members listed by p ercentage of valid votes received 
% Vote N a m e Organiz ation 
58 .46 Le Xuan Trinh State Planning Commission 
62.06 Nguyen Van Tu Vietnam Confederation of Workers 
62.70 Truong My Hoa VCP CC/Vietnam Women's Union 
72.20 Phan Minh Tanh VCP CC Dept Mass Motivation 
75 .58 Nguyen Van Chinh Vietnam Peasants' Association Central 
Committee 
76 . 74 Do Ouoc Sam State Planning Commission 
78 . 2 1  Average vote received by all 601 candidates 
78 .51  Le Xuan Tung City Party Committee 
79 .09 Bui Thien Ngo VCP Politburo/ Ministry of Interior 
79 .52 % One standard deviation below mean 
80 . 29 Do Muoi VCP CC Politburo /VCP Secretary General 
81 . 1 3  Huynh Cuong National Assembly eighth legislature 
82 .52 Pham Van Tra Mili tary Region Three 
83 .25 Hong Ha VCP CC Dept International 
83 .33 Truong Tan Sang City Party Committee 
83 .46 Nguyen Thi Than National Assembly Committee 
84 .43 Vu Dinh Cu National Institute of Technology 
85 .65 Do Phuong Vietnam News Agency 
86 .58 Le Phuoc Tho VCP CC Politburo/CC Dept Organization 
86 . 72 Nguyen Van Sy Province Party Committee 
86 .85 Ha Dang VCP CC Dept Ideology and Culture 
87 .01  Phan Van Khai VCP Politburo /Council of Ministers 
87.48 Do Quang Thang Secretary of the VCP CC Politburo 
87.72 Pham Van Hy Province Party Committee 
87.78 Nguyen Binh Giang Province Party Committee 
88 .02 Vo Van Kiet Council of Ministers /VCP CC Politburo 
88 .35 Vu Oanh VCPCC Politburo 
88 .45 Phan Thu General Dept Defence Industry and 
Economic 
90 .08 Nguyen Trang Xuyen Ministry of National Defence 
90 . 1 0  Le Van Tu Province Party Committee/People's 
Committee 
90 .35 Nguyen Due Hoan Province Party Committee 
90 .60 Huu Tho Newspaper, Nhan Dan 
90 .94 Nguyen Ha Phan Secretary of the VCP CC Politburo 
91 .33 Nguyen Trong Nhan Vietnam Red Cross Association 




9 1 .94 

















95 . 1 6  
95 .35 
96 . 1 6  
96 .41 
A Ma Pui 
I>ang Huu 
Dang Quan Thuy 
Do Binh Duong 
Vu Mao 
Nguyen Khanh 
Le Due Anh 
Dao Dinh Luyen 
Ha Thi Khiet 
Trang A Pao 
Pham Hung 
Nguyen Van Hieu 
Nguyen Ba 
Le Due Binh 
Ha Hoe Trac 
Nong Due Manh 
Doan Khue 
Ha Quang Du 
Nong Hong Thai 
Nguyen Van Hon 
Le Minh Huong 
Nguyen Nhieu Coc 
Dam Van Nguy 
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Province People's Committee 
State Science and Technology Commission 
Military Region Two 
Province Party Committee/People's 
Council 
National Assembly Office and State 
Council 
Council of Ministers 
VCP CC Politburo 
Ministry of National Defence 
Province Party Committee/People's 
Council 
Province Party Committee/ People's 
Council 
Supreme People's Court 
Vietnam Institute of Sciences 
Province Party Committee 
VCP CC Dept Internal Affairs 
Union of Scientific and Technical 
Associations 
VCP CC Politburo 
VCP Politburo /Ministry of National 
Defence 
HCM Communist Youth Union Central 
Committee 
Province Party Secretary 
Province Party Committee 
Ministry of Interior 
Province Party Committee 











Le Kha Phieu 
Do Van An 
Nguyen Manh Cam 
Nguyen Duy Quy 
Standard deviation: 
VPA Department Political General 
Province Party Comnittee 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Vietnam Institute of Social Sciences 
60 
88 .08 % 
58.46 % 
98 .72 %  
8.5 6 %  
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Appendix 4.B 
Average percentage vote received by winning candidates, by p rovince 
Province/City Vote rec'd Geographic region Formerly 
Per cent 
Lao Cai 9 3 . 97 northern mountainous Hoang Lien Son 
Ha Tinh 92 .24 northern central Nghe Tinh 
Lai Chau 9 1 . 74 northern mountainous 
Kon Tum 89 . 05 central highlands Gia Lai-Cong 
Tum 
Nghe An 88.96 northern central Nghe Tinh 
Tuyen Quang 88. 41 northern mountainous Ha Tuyen 
Yen Bai 88.00 northern mountainous Hoang Lien Son 
Ha Giang 87 .26 northern Ha Tuyen 
Thai Binh 84.62 northern delta 
Quang Binh 85 . 6 1  central Binh Tri Thien 
Thanh Hoa 85 . 1 5  northern central 
Cao Bang 84. 34 northern mountainous 
Lang Son 84. 1 2  northern mountainous 
Ha Tay 84.04 northern delta Ha Son Binh 
Son La 83 .30 northern mountainous 
Hoa Binh 83 . 21 northern delta Ha Son Binh 
Gia Lai 82 .09 central highlands Gia Lai-Cong 
Tum 
Minh Hai 8 1 . 96 southern delta 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 8 1 . 44 southern inc. Vung 
Tau-Con Dao 
Vinh Phu 8 1 .39 northern delta 
Ninh Binh 8 0 . 28 northern Ha Nam Ninh 
Bae Thai 80. 1 5  northern 
Quang Tri 79 .93 central Binh Tri Thien 
Nam Ha 79 . 72 northern Ha Nam Ninh 
Binh Dinh 79 . 6 1  central Nghia Binh 
An Giang 79 .57  southern delta 
Tra Vinh 79 . 55 southern delta 
Song Be 79.43 southern 
Quang Ngai 78. 89 central  Nghia Binh 
Dae Lac 77 .71  central highlands 
Hai Hung 77 .37 northern delta 
Kien Giang 75 . 79 southern delta 
[continued next page] 
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Average percentage vote received by winning candidates, by province 
[continues] 
Soc Trang 75 . 75 southern delta Hau Giang 
Ha Bae 75 .21  northern delta 
Hai Phong 74.99 northern coastal 
Thua Thien-Hue 74 .65 centra l  Binh Tri Thien 
Quang Ninh 74.33 central  
Ben Tre 73.23 southern delta 
Hanoi 73 .06 northern capital 
Lam Dong 72.33 central highlands 
Quang Nam 72.31  central 
Long An 7 1 . 86 southern delta 
Tay Ninh 70 .89 southern 
Can Tho 70 . 79 southern delta Hau Giang 
Tien Giang 70.35 southern delta 
Phu Yen 70 . 1 2  central  Phu Khanh 
Ho Chi Minh City 69 .90 southern municipality 
Dong Thap 6 9 . 21 southern delta 
Dong Nai 68.39 southern 
Ninh Thuan 6 7 .59 southern coastal Thuan Hai 
Vinh Long 6 6 . 70 southern delta 
Khanh Hoa 65 . 94 central coastal Phu Khanh 
Binh Thuan 62 .66 southern coa stal Thuan Hai 
Average: 78.1 1 % 
Standard Deviation: 1 2 . 0 1  % 
4 
The 1992 Constitution and the Rule of Law 
Ngo Ba Thanh* 
It is a big challenge for a Vietnamese lawyer, even one specialized 
in comparative law, to address the subject of Vietnam' s 1 992 
constitution and the rule of law. This challenge was made easier 
because of the experiences gained by a number of Australian scholars 
and businessmen who visi ted Vietnam at the time of the adoption of 
our policy on economic renovation and open door foreign policy. 
These persons, who were among the very first foreign pioneers from 
market-economy countries involved in the Vietnam war to visit  
Vietnam, experienced with us  the ini tial hardships and 
achievements in shifting from a bureaucratic command economy to a 
market-oriented economy, with the instrumentali ty of the rule of 
l a w .  
Interest i n  Vietnam has grown beyond this small circle t o  include 
other business people and academics, public servants, journalists, 
NGO representatives and other members of the public.  Their 
presence at this annual Vietnam Update reflects the interest of the 
Australian and international communities' interest in not only the 
prospects for Vietnam's future development but cooperation with 
Vietnam itself. I believe that exchange of views at the annual 
Vietnam Update conference constitutes small bricks that will build 
a solid relationship between Vietnam and its neighbours near and 
far in Asia and the Pacific, to further the cause of peace, stability, 
independence and development in the region and the world. 
The author would like to thank the Department of Political and Social 
Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National 
University, and all other organizations and individuals w hose 
sponsorship made possible her second visit to Australia and 
participation in the Vietnam Update 1992. 
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The Asia-Pacific region has been a region of tension over the 
past fifty years . The repeated great victories won by Asian nations 
in their struggle for national independence, and the growth of the 
forces of peace and development, have led to a change in the 
Asian-Pacific conjuncture and have promoted a trend for peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation in the region. The Asian and Pacific 
region is the cradle of solidarity among nations in the world, who 
struggle for the famous idea of the Non-Aligned-Movement, as 
reindorsed by the September 1992 Jakarta Declara tion: 
Since Bandung thirty-seven years a go, we have 
consi stentl y  struggled for the real ization of our 
fundamental principles and objectives . As we chart our 
course for this decade and beyond, the Movement is 
committed to the shaping of a new international order, free 
from war, poverty, intolerance and injustice, a world based 
on the principles of peaceful co-exis tence and genuine 
interdependence, a world which takes into account the 
diversity of social systems and cultures . It should reflect 
global, not separate, interests. And it should be sought 
through the central and irreplaceable role of the United 
Nations. We, the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
holding fast to the principles and ideals as originally 
articulated by our founding fathers do, hereby affirm the 
fundamental human rights to development, social progress, 
and the full participation of all in shaping the common 
destiny of humankind. Through dialogue and cooperation 
we will project our Movement as a vibrant, constructive and 
genuinely interdependent component of the mainstream of 
international relations. Only then, can a new international 
order take shape on a truly universal basis, ensuring 
harmony, peace, justice, and pro sperity for all ( 'A Call for 
Collect ion Action and the Democrat i zat ion o f  
International Relations', Jakarta, September 1 -6, 1 992). 
Vietnam is located in a world region with dynamic economic 
development and at a major international cros sroads, with 
favourable access to the sea. Vietnam is  also vested with manJ 
favourable conditions for expanding foreign economic relations, 
attracting foreign investment and developing trade, air, maritime 
services and tourism. 
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Vietnam is now in the transi tional period to socialism from a 
semi-feudal society, whose economy was characterized in the main 
by small-scale production, bypa ssing the stage of capi tal ist  
development, undergoing several decades of  war which have left 
complex consequences : backward technology, low productivity, 
cumbersome vestiges of a feudal colonial regime with disregard for 
the rule of law, avoidance of open conflict through non-adversarial 
dispute resolution by conciliation outside the orbit of the law, 
favouritism, corruption, arbitrary i ntervention through family 
connections with power centres, which are by-products of the 
so-called 'Asian way of  l i fe' which defini tely reduce the 
reliability of the legal framework. 
Disregard for the rule of law in Vietnam is due to various causes 
and deep-rooted historical, phi losophical factors, passing the 
modem boundary between law as a theory of government, to law as a 
source of posi tive action, as opposed to the deeply held traditional 
value of preservation of harmony, by avoidance of state-sponsored 
legal dispute resolu tion framework, to yield before local customs. 
Confucian heritage 
The persistence of Confucian heritage in Vietnam as in other East 
Asian countries, where peoples have been governed by ethics rather 
than by law, is qui te significant. Confucian teachi ngs were 
considered for centuries as mora l standards of human conduct. 
Though they have not the binding force of law, as their breaches do 
not entail a penalty but only expose the offender to public criticism, 
they are regarded as superior to law because of their high standard 
in ethics .  At most law is considered as a necessary supplement to 
ethics . 
The ancient Legali st School, headed by Han Fei, expounded law 
as a subject of political philosophy rather than as a juridical 
science. The gist of such a teaching is that government should be 
conducted by laws sternly enforced, as opposed to government based 
on benevolence and conducted by men deemed to be virtuous and wise, 
as preached by the Confucian School . It is characterized by a 
supreme belief in the efficacy of law as a panacea of government and 
seems to ignore that, after all, law is made and administered by 
men; i t  is men, not laws, that govern. 
It should be understood that the ancient Legalist School does not 
teach legal rules or the doctrine of supremacy of law, as understood 
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today, but methods of government.  Moreover, according to the 
traditional conception, civil disputes were most often settled in the 
village chapel, the temple or the guild. These customary 'courts of 
equity' were preferred to 'courts of law' by the people because these 
customary institutions evoke customs and ethical principles in the 
settlement of private disputes in the spirit of compromise. 
If  the Vietnamese ancient pol itical order with its Confucian 
foundations establishes the duties of an individual to the monarch, 
it also specifies the duty of the monarch to the individ ual . The 
monarch must conduct himself as under a mandate from heaven and 
must manifest an example of wisdom to the people. When a monarch 
oppresses his people in contradiction to the moral and the natural 
order, it is held that he loses the mandate and meri ts being 
overthrown by the people, who are legitimately justified in obeying 
another prince invested with a new mandate. Thus, the concept of 
'legitimate revolution' has always been current among the mass of 
the Vietnamese people, based on the principle that 'heaven hears 
by the ears and sees by the eyes of our people. Heavens honors virtue 
and punishes vice by means of our people . . .  ' . 
However, the interpretation of the wi thd rawal and the 
bestowal of heaven's mandate was left as vague as possible . The 
Confucian system, placing its faith in the goodwill of those 
governing, did not deem it necessary to establish more efficacious 
guarantees against the abuse of power. This failure was rectified by 
an insti tution which is uniquely Vietnamese, the commune (or 
village) .  The Vietnamese saying most often ci ted by the jurists 
concerned with state organization goes: 'Royal ordinances are 
primed by communal customs'. Briefly, the commune, thanks to the 
independence taken by it vis-a-vis the empire, is a state within the 
state, and counterbalances the power of the throne. It has its own 
administration by notables, its own customary tribunal and its own 
patrimony which is called communal property. The rice paddies 
belonging to the commune are inalienable; they are divided among 
the villagers for cul tivation. A part of the harvest from these lands 
is given to the commune and dispersed by the communal council for 
public works. 
Vietnamese renovation is a comprehensive and synchronous 
process, but we have to take appropriate steps, to aim at selected 
targets and define the main links for each period, through deeper 
insight into Vietnamese society past and present. The above bird's 
eye view o f  Confucian method of government, with both positive 
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and negative influence on social relations, might inspire some 
aspects of our approach in the building a modem state governed by 
the rule of law in Vietnam today. 
In the modern history of Vietnam, the concept of a s tate 
governed by the rule of law was first put forth by Ho Chi Minh in 
June 1 9 1 9. In his famous 'Eight-points demand of the Annamese 
people', sent to the Versailles Peace Conference, the future President 
of the first Vietnamese democratic republican state demanded that 
the French colonial administration apply the 'rule of law' in 
Vietnam. 
After the success of the August Revolution in 1 945 and the 
Declaration of Independence, President Ho Chi Minh laid down the 
urgent tasks for the provisional government, among which were the 
holding of general elections and drafting of a consti tution. He said: 
Formerly, we were dominated by the dictatorial imperial 
regime then by the colonialist regime, no less dictatorial. 
Therefore, our country had no Consti tu tion, our people had 
no right to freedom and democracy. We must have a 
democratic Constitution. I propose that the government 
holds as soon as pos sible general elections through 
universal suffrage. All ci tizens, male and female, from 18 
years upward, have the right to vote and to stand for the 
elections, regardless of their being rich or poor, their 
religious belief and generation. 
Four months after the Declaration of Independence, the general 
elections were held, on 6 January,1946. The first National Assembly, 
at its first session held on 2 March, 1946, elected the official 
government, with Ho Chi Minh as first president of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV). It  also appointed him as chairman of 
the commission to draft the constitution. In November 1 946, fourteen 
months after the Declaration of Independence, the constitution of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was officially adopted . It laid 
the legal foundation for the first democratic system in Vietnam in 
which all power in the country belongs to the people. It put an end to 
the hereditary imperial regime and the regime composed of 
mandarins designated by the king and regarded as 'the people's 
parents', as well as the regime composed of governor-generals, 
governors and residents designated by the colonialist rulers. From 
slaves, the Vietnamese people became masters of their own destiny. 
86 Ngo Ba Thanh 
Speaking at a national conference of the judiciary, on 22 March 
1957, President Ho stressed: 'The judiciary must contribute to the 
realization of the rule of law, maintain and defend the rights and 
interest s  of the people, and defend our democratic system' 
Unfortunately, the wars of resistance and the implementation of a 
centralized, bureaucratic administrative mechanism prevented in 
large measure, the realization of President Ho Chi Minh's intention 
to establish a democratic state governed by the rule of law. 
The l egal system implementing the 1 980 consti tution was 
establ ished and developed in conformi ty wi th the country' s 
revolutionary tasks in the period of transition to socialism on a 
national scale, with a triangular relationship between the 
Communist Party as leader, the people as master and the state as 
administrator in Vietnamese society. 
The pol itical  system of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(SRV).  the framework of which is the system of elected people's  
councils both national (National Assembly) and local, firmly 
consolidated in 40 years' struggle for national and social liberations, 
may be seen as providing the people with the appropriate political 
instrument it needs, to exercise its right to mastery. 
The corresponding economic system however, is only in the 
process of formation and has enormous difficul ties to face. The 
country's economy is extremely weak and most heterogeneous, 
including individual owners, manufacturers, and private capitalists, 
especially in the southern part . The policy line of the Vietnam 
Communist Party (VCP) adopted by the fourth congress demanded 
the mobilization of all productive forces for the advance toward s 
socialism. Hence the 1980 constitution assigned the socialist state 
the task of guiding, utilizing, and transforming the non-socialist 
sectors in of the economy, and instituting and consolidating the 
system of socialist ownership of the means of production. The aim 
was to build a national economy with two essential components, the 
state sector under the ownership of the entire people, and the 
collective ownership of the working people. State-run economic 
establishments operated according to the orientation and tasks laid 
down under the state plan. Cooperatives operated in accordance 
with national and regional economic plans. The state conducted the 
socialist transformation of the private capi talist economy in both 
urban and rural areas by suitable forms . The state guided the 
national economy according to unified plans. 
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Formally speaking, based on provisions of the 1 980 constitution, 
the legal framework was quite incoherent, especially regarding the 
economic insti tutions, which were not in conformity with the 
socio-economic development. As a result, ten years o f  misguided 
central planning, of  hasty socialist transformation attempting 
immediately to abolish the multi-sectoral economy, had by 1 986 
left the economy in a shambles . Per capita food production was 
decreasing, labour productivity was abysmal, industry was stagnant, 
private enterprise was suppressed, and hyperi nflation was 
rampant. 
The VCP Sixth Party Congress in December 1 986 severely 
criticized the above failures and shortcomings. It  also laid the 
foundation for the country's economic renovation, shifting from a 
bureaucratic command economy to a market-oriented economy, 
which will ensure full utilization of all economic sectors' potentials, 
expanding economic, scientific and technological cooperation and 
exchanges wi th the international market. 
All-round renovation makes it  imperative for the state 
promptly to promulgate suitable policies and laws in order to meet 
the need for social management through the rule of law. Yet, law 
has not become the state's main instrument for economic social 
administration or for the protection of the people's right to mastery. 
While we stand for a vigorous development of a commodity economy 
and diversification in production and business operations by all 
sectors, we fail to come out with specific legal provisions to d irect 
and control these activities on a timely basis, or to make the society 
develop dynamically in accordance wi th laws and regulations, 
without confusion and disorder. Our economy is undergoing structural 
changes, many new economic relations are taking shape or have been 
formed; meanwhile, lawmaking and organizations have not kept 
pace with these changes. I t  is our delay and shortcomings in legal 
and procedural matters that have created loopholes in business 
operations and other activities, allowing speculators, smugglers, tax 
evaders and corrupted cadres to make use of the dereliction in state 
management, to embezzle properties of the state and the people. 
The renovation process gained momentum after 1986, and has 
been institutionalized more recently in the form of a law on private 
enterprise and a companies law. Both laws, also known as domestic 
investment law, are aimed at institutionalizing the general line of 
development of the multi-sector economy, and encouraging various 
economic sectors to engage freely in business activities within the 
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framework of law. Objectives include mobilizing and making 
effective use of the capital, labour and natural resources of the 
country; generating new employment; speeding up the pace of 
economic development; protecting the lawful interests of enterprise 
owners and investors, while enhancing efficiency of state 
management of business activities. 
The two laws - private enterprise law and the companies law, 
including the l imited liability company and the shareholders' 
company - have met the expectations of various social strata, 
especially of people with capital available for business investment. 
As of 15  August 1 992, the various state economic arbitration agencies 
empowered to examine private enterpri ses and companies'  
application for registration, have issued 1 ,292 permits with a total 
capital of 700 billion dong, including 758 private enterprises, with a 
total capital of 141  billion dong; 492 limited liability companies 
with a total capital of 331 billion dong; and 41 share holders' 
companies with a total capital of 1 78 billion dong (1 0,500 dong= 
US$1 .00] . 
With the enactment of these two domestic investment laws 
private enterprises have been relegitimized and given equal rights 
with other enterprises under the law. They shall enjoy freedom of 
enterprise and full  initiative in all business activities within the 
framework of law. The result is the re-emergence of dynamic and 
creative private sector. Through the use of macro-economic 
management tools, such as restricting money supply, reducing the 
budget deficit, eliminating state sector subsidies and floating the 
local currency, inflation is gradually being brought under control and 
was running at to 30 to 40 per cent per annum in 1 992, half of the 1991 
rate. The state sector, al though it is to maintain a leading role in 
key economic areas, is being rationalized. Hundreds of small state 
enterprises at the local level have been merged or closed, and an 
equitization of state-owned bu siness is being undertaken on a trial 
basis, to accumulate experience for a large-scale equitization, before 
amend ing statu tory provisions, to even tually allow foreign 
organizations and individuals to buy shares in state-owned 
businesses. 
Five years of economic liberalization under the rule of law have 
much transformed Vietnam's social landscape. The door to the 
outside world has been opened wide, gradually integrating 
Vietnam's internal market with the external market. Foreign and 
domestic resources, financial and technological, have been brought 
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to bear on three priority areas: agriculture, consumer goods and 
exports. The foreign investment law of 1987, amended and 
supplemented by the National Assembly in 1 990, is  the leading 
legislative document of our foreign economic renovation policy, not 
only because it is considered as one of the most liberal foreign 
investment laws in Asia, but also because the amended law permits 
private Vietnamese economic organizations to establish business 
cooperation relations with foreign investors . This will help raise 
the share of domestic capital in the investment structure of the 
national economy, and increase the capacity for drawing foreign 
investments. 
A few years ago, the announcement of the renovation of the 
economy, the restructuring of the government's system of policies and 
measures for macro-economic administration on the basis of a 
five-sector market economy and open-door policy, was only a signal; 
today, all of these have become surprising reali ties . The renovation 
in banking, with joint venture banks and foreign banks operating in 
competi tion with Vietnamese banks, is obviously rad ical when 
compared to the stagnant state of affairs a few years before. 
Also, few people could imagine that from virtually a standstill, 
matters would advance at such a high speed . Over the past five 
years, the National Assembly's eighth legislature has examined, 
debated and passed 27 laws, and the Council of State has enacted 39 
ordinances. We have promulgated such legal documents with a view 
to institutionalizing the policies of the sixth and seventh congresses 
of the VCP, meeting the requirement of managing the country 
through the rule of law, and serving the all-round renovation work, 
first and foremost, economic renovation. This has helped to promote 
business activities in the economic sectors of the country and foreign 
investment for national economic development. 
Directly related to economic renovation are laws and ordinances 
such as the land law, the law on foreign investment, law on private 
enterprises, law on companies, the maritime code, the civil aviation 
law, the law on forest preservation and development, and taxation 
laws. Among the ordinances relating to the economy are those 
dealing with protec tion of indu strial property, transfer of 
technology, economic contracts, economic arbitration, state bank, 
credit cooperatives and finance companies, accounting and statistics, 
mineral resources, preservation and development of water resources, 
housing, quality of goods, and weights and measures. 
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On the whole, the legislation programme has been executed 
with diligence, the newly promulgated laws and ordinances have a 
higher quality than the earlier ones and some of these laws and 
ordinances have actually promoted the implementation of the 
social and economic tasks to suit the great changes. 
However, it should be pointed out that, in spite of the above 
said progress, work still falls behind the situation. The tasks of 
socio-economic management in economic fields have not yet been 
regulated and clearly delimited by corresponding documents. There 
has been no uniformity in the laws and ordinances already passed, 
and some have had little effect on economic and social life. Some 
laws which are important and badly needed have yet to be 
promulgated, such as the labor code. The labour, civil and 
commercial codes are still in the preparatory draft stage. In 
addition, some laws and ordinances still leave many questions 
unanswered; some were modified and supplemented many times, as 
they contained provisions challenged by social reality, especially 
regulations to guide the implementation of laws issued too belatedly 
by the Council of Ministers or by individual ministries. Some laws 
have a tendency to be ambiguous and vague, with major issues 
remaining to be resolved by subsequent administrative decisions . 
Such a tendency reduces the reliability of the laws, by deferring the 
'tough issues' for later government discretionary action. Weaknesses 
were also observed in the publication of laws, in making readily 
available to the public government regulations, instead of limiting 
access only to a small group of insiders. Also inadequate has been 
state management by means of law, leading to a slackening in social 
order and law observance because some officials, accustomed to the 
unavailability of government regulations, would adopt new 
regulations without official repeal of earlier enactments. As a 
result, the potential for inconsistent or conflicting provisions 
increased. A legal provision stipulating that no law, decree or other 
regulation would be effective until publication in an official gazette 
would be a practical improvement. 
The 1992 constitution 
At this point, it is necessary to stress that, if Vietnam's social­
economic renovation is to be irreversible and successful, a full­
fledged legal framework has to keep pace with the challenge of the 
new mechanism and be guaran teed by rel iable constitutional 
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provisions. All this i s  posing urgent tasks in the coming period 
aimed at building a democratic state under the rule of law, if in the 
process of 'making the people prosperous and the country strong', all 
citizens are to enjoy freedom of enterprise in accordance with the 
law, with their rights of ownership wi th regard to lawful income, 
savings, housing, chattel, means of production, fund s of other 
possessions in enterprises or other economic organizations, being 
protected by the law. 
The event that had the most significant effect on the law 
renovation in Vietnam was the revision of the 1 980 constitution in a 
radical and comprehensive manner. The revised 1 992 constitution is  
supposed to institutionalize the overall renovation line laid down 
by the VCP in its 'Programme on National Construction in the Period 
of Transition to Socialism', and i ts  'Strategy for Socioeconomic 
Stability and Development Until the Year 2000' put forth by the 
Seventh Party Congress. 
The 1992 constitution was adopted by the National Assembly' s 
eighth legislature, on 15  Apri l 1992 and promulated by the 
chairman of the Council of Sta te on 19 April 1 992. The 1 992 
constitution inherited from and developed Vietnam's three previous 
constitutions, those of 1945, 1 959 and 1980. The 1 992 constitution 
represents a step forward in Vietnam's consti tutional history, it is 
aimed at s trengthening state management of society through the 
rule of  law, building socialist democracy and enhancing socialist 
legali ty, so that the superstructure can well enhance its role in 
paving the way and accelerating socio-economic development. 
The constitution and economic renovation 
As far as substantive rights set forth by the constitution are 
concerned, the clearest changes are related to the economic system. 
In order to "'understand the impact of the constitution on economic 
renovation, it is important first to u nderstand the goal that 
constitutional reform is supposed to serve, namely the introduction of 
a free-market economy. 
Unlike a number of Eastern European countries that are md.king 
the transition to the free market, the adoption of free-market 
principles in Vietnam is no t predicated on an outright rejection of 
socialism. It rather represents formulation by the Vietnamese state 
of a strategy for developing the country economically. Under the 
economic renovation, Vietnam is still to maintain socialism as its 
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long-term goal, but prior to reaching socialism, it must first embrace 
the market in order to develop certain areas of the economy by using 
decentralized planning techniques associated with the free market. 
Article 1 5  asserts that the policy of the Vietnamese state is to 
develop a multi-sector commodity economy, based on a system of 
ownership by the entire people, by collectives, and by private 
individuals, of which the first two are the foundation. The aim of 
the state's economic policies is to satisfy to an ever greater extent 
the people's material and spiri tual need s by relea sing al l  
productive potential,  developing latent  possibi l i ties o f  al l  
components of the economy ( the state sector, the collective sector, 
the private individual sector the private capitalist sector and the 
state capitalist sector) to step up construction of the material and 
technical bases, to broaden economic, sc ientific, technical 
cooperation, and to expand intercourse with world markets. 
Another important amend ment is rela ted to Article 18 of the 
constitution, which presages significant changes in the country's 
land law, which is  also to be revised soon to accord with the 
constitution. While the land is owned by the entire people through 
and under the exclusive administration of the state, the constitution 
guarantees 's table and long term use of land' and the 'right to 
transfer the use of land'. A more comprehensive leasehold system of 
land usage is likely to be introduced , which might allow the buying 
and selling of land leases, the inheri tance of land use by immediate 
descendents and eventually the use of leasehold as a mortgage. It  
will  be sometime before these changes are legally codified and 
implemented . At present, land leasehold rights for foreigners are 
restricted to projects under the foreign investment law, leaving 
unclari fied the technical issue of how extensive should land 
regis tration be with respect to the registra tion of  mortgages, 
easements, and liens. There has been some talk of introducing a 
sophisticated land ti tle system, such as the Torrens system proposed 
by Australia, and taking up to fifteen years to put in place. This 
seems to be an issue for discussion by policy-makers rather than an 
actual project . 
To keep pace with the rapid development and fierce competition 
between investors and between countries receiving investments 
around the world, is consid ered an important acti vity of the 
Vietnamese government, taking form in the foreign investment law 
amended in 1 990. The 1 992 Constitu tion reaffirms that: 'The state 
encourages foreign organizations and individuals to invest funds and 
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technologies in Vietnam, in conformity with Vietnamese law and 
international law and practices; it guarantees the right to lawful 
ownershi p of funds, property and other interests by foreign 
organizations and individuals (Article 25 ) .  Vietnam has been 
seeking to institu te a system of bilateral investment protection 
agreements and a number of agreements have already been signed 
with Australia, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Italy, Swi tzerland, Belgium. Vietnam has also begun 
negotiating avoidance of double-taxation agreements, the first being 
signed with Australia in April 1992 . 
A series of regulations have been proclaimed during 1992, to 
include decrees on: entry and exit, on residence, on circulation of 
foreigners in Vietnam; on income tax for foreigners and Vietnamese 
working in enterprises with foreign invested capital; on minimum 
wages for Vie tnamese workers in the above-mentioned 
establishments; and on reduction of telecommunication fees to other 
countries. 
A survey conducted by the General Statistics Department in 1990 
showed tha t 4,484 out of 12,084 state-owned enterprises, or 88 per 
cent of the total, suffered losses. Of these enterprises, 29.6 per cent 
were cen trally run, and 39 .9 per cent locally run. These losing 
enterprises possessed 6,270 billion dong of fixed assets, or 38 per cent 
of all assets valued, and employed 32.9 per cent of all the work force 
of the state-owned economic sector. 
In recent years, with the new management mechanism beginning 
to take effect, a number of state-owned businesses, mostly centrally­
run, have gradually adapted, being able to stabil ize and even 
increase production. With the reorganization of the state-owned 
economic sector, a series of local businesses have been dissolved, or 
have gone bankrupt. 
The situation in developing countries has indicated the state­
owned economic sector as being generally less efficient that the 
private sector; for example, in Indonesia, investment for the state 
economic sector accounted for 54 .3 per cent, but this sector produced 
only 10 per cent of GDP . The respective percentages for South Korea 
were16 per cent and 1 1  per cent, and for India 27 per cent and 1 2  per 
cent. In recent years, these countries have taken steps to reorganize 
the state economic sector by means of privatization and by reducing 
the overall size of the sector. 
Equitization of state-owned enterprises is becoming popular as it 
has brought about manifest results in many countries. It is also an 
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inevitable trend in Vietnam. But due to the many constraints, 
equitization must be carried out step by step, with experimental 
transformation of state-owned enterprises into joint stock companies. 
In theory there is nothing to prevent shareholders from being 
government or non-government, nationals or foreign, managers or 
employees, or 'sleeping partners', to meet the demands of economic 
democracy. This would mean free access to production and business 
for non-producer and non-business people, for the sake of drawing in 
and making e fficient u se of inves tmen t capi tal  through 
shareholders, brokers and stock exchange intervention. The foreign 
investment law, the companies law and other legal documents will 
have to be adjusted, to provide a comprehensive, efficient legal 
framework to restructure the corporate system. The Rothschi ld 
Group's European Conglomerate will assist  the Vietnamese 
government to corporatize its state-owned enterprises. 
According to the Rothschild Group's experts, it is necessary to 
incorporate assets, liabili ties and business activi ties into new 
holding companies, whose shares would be issued to the Vietnamese 
state for sale to the public under the offer for sale.1 The likely size 
of the offer will have to be determined early in the divestment 
programme process. There are many interrelated matters, including 
the level of shareholding to be retained by the state, the level of 
debt to be included in the company on divestment, and the capacity 
of the domestic market and therefore the desirability of overseas 
tranches in the offering. It may be appropriate to restrict the extent 
of any overseas offerings, to a level which would not dominate the 
size of the offer in the domestic market, from a national point of 
view. 
Should Vietnam give to 100 per cent foreign-invested capital 
enterprises the same preferential treatmen t granted to joint­
ventures? Due to Vietnam's shortage of capi tal, personnel and 
management expertise, the law on foreig n  investment gives 
preferential treatment to the joint venture form over the 100 per cent 
foreign-owned enterprise, especially through tax incentives. Article 
27 of the foreign investment law provides: 
1 Tran Phuoc Thien, Managing director, Service Trad ing Division, N.M. 
Rothschild and ·sons (Singapore) Limited. 
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Depending on the branch or sector of investment, the scale 
of i ts capital contribution, the volume of its exports and 
the nature and duration of its operation, a joint venture 
may be exempted by the state organ for administration of 
foreign investment, from payment of corporate income tax 
for a minimum period of two years counting from the first 
profit-making year, and be allowed a 50 per cent reduction 
of corporate income tax for a minimum period of two 
succeeding years . . .  
Article 28 adds� 
In exceptional cases necessi tating encouragement for 
investment, the corporate income tax may be reduced by the 
state organ for administration of foreign investment to 1 0  
per cent  o f  the earned profits, and the period o f  tax 
exemption or reduction may be longer than that provided 
for in Art. 27. 
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It has been suggested that with our open-door policy, with new 
pri ori ties in socio-economi c development and investment 
opportunities in Vietnam during the 1990s, and in line wi th the 1992 
consti tution, perhaps the 1 00 per cent foreign-owned enterprises 
should enjoy the same preferential treatment and incentives given to 
joint-ventures . Experiences has shown that 1 00 per cent foreign­
owned enterprises have many advantages over other forms of 
investment. As far as investors are concerned, since the capital is 
provided and the enterprises are operated exclusively by them, 
some of the contradictions which may arise in joint ventures can be 
avoided and economic efficiency improved. Foreign investors are 
will ing to introduce advanced technology and management 
techniques, and in this way produce competitive products . The 
foreign enterprise can make use of the abundant resources and low 
labour costs of the host country. Vietnam need not contribute capital 
nor take risks. The advanced technology introduced by foreign 
enterprises can be gradually assimilated by local personnel. The use 
of local raw materials, parts and components by foreign enterprises 
means that local industry, commerce, transportation and other 
services can be developed, contributing to more employment, revenue 
and foreign exchange earnings. 
Finally, international investment often involves bilateral 
relationships . While Vietnam welcomes foreign enterprises to 
invest in Vietnam, we also begin to establish Vietnamese enterprises 
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in other countries. In choosing the form of international economic 
cooperation, it is necessary for the cooperating parties to respect 
each other's interests. Foreign enterprises must conform to the law 
and economic requirements of the host country in all their activities, 
from their establishment until their dissolution. The host country 
should respect international practices and the legitimate 
requirements of foreign investors. 
Nationalization 
This section will review the pros and cons in respect to the highly 
sensiti ve issue of nationalization, which involves na tional 
sovereignty and North-South polemics. Article 25 of the 1 992 
constitution guarantees that 'enterprises with foreign investments 
shall not be nationalized.' The question of whether an immunity 
from nationalization for enterprises with foreign inves tment in 
Vietnam should expressly be provided in the constitution wa s a 
subject of hot debate among policy-makers and lawmakers. 
The views of those who were against the provisions of Article 25 
are as follows. If the economic relations legislation includes the 
provision that no foreign enterprise will be nationalized, such 
provision, even though it  might temporarily relieve the foreign 
investors of their misgivings and enhance their enthusiasm for 
investment in Vietnam, would be tantamount to tying one's own 
hands and consequently would entail a potential danger. Even 
though the question of nationalizing foreign investment does not 
exist at present in Vietnam, it is unwise to exclude such a possibility 
entirely in the constitution. 
As for the opposite viewpoint, proponents argue tha t the 
exercise of national sovereignty is by no means absolutely free from 
constraint. In international relations, as long as different countries 
continue to cooperate with each other, each country needs to impose 
some self-restraint on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and its 
own free wil l .  This princi ple is enshrined in all international 
agreements or treaties concluded on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefi t, as rights and obliga tions are usually reciprocal . 
Furthermore, with the open door policy and the introduction of the 
foreign investment law, Vietnam as a socialist country has accepted 
foreign capital from capitalist countries and has opened part of her 
domestic market, to allow foreign capitalists to carry out 'capitalist 
exploitation' (from a Marxist point of view), for a certain period and 
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to a certain extent, so as to mobilize domestic economic potential and 
at the same time to attract foreign resources, with a view to creating 
a new driving force for the growth and development of the economy. 
Such self-restriction or self-restraint in the exercise of sovereignty 
is, in the final analysis, designed to achieve greater self­
development and to make Vietnam even more independent and 
prosperous. 
In light of the actual world si tuation and conditions of our 
country, attracting foreign capital and technology on a controlled 
scale, on a selective basis and in a methodical manner, would not 
lead to domination of the national economy by foreign capital or 
produce adverse effects on the people's livelihood . In view of the 
fact that foreign capital has not yet been introduced in sufficiently 
large amounts and fast enough and with the the US trade embargo 
remaining, it was wise to incorporate the express provision against 
nationalization of enterprises with foreign investments in the 1 992 
consti tution. 
The issue of immunity from nationalization for foreign 
investment in Vietnam being expressly guaranteed by the 
constitution of the SRV is highly significant, because for the first 
time Vietnam has departed from the trad itional practice of 
socialist countries, where no such express provisions have been 
made. And as we are building a state governed by the rule of law in 
a way sui ted to our country' s level of social and economic 
development, in line wi th the overall renovation policy,  
comprehensive foreign economic relations legislation must  be 
introduced in order to attract foreign investment in greater amount, 
at a higher speed and with better resul ts . 
I t  is necessary to stress a very fundamental question on which 
hinges the success or failure of any new task or policy, i .e. the 
question of actually establishing law and order in conformity with 
the new mechanism. Indeed, in the sphere of economic renovation, 
political-juridical reform requires first of all that businesses in all 
economic sectors operate according to the rule of law, strictly 
implementing financial discipline, in order to create a healthy 
market relationship in which the only things that count are 
productivity and quality of products. It is also intended to fight 
against injustices in distribution which have upset all sets of values 
in society� It is as well a basic condi tion to fight inflation, to 
stabilize the macro-economic management and to ensure safety for 
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all business activities. It is in addition, a prerequisite to fight 
against speculation, corruption, and smuggling. 
Positive results have been gained in the process of implementing 
economic renovation during the past years: agricultural production 
has gone up, resulting not only in food self-sufficiency, but also food 
surplus for exports. Foreign trade has developed relatively rapidly 
despite a sudden fall in market relations with the former Soviet 
Union, which compelled us to turn to new markets. Goods consumed in 
domestic markets have become more abundant and diverse, and 
consumers have the right to make their own choices. Considerable 
improvements have been seen in the socio-economic conditions and in 
the cultural and spiri tual life of the people. 
Through its policy of opening the door to the outside world and 
making friend s with all countri es, Vietnam attaches grea t 
importance to foreign direct investment, to attracting capital, 
receiving modern technologies, creating more jobs and gradually 
improving the managerial and entrepreneurial skills of business 
executives. To create a favourable environment for investment in 
Vietnam, the eighth Na tional Assembly which ended i ts five-year 
term of office with the vote of the 1992 constitution, debated and 
passed some 25 laws and 49 ordinances (Council of State) .  The 
government passed some 70 by-laws aimed at concretizing the law on 
foreign investment in Vietnam and providing guid ance for its 
implementation. 
Vietnam's direction of economic development in the next five 
years is to continue focussing efforts on agricultural production, 
especially food-grain production, attaching importance to forestry 
and aquaproducts vigorously developing the food industry and 
processing of farm, forestry and sea products; step up the production 
of consumer goods to meet domestic demand while increasing 
opportunities for export. Special attention must be paid to the 
application of new techniques and technologies to raise the quality 
and diversity of products. 
Efforts should be made to develop the fuel and energy industry, 
including expansion of oil and gas prospecting and exploitation on 
the continental shelf, to increase the capacity of electricity sources 
and transmission lines, to expand coal mining and raise its quality, 
and to start construction of an oil and gas refinery. Investments must 
be made to improve and develop infrastructure, especially that of 
telecommunications and transport, information and liaison, with the 
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aim to ensuring steady stages of economic development and creating 
favourable conditions to attract more and more investment. 
Since our renovation course aims at establishing a multi-sectoral 
commodity economy, the state is to regulate the economy according 
to long term objectives of the country on the basis of the market law 
on supply and demand. According to these principles, the spirit of 
which it reflected in provisions of the economic system chapter of 
the 1992 Constitution, all economic sectors are equal before the law, 
economic uni ts are autonomous in terms of finance, planning and 
distributing business profits, the circulation of goods is free on 
nation-wide level, and prices are mainly determined by the 
markets. 
To achieve a law-governed state, importance has been attached 
to the state's function and task of management in a market economy 
and to the free enterprise of grassroots economic units, in order to 
strengthen its role as a macro-manager in all spheres and do a way 
with the existence of scattered and overlapping responsibilities, 
streamlining organization, administration and intermediary roles in 
each branch, as well as in the management apparatus as a whole. 
Laws need to be perfected in the following directions : codifying 
regulations on different types of business enterprise (cooperatives 
law, state enterprise law ); partnership law, strengthening the role 
of judicial tribunals dealing wi th business activities, and laying the 
legal foundation for the settlement of bankrupted enterprises; some 
legislation needs to be revised : the land law, the foreign investment 
law, companies law, private enterpri se law, and the economic 
contract ordinance. New legislation will be drafted : civil law, 
commercial law, environment law, insurance law, competi tion law, 
bankruptcy law, and stock market law. 
Such is the juridical-economic basis for an economic system open 
to both domestic and foreign markets and aimed at a common 
objective: to mobilize all domestic economic potential and at the 
same time to attract foreign resources, with a view to creating a new 
driving force for the growth and development of the economy. 
Political renovation and the state apparatus 
In the face of the needs of all-round renovation of the country, 
which is hinged on economic renovation, the political system has 
exhibited many weaknesses and shortcomings .  In particular, the 
apparatus of the party, state and mass organizations has not been 
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able to represent and implement the right to mastery of the people; 
responsibil i ties are not clearly defined, the organization is 
cumbersome, the working style not scientific, di sciplined or 
effective; bureaucracy and corruption are widespread and serious.  
We have already renovated step by step the political system to 
meet the demands of socio-economic renovation. The present 
situation requires renovation of the political system in a more basic 
and systematic manner, thus deepening the process of synchronous 
and comprehensive change. Revising the 1980 constitution, taking 
one step in reforming the state apparatus and renovating the party 
leadership toward the state, are the major policies put forth by the 
seventh party congress aimed at strengthening the effect of the state 
management of society through the rule of law, bui lding the 
socialist democracy and enhancing socialist legali ty, so that the 
superstructure can enhance its role in pa ving the way and 
accelerating socioeconomic development. 
As stated by Vo Chi Cong, chairman of the Committee to Amend 
the 1980 consti tu tion: 
As time passes, we better understood that there will be no 
ready model for us to copy on our way to socialism, since the 
transitional period in our country has its specific character. 
Surely, we need time and transitional steps, measures and 
methods which should be sought for and tested in reali ty, 
in order to change from an old model to which we have 
become too much accustomed, to a completely new one. 
Objective law requires that the new can emerge only when 
there are enough prerequisites for its emergence. 
The process of renovation in general and reform of the state 
apparatus in particular must be carried out actively.  But i t  is 
necessary to carefully weigh each step in order firmly to ensure and 
increase poli tical stability. This process must be based on creative 
application of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's Thought, on 
realities in the country, and on experience in bu ilding the 
Vietnamese state in several past decades, taking into account 
advanced experiences of the world . 
Sal ient constitutional provisions related to the pol itical regime 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam include the following. Article 1 
reiterates the principle that Vietnam is an independent, sovereign 
and united country, which in its territorial integri ty comprises the 
mainland, off-shore islands, airspace and territorial waters. 
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Unlike Article 2 of the 1980 constitution, which defines the 
Soci al ist  Republ ic of Vietnam as 'a s tate of proletarian 
dictatorship', the 1 992 constitution adds a new concept, defining the 
SRV as 'a state of the people, by the people, for the people'. All 
state power belongs to the people, whose foundation is the alliance 
of the working class with the peasantry and the intelligentsia . 
Article 4 reaffirms the overall leading role of the Vietnam 
Communist Party, described as 'the vanguard of the Vietnamese 
working class and loyal representative of the interests of the 
working class, the toiling people and the whole nation, acting upon 
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's Thought, is the 
force leading the state and society. All organizations of the party 
shall operate within the framework of the constitution and the 
law' . There must be no confusion between the party organization and 
the state apparatus. The principle of democratic centralism must be 
thoroughly observed in all organizations and activities of the 
National Assembly, the people's councils and all other state organs. 
The Vietnam Fatherland Front is no longer 'a firm prop of the 
state' , but 'consti tu tes the poli tical base of people's power', and 
together with the state works for the care and protection of the 
people's legitimate interests, encourages the people to exercise their 
right to mastery, ensures the strict observance of the constitution, 
and supervises the activity of state organs, elected representatives 
and state officials and employees. 
In 1 980 the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions was 
described as 'the largest mass organization of the working class, a 
school of communism, of economic management, and management of 
the state' . The 1992 consti tution states: 
The Trade Union, being the socio-political organization of 
the working class and the toiling people, joins state organs, 
economic and social bod ies in looking after and 
safeguarding the rights and interests of cadres, workers, 
employees and other laboring people, joins state organs, 
economic and social bod ies in looking after and 
safeguarding the rights and interests of cadres, workers, 
employees and other laboring people, participates in state 
administration and social management, and in the control 
and supervision of the activity of state organs and economic 
bodies; educates cadres and labouring people with respect 
to construction and defence of Vietnam. 
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Under Article 5, the state carries out a policy of equali ty, 
solidarity and mutual assistance among all nationalities and 
prohibits all acts of national discrimination and division. 
All social activities are brought within the confines of  the 
constitution and the rule of law through the provisions of Article 12, 
according to which the state exercises the administration of society 
by means of the law, and constantly strengthen socialist legality. 
All state organs, economic and social bodies, units of the people's 
armed forces, and all citizens must seriously observe the constitution 
and the law, strive to prevent and oppose all criminal behaviour 
and all violations of the consti tution and the law. All infringements 
of state interests, of the rights and legitimate interests of collectives 
and individual ci tizens, shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
l a w .  
A new disposition provides that foreigners residing i n  Vietnam 
are required to comply with the constitution and the laws of 
Vietnam. Their lives, assets and legitimate rights and interests are 
protected by the state, in accorda nce with the provisions of 
Vietnamese law (Article 81 ) .  
The state protects the legiti mate interests of o verseas 
Vietnamese, creates favourable cond itions for them to keep close 
contacts with their families and homeland, and contribute to the 
construction of their native land and country (Article 75) .  
Regarding fundamental rights and duties of the ci tizen, the 
constitution has introduced new provisions guaranteeing not only 
substantive bu t also procedural rights of citizens before the courts. 
Article 50 for the first ti me provides that ' [ i ] n the Socialis t 
Republic of Vietnam, human rights in the political, civic, economic, 
cultural and social fields are respected . They are embodied in the 
citizen's rights and are determined by the constitution and the law' . 
New rights guaranteed by the constitu tion include the following: 
Right to do business freely in accordance with the law; 
Right of ownership of lawful income, savings, houses, means of 
living and production, capital and other assets used by private 
businesses or by other economic organizations; 
Right to build dwelling hou ses according to zoning regu lations 
and the law. Rights of lessees and lessors are protected by law; 
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Right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
country, and to travel outside Vietnam and return home from 
abroad, in accordance with the law; 
Right to copyright and industrial property ownership; 
Equality before the law of all business enterprises . Their legal 
ownership of capital and assets are protected by the state; 
Enterprises of all economic sectors are permitted to enter into 
joint ventures or cooperate with foreign individ uals and 
organizations; 
Private sector entities may engage in business and production, 
and may establish enterprises wi thout restriction as to the 
size and scope of operation. 
Presumption of innocence: a constitutional principle 
Article 72 of the consti tution provides that: 'No one shall be 
regarded as guilty and be subjec ted to punishment, before the 
sentence of the Court has acquired full legal effect' . The principle 
according to which no one may be adjudged guilty of a crime and 
subjected to punishment as a criminal except by a court sentence and 
in conformity with the law was earlier record ed in the code of 
criminal procedure. 
Yet, during the drafting of the criminal procedure code some 
people advanced the following argument against the formulation 'a 
person is presumed to be innocent': why is the defendant presumed to 
be innocent once he is brought to trial and is inculpated in committing 
a crime? Who considers him innocent? Evidently not the 
investigator who has preferred a charge against him and drawn up 
an indictment, nor the procurator who has approved the indictment 
and sent the case to court and maintains the accusation in a trial . 
Moreover, before the court has passed a judgment it does not presume 
the defendant to be guilty or not guilty. Otherwise, it would not 
have rendered a decision (a rider) on bringing the defendant to trial, 
but would have dismissed the case in administrative session. Who 
then, presumes the defendant to be innocent? Such a line of reasoning 
is based on the wrong understanding of the meaning of the 
presumption of innocence, which does not imply a subjective opinion 
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held by one or the other trial participant, but an objective legal 
status established by law. 
According to the presumption of innocence, the law regards the 
defendant as innocent until those who consider him guilty can prove 
that the defendant is guil ty, and the court agrees with this 
conclusion in its judgment. The investigator and the procurator' s 
statement, to the effect that the defendant is guil ty, is only their 
subjective opinion, inference, or conclusion, the correctness of which 
the court has to prove, and only the court sentence means a positive 
solution to the accused's guilt. 
The right of the defendant to defence and the presumption of 
innocence are inseparable, i .e the very right to defence would not be 
protected without the presumption of innocence. Violations of the 
right to defence arise in one form or another, from the ignoring of the 
presumption of innocence, from adopting an attitude to the defendant 
as an exposed criminal . The identification of the defendant as a 
guilty person before the court handling the case, and the declaration 
that the defendant is an exposed criminal, with regard to whom the 
court is alleged to se ttle only the ques tion of the degree of  
responsibility and the meting out  of punishment, are very serious 
breaches of the defendant's right to defence and of the presumption 
of innocence. 
The 1 992 constitu tion contains express formulations which 
remove any possibil ity of incorrect understanding. It  says in 
straightforward terms : 
The right of the the defendant to be defended is guaranteed . 
The defendant can either conduct his own defence or ask someone 
else to do it. An organization of barristers shall be set up to help 
the defendant and other parties in a law-suit to defend their 
rights and legitimate interes ts and contribu te to the 
safeguarding of socialist legality (Article 1 32) .  
No one shall be regarded as gui l ty and be subjected to  
punishment before the sentence of the court has acquired full  
legal effect. 
Any person who is arrested, held in custody, prosecu ted, or 
brought to trial in violation of the law shall be entitled to damages 
for any material harm suffered and his reputation shall be 
rehabilitated . Anybody who contravenes the la w in arresting,  
holding in custody, prosecuting, or bringing to trial another person 
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thereby causing him damage, shall be dealt with severely (Article 
72) .  
The sentences and decisions o f  the people's court which have 
acquired legal effect must be respected by state organs, economic 
bodies, social organizations, people' s  armed units and all  
ci tizens; they must be seriously implemented by the individuals 
and organs concerned (Article 136) . 
Vietnam's approach to human rights 
Addressing the opening session of the ninth National Assembly, Do 
Muoi, VCP Secretary General, pointed to the great significance of 
the adoption of the 1 992 constitution, which he described as  
'conforming with the real situation, meeting the development needs 
of the country and matching the progressive trend of our time' . He 
ad ded :  
Our society by its nature is a democratic society. We are for 
more and more democracy, constant expansion of democracy 
alongside national development. However, democracy 
mus t always lie within the boundary of law: all acts of 
citizens must comply with the constitu tion and the law. To 
challenge and trample upon the law is to challenge and 
trample upon democracy, and to disregard the freedom and 
democracy of others, as well as the entire people. Tha t 
cannot be tolerated. 
At present, Do Muoi said, some people regard themselves as 
supreme judges in the matter of human rights. They condemn others 
for violating human rights. But, what is the respect of human 
rights, if not the guarantee of the right of people to live in peace, 
independence and freedom, to be the master of the country, society 
and themselves, to lead a plentiful, equal and happy life ? Respect 
for the rights of each person must relate to respect for the right to 
equality of all nations free from imposition by any country. Equality 
of ci tizens before the law, equal ity among nationalities, between 
men and women, freedom of belief and non-belief, and other 
democratic freedoms, must go hand in hand with the obligations and 
responsibili ties of citizens before the country and society. Those who 
act contrary to the constitution and law, who violate the freedoms 
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and democratic rights of other people, who harm the interests of the 
nation and the community, and even misuse freedom and democracy 
to betray the motherland and oppose the people, must  be duly 
punished according to the constitution and the law. 
That is our concept of democracy. Judging from the above, we can 
assert that our country, our people and our state really respect 
human rights and respect the Universal Declaration and other 
conventions on human rights. In our socio-economic environment, 
democracy and human rights are to be considered as both rights 
protecting the individual and rights to participa te in fashioning 
society. They are designed to enable people in their own interest to 
get involved in shapi ng society, invigora ting the party ' s  
leadership, improving the efficiency of the law-governed state, 
promoting and supervising socialist democracy, indirectly through 
representatives to the National Assembly or people's councils, 
through collective mastery in mass organiza tions, through direc t 
participation in public affairs at the grassroo ts level, or through 
both indirect and direct forms of people's power. 
Human rights as guaranteed by the constitution should not lead 
anyone to blind trust. Implementation of citizens' rights is to a grea t 
extent dependent on people's active involvement and on the action or 
failure to act of public au thori ties and other people. Contradictions 
may occur due to erroneous decisions, illegal behaviour or undue 
claims. The law of the press, for example, provides that if the press 
gives false, distorting or denigrating information against a citizen, 
harming his/her honour and dignity, the press must make public its 
correction and apology. It it refuses to do so, the citizen concerned 
has the right to protest to the sponsoring office of the press organ or 
file an action in court. 
To conceive of human rights as participating in the shaping of 
society means accepting that the contents of these rights undergoes 
constant development. Laying down and implementing human rights 
must never be viewed, therefore, as something static and complete 
once it has been performed, but therefore as something which needs 
to be improved and renewed constantly. 
The National Assembly 
The National Assembly is the only organ vested with constitutional 
and legislative powers. It makes and amends the constitution and 
the laws, it works out a programme for making laws and decrees; it 
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exercises the supreme control over conformity to the constitution, the 
law and the resolutions of the National Assembly. 
The Standing Commi ttee of the National Assembly has the 
power: to interpret the consti tution, laws and decrees; to enact 
decrees on matters entrusted to it  by the National Assembly; to 
exercise supervision and control over implementation of the 
constitution, laws and resolutions; to suspend execution of formal 
written orders of the government, the prime minister, the Supreme 
People's Court, the Supreme People's Office of Supervision and 
Control, if they contravene the constitution, or laws and resolutions 
of the National Assembly; to report the matter to the National 
Assembly for it to decide on abrogation of such orders; to repeal 
written orders of the government, prime minister, the Supreme 
People's Court, the Supreme People's Office of Supervision and 
Control that are contrary to the decrees and resolutions of the 
Standing Committee of the Na tional Assembly; to exercise 
supervision and control over and give guidance to the activities of 
the people's councils; and to annul wrong resolutions by the people's 
councils of provinces and cities under direct central rule (Article 91). 
The country's president, who is the head of state, has the power 
to promulgate the constitution, laws and decrees and to propose to 
the Standing Committee of the National Assembly to review its 
decrees and resolutions in matters stipulated in points 8 and 9 of 
Article 91 , within ten days following their adoption.  If those 
decrees and resolutions are again passed by the Standing Committee 
of the National Assembly with the country's president dissenting, 
the latter shall report the matter to the National Assembly for it to 
decide the issue at its next session. 
As for the government, it shall issue resolutions and decrees, the 
prime minister shal l issue decisions and directives and cabinet 
ministers shall issue decisions, d irectives and circulars. It is the 
government's responsibility to ensure implementation of the 
constitution and the law in state organs, economic bodies, social 
organizations, units of the armed forces, and among the citizens, 
besides presenting draft laws and decrees to be passed by the 
National Assembly and i ts Standing Committee (Articles 1 12, 1 15, 
1 1 6) .  
Finally, local governing authorities, such as  people's councils, 
shall pass resolutions on measures to implement the constitution and 
the law at  local level. The people's committee elected by the 
people's council and being its executive organ and the organ of local 
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state admini stration, has the expres s duty to implement the 
constitution and national laws, as well as the power to enact more 
detailed rules, decisions and directives, but only to the extent they 
are not inconsistent with national laws, the formal written orders of 
superior state organs and the resolutions of the elected local organ of 
state power, the people's council (Articles 1 20, 123, 124) .  
The enumeration of lawmaking institutions in the constitution 
provides a means by which a basic legal hierarchy can develop, as 
all laws mus t  accord wi th the constitu tion and all government 
decrees and administrative regula tions must be in accord with the 
law.  Practical evid ence for this ba sic commi tment to the 
consti tution's supremacy is found in the fact that the first session of 
the National Assembly's ninth legislature has to revise previously 
adopted laws, such as the law on government organization, the law 
on people's court organization and the law on the people's office of 
supervision and control , in order to assure their compa tibi l i ty with 
the 1 992 consti tu tion. 
The rule of Law 
Through such a process, Vietnam is building a legal framework for 
the new law-governed state appara tus, aimed at perfecting all state 
bodies from the central down to the grassroots level by streamlining 
those bod ies and ensuring their unified ma nagemen t and 
effectiveness, clearly defining their respective du ties, mandates and 
powers . This process al so aims to overcome irra tional working 
s tyles,  bureaucracy, arbi trari ness,  and corruption, while 
scientifically perfecting the central and grassroo t economic 
management bo dies, and sepa ra ting business and production 
management duties out of administrative management duties, in fact 
and in law. Vietnam will give due consideration to comparative law 
research, as it is well-known that the concept of the rule of law and 
the building of the state has exis ted since the Middle Ages in 
Eastern and Western societies. 
The 1 992 Consti tution and the Rule of Law 109 
According to Dicey2 , the rule of law means equality before the 
law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the 
land administered by the ordinary courts. In this sense, the rule of 
law conveys that no man is above the law, that officials l ike 
private citizens are under a duty to obey the same law, and that 
there are no administrative courts to which are referred claims by 
ci tizens against the state or i ts officials. Dicey contrasted the rule of 
law with the French droit administratif. But this was not all that 
Dicey meant by 'equality before the law':  'With us,' he wrote, 
'every official, from the prime minister down to a constable or a 
collector of taxes, is under the same responsibili ty for every act done 
without legal justification as any other citizen'. This was written at 
a time when the maxim 'The Queen can do no wrong' prevented the 
crown from being sued, in the ordinary or any other courts, for breach 
of its own legal duties. To Dicey, the rule of law means the absolute 
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of 
arbi trariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary 
authority on the part of the government. 
It is in the nature of criminal procedure, more than in the content 
of the substantive law, that the rule of law is at its strongest in  
England, and it  is in this respect that the English rules provide a 
good example of how fu nd amental righ ts of the ci tizens are 
safeguarded by the rules of procedure necessary to ensure the rights 
themselves. Also interesting is the fact that the American system, 
al though being a Common law jurisdiction, has some trends different 
from i ts parent country. For example, while England has no written 
constitution, the United States find s i ts source of law in the very 
wording of a written consti tu tion, so that legality means primarily 
legality according to the constitution. While the procedural matters 
on which legality depend are on the whole as well protected in the 
United States as in England, the US Supreme Court has to rely on 
the execu ti ve branch for enforcement of the law, whereas the 
English courts have inherent au thori ty to compel by sanctions 
obedience to their judgments. 
2 Albert Vern Dicey (1 835-1 922) was a British juri st who wrote the 
influential book, The Study of the Law of the Contitution, which was first 
published in 1 885. 
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In Vietnam today, the building of a modem state governed by 
the rule of law has become the central task of economic and political 
renovation. We need not underline the importance of the concept of 
the rule o f  law i n  modern times . Lawyers s pecial izi ng in 
comparative law, belonging to different legal systems throughout  
the world, have joined their efforts in an attempt to  ascertain what 
the rule of law means in terms of modern insti tutions, and to 
formulate principles considered essential to the rule of law in any 
society. Despite different conceptions, basic elements of the rule of 
law are common to most countries. Common denominators abound 
when we talk of those doctrines which constitute the essence of the 
rule of law, such as: separation or diffusion of power; fundamental 
rights both human and civil; subjection to the law of all persons, 
including those at the political summit; legality and judicial review 
of administrative acts; fair trial, i .e. fair and objective procedure, 
both in the courts and in the administrative process; an independent 
judiciary brought up in a trad ition of impartiality and objecti vity; 
and judicial restraints on arbitrary action by a parlia mentary 
majority. 
The search for equivalence of institutions through a comparative 
method provides a good instrument to weigh more efficiently the 
functioning and meaning of one's own national institutions through 
the penetration of foreign legal systems. The law-governed state of 
Vietnam, as part of the social superstructure, must be buil t firmly, 
step by step, in a way suited to our country' s level of social and 
economic development. Such i s  the crea tive appl ication of 
Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's Thought to the building of 
our state apparatus and our political system. This is a long process. 
For the present purpose, and at the preliminary stage, the build ing 
in the SRV of a state governed by the rule of law is to be undertaken 
along the following basic orientations. 
1 .  Principle of people's sovereignty:  to ensure that all power 
belongs to people and that the people are the real masters of 
the country. Our state is a state 'of the people, by the people, 
and for the people' .  Such a principle derives from the nature of 
our regime: 'In whose hand s is the power and whose interests 
that power serves, tha t decides the whole content of the 
consti tution', said President Ho Chi Minh when commenting on 
the draft of the 1 959 constitution. 
The 1992 Constitution and the Rule of Law 1 1 1  
2 .  To respect and ensure the actual implementation o f  the citizens' 
human rights, and democratic rights, since man is placed at the 
centre of all socio-economic strategies and policies. Such basic 
individual rights and freedoms are always associated with the 
nation's fundamental rights and only on the basis of triumph 
over poverty and backwardness. That is why the exercise by 
citizens of their rights and freedoms is inseparable from the 
performance of their duties and obligations . Enjoyment by 
citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment 
of the interests of society or infringe the legitimate rights of 
other citizens. 
3. To build a society characterized by mutual responsibility 
between the state and citizens. As lawmakers, state officials 
have the compulsory and exemplary duty strictly to observe the 
law. Everybody is  equal before the law and no organization or 
individual may place themselves outside and above the law. 
4. All social relations must be regulated basically by law, not by 
ethics. The supremacy of law must prevail in the whole society, 
in the activities and behaviour of all entities, of every citizen. 
Juridical sources must conform to the hierarchy and ensure the 
unity of the whole legal system in which supremacy is exerted 
by the constitution . 
5 .  The state apparatus i s  built on the principle that the highest 
state power is concentrated in the National Assembly.  
However, division of  jurisdiction between the elected body, the 
executive branch of government and the judiciary must be clearly 
defined for the state apparatus to operate scientifically within 
the bounds of the constitution and the law. There must be unity 
of understanding and enforcement of laws throughout the 
territory, under democratic centralism. 
6. The principle of equality of citizens is embodied in the principle 
of the equality before the law applied by the court. Thus, it is of 
utmost importance to ensure the independence of the judiciary, 
which only obeys the law when passing judgments in the name 
of the state, subject to neither legislative nor administrative 
organs, nor any political or social organizations . In order to 
strengthen the authority and independence of the judiciary 
under the new constitution, the election of judges of the people's 
courts is replaced by a system of appointment of judges by the 
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head of state, to ensure a selection of competent professional 
judges having high prestige and credibility to pass judgment 
ensuring the rule of law. 
7. To strengthen auxiliary judicial bodies requires the training or 
retraining of a full contingent of legal experts with high ethical 
and professional qualifications to meet the overall renovation 
process: bar association, notaries public, enforcement officers, 
law gazette, and judicial records 
8.  Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon 
public confidence in the integri ty, independence, and 
professionalism of judges, which in turn, depends upon their 
acting without fear or favour, free from personal bias. Together 
with the method of appointment and tenure of judges by the 
head of state, new mechanisms to ensure independence of the 
judiciary, professionnal education and training for judges, 
together with a code of judicial ethics are imperative structural 
requisites for development of a judiciary having sufficient 
institutional power, whose authority reaches every corner of 
society, every facet of life. 
9. Last but not least in institutionalizing the rule of law system, is 
to develop a popular legal culture that accepts and trusts the 
law, being aware of its socio-political value and considering its 
realization as vital. This serves the cause of renovation, in 
directing people's behaviour, establishing a sense of 'permitted' 
and 'non- permitted', encouraging and condemning specific social 
behaviour. 
10. The building of such a state in Vietnam is extremely 
-complicated. A hasty acceleration without necessary premises, 
or a wrongly oriented political renovation, will result in  
political instability, which will cause numerous hindrances to 
the cause of overall renovation and the open-door policy. This is 
a major lesson drawn from realities in our country as well as the 
experiences of some other countries. For the Vietnamese people's 
deep aspiration is to build a socialist society based on the 
creative application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi 
Minh Thought. The leadership of the VCP will have to make a 
thorough renovation in law-oriented thinking and leadership, 
as the 1992 constitution states that the Party is the 'vanguard 
force' charged with representing not only the working class, but 
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the entire people, the force leading the state and society .  
However, the party is explici ty brought within the confines of 
the constitution and the rule of law. 
Conclusion 
The 1992 constitution constitutes a fundamental law of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the legal foundation for economic, political, 
social, cultural, national defence and security, and foreign affairs 
activi ties of the whole country, under the renovation l ine and 
open-door policy initiated by the VCP since the Sixth Party Congess 
( 1 986) .  
Vietnam has already embarked upon ambitious legal reform 
programmes designed to provide the legal infrastructure that 
supports, perpetuates and fosters the political economy of our nation. 
We are fully conscious that, for any such programme to be successful, 
those who formulate such a comprehensive legal reform programme 
must make important policy choices . These choices cannot be made 
without information, and require precision and planning to be 
successful . Lawmakers must understand the fea tures, terminology 
and choices that underlie specific substantive policies of law reform. 
Those cha rged with the task of implemen tation mu st  also 
understand the system. 
Some countries tha t have begun such legal reforms lack 
familiarity wi th or access to the necessary information to train 
people in these important areas, as they move from a centrally 
planned economy towards a market-oriented one. Such a shift will 
require hundreds of changes in both written laws and unwritten 
atti tudes,  perspectives and behaviou ral patterns among 
law-rela ted officials .  At least one purpose of developing a 
market-orientated legal framework is to create space for private 
economic activity and to foster increased activi ty by means of the 
improved certainty, stability and safety usually associated with 
the rule of law. 
The structure of the world community has changed considerably 
over the last few years . The easing of Cold War tensions as well as 
poli tical realignments, have presented all nations wi th new 
challenges and opened doors long closed, despite the out-of-date 
trade embargo. These changes provide nations, especially in the 
Southeast Asia region, with a unique opportunity to reassess and 
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redefine their national and international priorities. Vietnam, being 
a developing and non-aligned country, has acceded to the Bali 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and become an 
observer of ASEAN. It carries out an open-door policy, with the 
guideline of wishing to be 'a friend of all countries in the world 
community s triving together for peace, independence and 
development' . We are actively expanding our friendly relations of 
cooperation and mutual benefit with all countries, first of all with 
countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
Asian social scientists, specifically lawyers, are aware that one 
way of meeting the new challenges, closing the legal information 
and training gap, is to coordinate legal reform efforts wi th Asian 
studies programmes fostered among other disciplines, legal 
education, training and developmen t.  Such Asian s tudie s 
programmes could assist countries and members of the legal 
community in informing themselves regarding legal reforms, the 
history and structure of international legal sys tems, and the 
traditions and policy choices upon which these systems are founded . 
They could also familiarize nations in the region with the 'ad hoe 
language' of the rule of law, particularly in business, international 
trade and foreign investment matters, coordinating the efforts of 
development organizations drawn from across the globe, in the spiri t 
fostered by UNESCO: 
That we found ourselves to be of one mind as to the 
importance of comparative law, as an integral component 
of any programme designed to further interna tio nal 
understanding and peace. 
And let me expressly add that such study will assist relations 
between states, and between private organizations and states, 
throwing light on the causes of interna tional tensions and 
misunderstandings arising from differences in national laws. We can 
begin to remedy this problem in a number of ways, such as : 
providing a broad training programme for pol icy-makers, 
government officials, judges and other practitionners, on a 
variety of subjects; 
providing nations in the region with information and assistance 
in reforming the system of legal education; 
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collecting, collating, distribu ting, and publishing information 
regarding legal systems and legal development efforts; 
providing an internationally recognized programme focussing in 
new and developing areas of international law and global 
trade and investment law; and 
organizing meetings of policy-makers for the purpose of 
exchanging information and coordinating policies. 
Our exchange of views at  the Vietnam Update, in such a 
people-to-people direct contact, through and beyond academic 
circles, constitutes, as I noted earlier, small bricks that help to build 
a solid relationship and expand more vigorously Vietnam-Australia 
cooperation.  It  also implements Vietnam's foreign policy: to 
acti vely expand, and diversify our relations in all  fields  -
political, economic, cultural, scientific and technical - at the party 
and state levels, and at the mass organization, non-governmental 
organization and ind ividual levels.  
5 
Vietnam's Revised Constitution: 
Impact on Foreign Investment 
Levien Do* 
The National Assembly of Vietnam adopted on 15  April 1 992 a new 
consti tution which replaced the Soviet-inspired constitut ion 
adopted on 18  December 1980, the first charter of the country since 
reunification.  The adoption of the constitution is the mos t  
significant real ization o f  the Vietnam Communist Party' s (VCP) 
policy in terms of national development and the involvement of the 
party in all aspects of the daily life. The consti tution is also the 
result of Vietnam's legislative efforts to install a fundamental legal 
structure in which doi moi operates, in line with the lynchpin of the 
open door policy, the 1 987 law on foreign investment . 
Judging by the proportion of unchanged or revised articles 
compared to the number of newly introduced ones, the constitution 
appears essentially to be a re-draft of the 1 980 Constitution. Of the 
constitution's 147 articles, 1 1 5  are revised versions of articles which 
existed in the previous constitution. Twelve remain unchanged,and 
only twenty articles are new. Overall, the structure of the new 
document is similar to that  of the previous one. This is not to say 
that the consti tution does not imply significant changes for 
Vietnam, but the changes are often subtle ones. For instance, certain 
words or expres sions have disappeared from the o fficial 
vocabulary, such as 'proletarian dictatorship', or 'in the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, all  power belongs to the people' . Even if these 
changes may appear superficial, they represent very significant 
changes of view among Vietnam's leaders on issues such as the role 
of the communist party within the state, the role of the state in the 
The author acknowledges the contribution to thi s paper by Mr Jean 
Reynaud who was previously associated with Mallesons Stephen Jaques 
and is currently practicing as a lawyer in France. 
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economy and the role o f  the government. The question arises a s  to the 
impact these amendments may have on foreign investments made in 
Vietnam. 
The role of a constitution in a communist system is not to organize 
the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers but rather to legitimize and dignify the existing 
regime. The 1 992 constitution is no exception to this rule. The 
constitution reflects the intention of the Vietnamese leaders to carry 
out economic reforms without affecting the political monopoly of the 
VCP which has been in power in Hanoi since 1954. The changes to 
the political structure introduced by the constitution appear to 
reinforce the power of the executive. 
Changes to the political structure 
The National Assembly 
As 'the highest organ of state au thority in Vietnam', the National 
Assembly has greater powers than the legislative body of a Western 
democracy . I ts powers are not limited to legislative du ties, but 
extend to government organization, pol icy making and leadership 
control . The powers of the National Assembly may be listed as 
fol lows: 
Government organization: 
to define its own organization and the powers of state bodies, 
including governmental organizations and local 
administration, 
to decide on the setting up or dissolution of ministries, 
to assess the performance of the government and ministers. 
Policy making: 
to define the state plan, 
to define the state budget (including new taxes), 
to control foreign policy. 
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Leadership control: 
to appoint the state president (chu tich nuoc) and vice 
president (pho chu tich nuoc), the prime minister, members 
of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, 
government ministers and other senior officials; 
to supervise the activities of people's committees in the 
provinces and ci ties which are under the central 
government's jurisdiction; and 
to abrogate decisions of state organizations (including those 
of the prime minister and the government) that are 
inconsistent.with the consti tution, laws which have been 
enacted, and resolutions adopted by the National Assembly. 
The National Assembly will play a important role in the 
running of the country, now that the VCP has placed itself under the 
authority of not only the constitu tion (which was also the case under 
the 1 980 Constitution), but also the law (provision for which was 
included in Article 4 of the 1 992 Constitution) . In Vietnam, to a 
greater extent than in the West, laws passed by the National 
Assembly require further implementing regulations, because laws 
passed by the National Assembly only contain general guid ing 
principles and statements of intent. 
The input of the government in the legislative process in issuing 
decrees, ordinances, and of subord inate authori ties in issuing 
decisions and circulars for the implementation of laws passed by the 
National Assembly, therefore has become increasingly important. 
This process results in foreign investors having the often difficult  
task of keeping up to date with the latest changes. Despite the fact 
that the National Assembly retains the power to review and to 
abrogate unwanted 'formal written documents' issued by the above 
mentioned authorities (Articles 84[2] and [9] ) ,  the heavy legislative 
schedule of the National Assembly in its two sessions per year may 
not permit it to discharge satisfactorily this function. One should 
also bear in mind that the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly has the power to interpret the constitution, la ws, 
ordinances and decrees (Article 91 ), and in the absence of a parallel 
judicial review power, there remains the question of standing to 
initiate a review of consti tu tional ity and independence in the 
review process. 
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I t  i s  understood that the Ministry o f  Justice has been upgraded to 
fifth place in the hierarchy of ministries ( from previously near the 
bottom), and it is hoped that will permit it to play a more 
influential role in the establishment of a uniform and more certain 
legal framework for Vietnam. 
The Standing Committee of the National Assembly 
The constitution abolished the Council of State that existed under 
the 1980 Consti tution and established instead a Standing Committee 
which, when the National Assembly is not in session, will act to 
ensure the continuous function of the National Assembly. It may also 
convene extraordinary sessions of the National Assembly of its own 
volition. Under the 1 980 constitution (Article 99) the Council of 
State was 'the collective presidency of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam'; in practice the chairman of the Council of State, who was 
elected from among deputies in the National Assembly, acted as the 
'head of the state' . Under the constitution the National Assembly 
now directly elects the state president and the chairman of the 
National Assembly is also the chairman of the Stand ing 
Committee. 
The legislative powers of the Standing Committee are not as 
broad under the constitution as the powers previously held by the 
Council of State. Whereas the Council of State had the right to 
issue decrees on its own initiative, the Standing Committee may 
only do so 'on matters entrusted to it by the National Assembly' 
(Article 91 [4] ) .  
The prime minister and the government 
The constitution has created the position of prime minister replacing 
that of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister 
has more effective control over the government than his predecessor. 
The prime minister may, in particular, appoint all deputy prime 
ministers and ministers in the government, subject, though, to 
ratification by the National Assembly. Under the 1980 Constitution, 
all members of the Council of Ministers were directly appointed by 
the National Assembly. 
More importantly, the prime minister has the power to d ismiss 
the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the people's committees of the 
provinces and cities under the central government's jurisdiction. The 
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chairman of the Council of Ministers did not have such a power. The 
prime minister also has the power to repeal decisions, directives 
and circulars of government ministers and resolutions (and decisions 
of the people's committees). There is anecdotal evidence that in 
recent years certain investment projects supported at the national 
level did not proceed due to a lack of enthusiasm or cooperation by 
local governments, although the chairmen and deputy chairmen of 
the people's committees at all levels are still elected by their own 
constituencies, the possible removal of them by the prime minister is 
a sweeping change capable of allowing the integrity o f  central 
government ini tiatives to be maintained nationwide. 
The state president 
A new posi tion of state president has been created under the 
constitution, replacing the chairman of the previous Council of State 
as head of state. Besides having usual honorary and ceremonial 
duties of the head of state, the president is also able to participate 
actively in Vietnamese poli tics by recommending the election and 
removal of the vice president, the prime minister, the chief jus tice 
of the Supreme Court and the head of the Supreme People's Control 
Commission (Article 1 03 [3 ] ) . With this au thori ty, the sta te 
president arguably hold s the balance of power in the National 
Assembly. 
The court system 
The constitution does not address the issue of revamping the court 
system, which places an over emphasis on social order at the almost 
absolute expense of commercial relations . I t  i s  understood that 
Vietnam will pass laws for the es tabl ishment and operation of a 
more efficient court system which would be capable of dealing with 
commercial disputes. Such a move by Vietnam's leaders is crucial in 
gaining further confidence of foreign investors in Vietnam's 
investment environment. 
The role of the Vietnam Communist Party 
Although making certain concessions on the economic front, the VCP 
remains the dominant force in Vietnamese politics. As a National 
Assembly press statement of 15 April 1992 stated : 'Between the 
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Nati onal Assembly and the Party, there is  sti l l  a close 
relationship' . This is clearly an understatement, considering that 
almost all of the 395 deputies of the National Assembly are party 
members who are subject to party directives, and that Vietnam 
remains a one-party pol itical system. However, there is an 
evolution in the role of the VCP within the state. This evolution is 
apparent when one compares the provision dealing with the role of 
the communist party within the state in successive constitutions: 
1 980 Constitution 
The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard and general 
staff of the Vietnamese working class, armed with Marxism­
Leninism, is the only force leading the stat� and society, and 
the main factor determining all successes of the Vietnamese 
revolution. The party exists and struggles for the interests of 
the working class and the people of Vietnam as a whole. I ts 
orga nizations opera te within the framework o f  the 
constitution. 
1 992 Constitution 
The Communis t Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the 
Vietnamese working class and loyal representative of the 
interests of the working class, the labouring people and the 
entire nation, adhering to Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh 
Thoughts, is a leading force of the state and society. All party 
orga nizations operate wi thin the framework of the 
constitution and law (Article 4). 
Two changes are worthy of particular mention as demonstrating 
the profound changes effected by the constitution. The first can be 
seen in the language referring to the role of party in the state and 
society. The 1 980 Consti tution states that the party is 'the only force 
leading the state and society', whereas the 1 992 Constitution states 
that the party is 'the leading force of the state and society' .The 
second change relates to the inclusion of 'Ho Chi Minh Thoughts' as 
a gloss to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 
Another novelty in the new consti tution is the relationship 
between the communist party and the legal system. Traditional 
Marxist philosophy argues that under a non-communist system the 
law is made and enforced by the ruling class and is a mere expression 
of its economic predominance, whereas under a communist system the 
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law is subject to the overruling power of the communist party. The 
revision of  the last sentence of the provision above indicates a 
profound shift in  attitude, by affirming that the Vietnam 
Communist Party is now subject to the rule of law. 
This is not to say that Vietnam is preparing gradually to shift 
to a Western-style democratic system. Rather, the principle of 
democratic centralism which ensures the overriding authority of the 
party within the state is maintained (Article 6). The Vietnam 
Fatherland Front, a mass organization under the direction of the 
VCP, has the right to 'supervise the activities o f  s ta te 
agencies,.elected deputies state officials and employees' (Article 9) .  
Further, the Law on Election of National Assembly Deputies ( 15  
April 1 992) exclusively empowers the Vietnam Fatherland Front to 
vet and select candidates. 
Foreign relations: from confl.id to cooperation 
The constitution also reflects a change in the attitude of Vietnam's 
foreign policy, aimed at helping the country out of the international 
isolation that resul ted from its former foreign policy and the 
invasion of Cambodia in 1 979. This has resulted over the past few 
years in closer relations between Vietnam and ASEAN countries, and 
with Western countries generally, including the United States, with 
a view to normalizing relations with the United States. This also 
resulted in the normalization of relations wi th China in November 
1 99 1 .  
This policy shift i s  apparent when comparing the aims stated in 
the respective constitutions. Whereas the 1 980 Consti tution insisted 
on the necessity to react to aggression ( this was one year after the 
Chinese offensive on Vietnam's northern border), on the 'fraternal 
friendship' with socialist countries including 'the Soviet Union, 
Laos, Kampuchea', on solidari ty with the national independence 
movement, and, finally, on support of the struggle against  
imperialism, the 1 992 Constitution refers to  'international relations 
and co-operation with all cou ntries in the world i rrespective of 
their political and social systems'. This change of atti tude is also 
apparent in deletion from the constitution of such expressions as 
'French colonists', 'American imperialists', and 'Chinese hegemonist 
aggressors' (refer to the preamble of 1 980 Constitution). 
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Economy and foreign investment 
An end to state monopoly 
The 1 980 Consti tu tion simply stated that, 'The State holds a 
monopoly on foreign trade and all other foreign economic relations 
with foreign countries' . This provision was inconsistent with the 
foreign investment law which promotes investment in Vietnam and 
authorizes state-controlled enti ties (and at a later stage also 
private enterprises) to enter into joint venture agreements or business 
cooperation contracts with foreign investors. In a fully developed 
Western-style legal system, this inconsistency would have resulted 
in the investment law being unconsti tutional . However, for nearly 
five years after the investment law was passed, foreign investments 
were carried out in conjunction with local enterprises despite this 
existing constitutionally entrenched prohibition. 
The principles underlying the investment law have now been 
included in the 1 992 Constitution, which states that, 'Enterprises in 
the various economic sectors may enter into joint ventures with 
domestic or foreign individuals or economic organisations as 
provided for by the law' (Article 22). The state monopoly over 
foreign economic relations and foreign investments in Vietnam, 
which, in practice, ended nearly five years ago, has now officially 
ended with the 1 992 Constitution. 
Chapter two of the 1 992 Consti tution, enti tled 'The Economic 
Sys tem' (as in the 1 980 Constitution), has been revised most  
profoundly. Half of the fourteen articles it contains are new. 
Whereas the 1 980 Constitu tion claimed that Vietnam was 
advancing directly from a small-scale production economy to 
socialism, 'bypassing the stage of capitalist development'; the 1 992 
Consti tution encourages i ndividual economic entities and the 
private capital sector to set up businesses without any limitation as 
to their scale of activi ties in areas which are beneficial to the 
cou ntry' s economic development (Article 2 1 ) .  Thi s is an 
extraordinary change of direction since the 1980 Constitution, which 
only envisaged an economy limited to two sectors, the state sector 
and the 'collective economic sector' and where remaining private 
activities, such as small -cale trade, would 'gradually switch to 
production and other suitable occupation'. 
Private enterprise, however, is only allowed a role within an 
economy of which people's and collecti ve ownership is  the 
foundation. The state sector is to be strengthened and developed in 
124 Levien Do 
particular in key areas, thus guaranteeing it a leading role in the 
national economy (Article 19). This is compatible with Article 5(2) 
of Decree No. 28/HDBT of 6 February 1991 providing regulations on 
foreign investment in Vietnam, which requires the permission of the 
prime minister in respect to foreign investment in the following 
areas :  
production and distribution o f  explosives and poisonous 
substances; 
exploitation of rare and precious minerals; 
large scale generation and supply of electricity and 
production and supply of water; 
production of transmitters, provision of  post a nd 
telecommunication services; 
provision of radio and television broadcasting and 
publishing; 
ocean shipping and air transportation; 
export and import business; and 
international tourism. 
The permission of the prime minister is unusual and more 
stringent than that of the chairman of the State Committee of 
Co-operation and Investment, who is vested with the power to grant 
investment (or business) licences in all other areas. 
Under the 1 992 Constitution, state-owned enterpri ses are 
afforded some autonomy to determine their production and 
transactions and have some responsibility for the results of their 
operations . Indeed, state subsidies for state enterprises are 
gradually being removed, paving the way for the public sector and 
private sector to compete on an arm's length basis. This new 
direction will result in a mixed economic system, where state 
planning and the market economy each have a role to play. The 
opening provision of chapter two clearly states that 'The State 
develops the multi-sectoral commodity economy in accordance with 
the market mechanism based on state management and socialist 
orientation.' In reality, one wonders how the state sector can be 
expected to maintain a leading role in Vietnam's economy in terms of 
productivity and dynamism. 
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Guarantees to foreign investors 
The 1 992 Constitution also provides some comfort to foreign investors 
agai nst the risk of requisition or nationalization of their 
investment. It was often overlooked by foreign investors in Vietnam 
that, until 15 April 1 992, the Vietnamese constitution gave the state 
the right to nationalize assets 'with or without compensation' when 
it considered it 'really necessary' . This provision gave the state a 
wide discretionary power over foreign investments. 
Most legal systems provide that the state may nationalize 
assets for the purpose of public interest, subject to adequate and 
prompt compensation. The 1 992 Consti tution goes even further than 
this generally accepted requirement, by providing that: 
The state encourages interna tional organizations and 
foreign national s to invest capi tal and technology in 
Vietnam in accordance with Vi etnamese law and 
international law and practices. The state guarantees the 
right of ownership of the legitimate capital property and 
other interests of the various international organisations 
and fo reign na tional s .  Foreign inves tmen t-fu nded 
enterprises shall not be subject to nationalisation (Article 
25) .  
This new provision aligns the 1992 Constitution with the Foreign 
Investment Law, which contains a similar guarantee (Article 2 1 ). 
Conclusion 
The new constitution is a great step forward, if only the first step of 
many more which are needed. If the 1 992 Constitution could be seen 
as Vietnam's manifesto, its message is clear. That is that national 
development is to take precedence over ideological pursuits, and 
therefore national ization of foreign investment in the current 
situation of Vietnam should not be a cause of concern. Instead, a 
reasonably reliable legal infrastructure, a workable bureaucratic 
system, and a consistency in the policy-making process must all be 
pu t in place before Vietnam can expect to see the world 
wholeheartedly respond to its invitation to invest wi thout any 
reservation. For Vietnam, adoption of the 1 992 Constitution is the 
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The Evolution of Private Commercial 
Freedoms in Vietnam 
John G illespie 
Introduction 
An attractive legal regime is, of course, only one factor that needs to 
be considered when deciding whether to invest in a foreign country. 
In the case of Vietnam, frequent policy changes, non-transparent 
law, and a truculent bureaucracy, make knowledge of laws and legal 
cul ture particularly important. The law is currently experiencing 
rapid change as it is employed to engineer an open, market­
orientated economy. During the transition period, a conflict has 
arisen between what is essentially a rights-based commercial legal 
system, and a state apparatus and economy that is only now 
emerging from a rigid command ideology (Thayer 1 992d:1 1 0-1 29) .  
The tensions generated are of more than mere academic interest, as 
they shape the business and regulatory environment within which 
an investor must operate. 
Private rights in a mixed market economy 
In the pursuit of a 'mixed market' economy, the question arises of 
whether the interplay between private and state rights in Vietnam 
is sufficiently dynamic to allow emergence of novel and innovative 
business practices. For this to happen, the state must reconcile the 
fact that devolution of economic and legal autonomy to individuals 
comes at the cost of possible disruption to state planning objectives. 
At this point, the emergence of private commercial freedoms 
assumes importance, as they are the link between an individual and 
the legal system; they simultaneously declare what an individual 
may expect from the law, and, perhaps more significantly, what the 
law may expect from an individual. 
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At this stage of the discussion the term 'private freedoms' used 
in the title requires further classification. It  has been selected over 
the more precise designation, private legal rights, to draw attention 
to the fact that a legal right in Vietnam may not always give rise to 
the commercial freedom to carry out a business activity .  This 
apparent contradiction is partially explained by the different 
po sitions legal rights occupy in Wes tern (Anglo-American 
jurisdictions) and Vietnamese society. 
Most would agree, for instance, that there is a clear difference 
between saying that someone has a right to conduct a certain business 
practice, and saying that it is the 'right' thing for a person to do . 
This is because in the West, in theory at least, a clear distinction 
may be drawn between what is morally right, and what is legally 
right. Often the two rights coincide, but it  is only legal rights, with 
the assistance of the state, that can be harnessed by individuals to 
control the behaviour of others . In Vietnam the distinction is not 
perhaps as acute, as legal rights have tradi tionally been 
subordinated to an overriding moral obligation owed to the central 
pol itical authority and family. More particularly, commercial 
freedoms historically have had li ttle to do with state protection of 
private property by the formal legal system. They were, and to a 
large extent remain embedded in customary practices exhibited in 
family relationships, religious bel iefs, aphorisms and popular 
l i tera ture. 
Commercial freedoms are not of course absolutes, as they exist in 
a rich diversi ty in their respective cul tural settings. To the 
conceptual relativist, (Taylor 1 987: 155-1 56) cross-cultural analysis 
will invariably lead to the mistake of ascribing Western precepts to 
Vietnamese practices. The move towards a market economy has led 
to a partial convergence of economic cultures, which hopefully now 
allows commercial freedoms in Vietnam to be meaningfully 
compared with their counterparts in Western market economies . 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the relationship between a 
flourishing market and stable and predictable commercial freedoms 
is well understood by Vietnamese lawmakers . This essay will 
explore and speculate upon the less clearly understood paradox: 
that, on the one hand, it  is governments which create and protect 
private rights, but on the other hand, they may become the greatest 
threat to private rights and commercial freedoms. Finally, as there 
is little recent jurisprudential writing on Vietnam, and one can not 
look to State Economic Arbitrators or People's Courts for guidance, 
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most information must be  gleaned from Vietnam Communist Party 
(VCP) policy, state legislation, and interviews with law makers 
and administrators. 
An overview of the origins of commercial freedoms 
Vietnamese Imperial Codes 
Prior to French colonization most law was derived from the Chinese 
Imperial codes (Ta Van Tai 1 982:523-525; Lan Quoc Nguyen 1 989:142-
144) .  The Vietnamese Imperial Codes, especially the Le Code1 
(Hong Due 1428-1 788), departed from the Chinese T 'ang and Ming 
models by extending a limited degree of protection to a range of 
private commercial rights . Landowners, for example, were 
compensated against unauthorized government appropriation, 
private encroachment through the removal of boundary markers, or 
fraudulent sale. Other aspects of commerce also received protection. 
Contracts, for instance, were vitiated by fraud or duress; market 
manipulation and forms of usury were also forbidden (eg. Articles 
388-400, 577 Le Code). It is important not to overstate the importance 
of the code to commerce; of i ts 722 articles, less than 10 per cent dealt 
directly with land, chattels or contracts. 
Although superficially similar to Western legal codes, imperial 
law only interacted vertically from state to the individual . I t  
completely disregarded the support an individual ( in a Western 
jurisdiction) might expect to receive from the state to assist the 
prosecution of private righ ts, horizontally, against other 
individuals.  As a consequence, private commercial relationships 
remained a creature of customary practice (Wolters 1 979:442-443), 
escaping official attention unless they threatened tax collection or 
social order, the two preoccupations of Imperial rule. 
Customary practice 
What little is known about traditional commercial practice suggests 
that trade was conducted through a network of interlocking 
Although much of the legal thought that appears in the Le Code has been 
attributed to the Le Dynasty, as legal thought does not ari se from a 
vacuum, at least in part it must have existed during the previous Tran 
Dynasty (1225-1 400).  
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obligations. Each relationship depended upon the observance of a 
patronage obligation, son to father, family to clan, clan to village, 
etc. (Hooker 1 975:227-229; Ta Van Tai 1988 :Chapter Four). Within 
this system, entitlements depended upon status, and trade tended to 
be conducted within lineage groups where the hierarchy of 
authority was well known and likely to be observed . The more 
distant the relationship and weaker the patronage obligation, the 
greater the need for the intercession of a respected middleman who 
could augment the trading link by guaranteeing the performance of 
each party (Woodside 1984 :318-320). 
The Vietnamese preoccupa tion with family and clan 
relationships arose out of a prudent desire to  reduce the risk of 
transacting with strangers. Patronage links were a means of exerting 
extra-contractual leverage over a recalcitrant trading partner. As 
the Imperial laws were penal in nature and largely ignored private 
commerce, traders avoided the official regulatory system if at al l 
possible, and relied on informal dispute resolution . If a trader 
misjudged his commercial partners, and personal and family ties 
were insufficient to secure compl iance, the aggrieved party 
appealed to public opinion to ostracize the offender (Yu Insun 
1978:56-79) .  
When all  other means of preserving harmony failed, an 
intractable dispute could be referred to a clan or village leader. Bu t 
even in a village forum where conflicting interests were brought 
sharply into focu s, dispu te resolution had li ttle to do with 
adjudication of individual claims. On the contrary, by approaching 
an umpire of higher social status, the disputants had implici tly 
abandoned their respective 'rights' and agreed to place their 
fortunes in 'the hands of a wise and virtuous man' (Young 1976; 
Landa 1 981 :355-361) .  The primary goal of mediation was to restore 
stabili ty and harmony to family I clan trading relationships, and in 
the process enhance the social authority of the clan or village 
el i te . 2 Family, and more particularly individual commercial 
freedoms, were often sacrificed in pursuit of these social goals. 
2 Although there was often a dichotomy between the Confucian-oriented 
rulers and their predominantly Taoist, Buddhist and animist subjects, 
there is little reason to suspect that family or village heads were any more 
egalitarian or rights-conscious than the monarch or court officials (Marr 
1971 : 20-25; Whitmore 1 984: 300-305) . 
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French colonial law 
Colonial rule formally began in Vietnam when Emperor Tu Due 
signed a treaty in 1 862 which ceded the three southern provinces of 
Cochinchina to the French. The remaining areas of Annam and 
Tonkin continued to be governed under the titular leadership of the 
Nguyen emperors ( 1 802-1 945 ),  subject to the extensive 
administrative powers of the French resident  generale (Nguyen The 
Anh 1 985:148-150; Hooker 1975:229-283). 
The French mai ntained two parallel legal systems. One was 
essentially the same as the rights-based civil law system of 
Metropolitan France. It applied to French citizens, Europeans and 
others whose national laws happened to be substantially similar to 
those of France. With the exception of a small francophone 
bureaucratic and merchant eli te, most Vietnamese and Chinese 
continued to be governed by the Vietnamese Nguyen Code (Gia Long 
1813-1945) and customary practice (Duiker 1 976:1 05-1 07; Hooker 
1975:233-234) .  
Socialist commercial practice 
Even before the Declaration of Independence in 1 945, the 
Indochinese Communist Party had advocated a policy of 
national ization and redistribution of land that belonged to the 
French, 'i mperialist aggressors' and 'reactiona ry' landlord s  
(Ginsburgs 1 973 :674-676; Moise 1 976:70-73) .  Under the Vietnam 
Workers ' Party (VWP) this policy accelerated after partition in 
1954, and very quickly almost 90 per cent of agricul ture and industry 
in the North was brought under State or collective ownership (Vo 
Nhan Tri 1990:9-14) .  What is highly significant about the change is 
that traditional trading practices were swept aside along with 
many colonial commercial practices. The VWP managed to disrupt a 
trading culture that had survi ved both Chinese and French 
annexation. That the VWP succeeded is all the more remarkable 
when it is realized that at this time the lower courts were still 
turning to the 'rights-based colonial' law for guidance in commercial 
matters (RV Decree No 47, 1 0  October 1 945). French colonial laws 
were not formally abrogated until the 1 946 Constitution w a s  
replaced by a more orthodox socialist consti tution in 1 960; this re­
enacted an Instruction previously issued by the Ministry of Justice on 
30 June 1 955 (Nguyen Van Huong 1974 :1 92), cautioning against the 
use of anti-revolutionary laws. 
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Ini tially influenced heavily by the radical Maoist  Chinese 
model, the VWP progressively turned to the Soviet Union as a source 
of ideology and legal inspiration. Soviet influence was particularly 
pronounced in its effect upon both the substance of law and formation 
of legal institutions (Duiker 1 977:4 14-419) .  E ven so, the modus 
operandi of legal administration remained peculiarly Vietnamese. 
The French Colonial law which had di scriminated between 
individuals on the basis of their relationship to property, gave way 
to a VWP policy which was preoccupied with class and 
nationalism. The few laws that were enacted were often not made 
public or indeed strictly followed. Except in the south, where even 
after reunification in 1975 private commerce remained important, 
much economic activity was conducted by state-owned enterprises or 
collectives . In this environment commercial law took the form of 
administrative regulations, which determined production targets, 
the price of raw materials, finished products, services, transport and 
most other tradeable property. In short, the commercial law was 
relegated to the role of administrative directive, whose sole 
purpose was the implementation of Party ru ral or industrial 
management policy. To use a phrase that is as true as it is 
hackneyed, 'the rule of law was replaced by the rule of men' . It is 
not really until the neo-Confucian and Marxist antipathy towards 
legalism is understood, that one can appreciate how formidable is 
the task of creating a commercial rights based legal system (Nguyen 
Khac Vien 1 974:45-49; Young 1 979:776-777). 
Legal restriction of commercial freedoms 
With the exception of the highly restrictive and demonstrably 
unsuccessful  Ordinance on Foreign Investment, 1 9 77, at the 
commencement of Doi Moi in 1986 Vietnam had virtually no market 
based laws. In the interim Vietnam has changed from a society 
where income producing property (public property) could only be 
owned by the state or collectives, to one where the means of 
production may now be privately owned and managed (Articles 21 ,  
25, Constitution 1 992) .  Nei ther socialist or  Western, the legal 
system has become an amorphous hybrid. In some areas, commercial 
freedoms are regulated almost to the point of extinction, whereas 
others flourish virtually free of restriction. What appears to trigger 
intervention is the potential for a business activity to impinge upon 
state planning objectives. In these circumstances, the interests of the 
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sta te are preserved by res tricting access to the potentially 
troublesome business sector. 
Land use rights 
This process is demonstrated by the administrative barriers erected 
to control the availability of 'land use' rights. Private ownership of 
land is not permitted in Vietnan. Article 1 La nd Law 1 987, 
unequivocally states that land remains ' . . .  under the ownership of 
the entire people', and is placed under the exclusive administration 
of the state. This latter function has been delegated to people's 
committees at both the provincial/ city and district levels. They are 
responsible for administering land, promulgating zoning and land use 
regulations, allotting (leasing) land, registration and settling land 
use disputes (Article 6, Land Law 1987). 
Although not entitled to full ownership, various lesser interests 
in land are available to state/private companies, cooperatives and 
individuals (Article 1 8, Constitution 1 992).  The highest of these 
interests is known as a land use right, which may be allotted on 
either a stable long term basis, or for a fixed or temporary purpose. 
Land use rights are not crea ted equally, as many of their 
characteristics, such as duration, abil ity to be transferred or 
bequeathed, depend upon the purpose for which the land is to be 
used . The largest estate is  reserved for residential land. In practice 
this type of land use right exi sts in perpetuity, may be freely 
transferred or bequeathed, and in most other respects differs l ittle 
from a fee simple estate. These benefi ts have yet to be formally 
recognized at law, but are included in the current draft amendments 
to the Land Law 1 987. 
In contrast, a land use right granted for a commercial usage 
cannot be transferred without bureaucratic approval and subsists for 
a limited duration, 5-20 years in the case of cultivation, 20-50 years 
for industrial or office use.3 For similar reasons, its transfer and 
3 According to Article 15, Law on Foreign Investment 1987-1992, it is now 
possible, albeit in exceptional circumstances, for a land use right to be 
created for a commercial purpose for a period of 50 years. The current 
draft of the law amending the Land Law 1987 (July 1 993) formalizes an 
unlimited tenure for domestic land, 20-50 years for industry and 20 years 
for agriculture. There is some doubt, however, that the draft will pass the 
National Assembly in its current form. 
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bequest are also highly regulated, creating an enti tlement that 
resembles the Western concept of a mere licence in land. Also 
indicative of a l icence is the fact that land users, for any type of 
land, do not possess a tortious right to take action directly against 
third party infringers . I t  is true that they may ' . . .  enjoy state 
protection against infringement of their legal land use rights' 
(Article 49 (6) Land Law 1 987) .  But they cannot initiate their own 
action and must rely upon the favourable exercise of an unfettered 
administrative discretion. 
Allotment of land use rights 
Some of the inherent dangers of allotting land through a process of 
non-transparent administrative discretion are well illustrated by a 
supposedly hypothetical example furnished by the Land Inspection 
Office, Hanoi . In this case, an applicant for a Land Use Certificate 
resided for a long period of time in a villa confiscated from the 
French at the end of the colonial period (Articles 2, 3, 26 Agrarian 
Reform Law 1 953, DR). Unhappily, the applicant did not possess a 
French colonial land title (ancien regime), as this is general ly 
accepted as compelling, if not conclusive evidence of customary ti tle. 
And in the absence of a legally enforceable prescription period, he 
would not automatically have been enti tled to an allotment on the 
basis of adverse possession. The current process is destabilizing, as 
the regulatory vacuum leaves room for considerable bureaucratic 
arbitrariness and the social and pecuniary advantages of allotment 
are manifold.  Once an allotment of a land use right is made, the 
holder becomes enti tled to a housing ownership certificate (Articles 
1 1, 15 Ordinance on Residential Housing 1 991) ,  and this document 
conveys the right to sell both the dwelling and the subordinate land 
use right (Articles 16 Land Law 1987). In spite of official denials, 
the recognition of some customary rights but not others may be 
interpreted as a selective gift of assets (Vietnam Investment Review 
8 June 1 992:15; 26 April 1993:5).  Many of these problems could have 
been avoided by the adoption of transparent rules ou tlining the 
procedure for the alienation of land from the State.4 The Central 
4 For example Chapter 2, 'Measures of Shanghai Muncipality Concerning 
the Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value', 1 987, Shanghai Municipal 
People's Council. 
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government office is currently reviewing land allotment procedures 
and is expected to issue a decree regularization valuation and 
disposal of state land by late 1993. 
Ownership of improvements to land 
Even though a legal fiction is maintained that land cannot be 
privately owned, there is no pol icy objection to the outright 
ownership of improvements such as buildings or plantations. 
Ownership of an improvement automatically conveys a land use 
right to the substratum. It is unclear whether the process operates in 
reverse (Articles 5, 1 5, Ordinance on Residential Housing, 1991 ) .  In 
order to stimulate private investment in housing construction, law 
makers had to find a way of conveying securi ty of tenure over 
improvements without offending the VCP unwavering commitment 
to state ownership of land.  Unfortunately the two objectives cannot 
easily be reconciled without creating a mismatch of tenures.  
Residential buildings are not effected by this problem, as land use 
rights for domestic land, like ownership rights in dwellings, exist in 
perpetuity, hence there is a concurrence of tenures. It is an entirely 
different matter for commercial buildings, for although the structure 
may be owned in perpetuity, the subsisting land use right is only 
granted for a period of 20 to 50 years. 
The land tenure system leaves many other questions unanswered, 
chief among these is whether on expiration of a commercial land use 
right ownership of improvements automatically reverts back to the 
state? An affirmative answer appears to be incompatible with the 
very specific guarantees of private ownership of property contained 
in the Constitution 1992. If, on the other hand, ownership of the 
improvement continues in perpetuity, it is a nonsense to suggest that 
it has a realizable value unless it can be sold with the subsisting 
land use right. If this supposition is correct, once commercial land 
has been improved the underlying land use right becomes alienated 
from the state in perpetuity, thereby eliminating the mismatch of 
tenures, but perhaps offending the Party's injunction against private 
ownership of land. 
Commercial contracts 
Barriers have also been erected to control access to legally 
enforceable contractual rights. Only those who have been vetted 
and granted 'business registration' ei ther as a company, private 
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enterprise or sole trader, can form commercial agreements that will 
be recognized and enforced by state institutions, in this case Economic 
Arbitrators (Article 7 Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1 989; Article 
12 Ordinance on Economic Arbitration 1 990). Excluded from this 
privilege are unregistered family traders, by far the largest and 
most active of the private economic sectors. In contrast, all may enter 
contracts for non-income producing activities (Articles 3, 4 Ordinance 
on Civil Contracts 1 99 1 ) .  Of course the distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial pursuits may not always be clear. 
According to one school of thought, for example, a contract entered 
into by an excavation company to purchase a truck is governed by the 
Ordinance on Civil Contracts 1 991 ,  as the truck is not used as a 
tradeable commodity. Had the truck been purchased to be leased or 
sold, the Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989 (Article 1 )  may have 
applied. Other commentators might insist that as both transactions 
have a commercial flavour they are economic contracts. 
Although in most civil law jurisdictions contracts are classified 
by the rules of civil procedure according to their dominate purpose, 
there are convincing reasons for believing that in Vietnam the 
distinction is ideological . This supposition is supported by the fact 
that the penal ty for making a mistake and entering an economic 
contract without business registration is not only an unenforceable 
contract, but also possible criminal prosecution (Articles 8, 39 (3) ,  
Ordinance on Economic Con tracts 1 989) .  Surely this is  an 
unnecessarily draconian outcome if the economic/non-economic 
classification is merely a procedural issue. 
One possible explanation for a legal system that restricts access 
to commercial, but not non-commercial property, may be found in 
Party pol icy. The VCP has set itself two contradictory if not 
irreconcilable objectives. The tension should be familiar to Western 
observers, as it concerns the balance between state control and 
private commercial autonomy.5 In the past the socialist distinction 
5 The Constitution 1 992 {Articles 1 2, 1 5, 1 6) now allows individ uals to 
exercise private rights over both income producing assets and personal 
property. Paradoxically, although Article 22 of the Constitution 1 992 
states that all sectors of the economy including citizens are equal before 
the law, state and collectively owned segments are otherwise described as 
enjoying a 'corner stone' {art.icle 15) or 'leading role' (article 1 9) in the 
economy. It should be noted that some of the drafts of the Constitution 
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between public and personal property ensured that income producing 
property (public property), was controlled by state enti ties or 
collectives. Other property which satisfied personal material and 
cultural requirements, but did not actually contribute to the economy 
(personal property) could be safely entrusted to individuals 
(Quigley 1 988b: 154-157). 
Economic circumstances have now changed . Faced with the 
emergence of a burgeoning privately owned economy and foreign 
investors, planners have been forced to abandon direct enterprise 
management as a form of economic control. But the market is still 
said to be insufficiently developed to enable traditional economic 
levers such as taxation and interest rates to operate efficiently. 
Commercial freedoms, on the other hand, have matured to the point 
where they may now interfere with state planning goals. This 
potential for conflict has for the time being been minimized by 
restricting private access to commercial rights. Applicants for 
commercial land, or 'business registration', must convince bureaucrats 
of the need for a proposed commercial activity. Factors such as the 
availability of raw materials, trained labour, utilities, demand for 
products or services, and compliance with national planning policy, 
are all used to assess the suitabili ty of an application. But in the 
end private commercial freedoms must be enjoyed by an individual in 
a way that harmonizes with state policy. 
Bureaucratic control of commercial freedoms 
Commercial freedoms are not just subordinated to the public interest 
by restricting access to commercial private rights. Once alienated 
from the state, commercial land use rights can only be transferred 
with the approval of the appropriate people's committee. Further 
restrictions apply to the transfer of a certificate of ownership for 
buildings erected on commercial land. As transactions of this nature 
are regarded as a sale or merger of a business, transfer is conditional 
upon the incoming parties complying with all the previously 
described requirements for business registration (Articles 24 Law on 
Private Enterprise 1990; articles 1 5, 21 Law on Companies 1990), or 
1 992 clearly display the competing agendas of the so-called 'socialist hard 
line' and progressive factions within the VCP. 
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the rules of the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment 
(SCCI) where transferees happen to be foreign enti ties (Articles 15,  
33 Decree Providing Regulations on Foreign Investment in Vietnam 
1 993) .  In keeping with the policy of leaving non-commercial 
property relatively free of restriction, ownership certificates for 
residential land may be transferred upon the completion o f  
mechanical registration formali ties (Chapter 5 ,  Ordinance o n  
Residential Housing 1991 ). 
Intervention by economic arbitrators 
The Ordinance on Economic Contracts 198, in most respects leaves 
contracting parties free to strike a commercial bargain. When the 
ordinance was introduced, an administration still unfamiliar wi th 
and distrustful of private commerce insisted that contracts must be 
registered with [E]conomic [A]rbitrators. Although this practice has 
all but discontinued, economic arbi trators still retain the power 
proactively to monitor the performance of registered economic 
contracts, and intervene even when parties to a contract have not 
formally attempted to assert their legal rights (Articles 1, 2, 7, 14 
Ordinance on Economic Arbi tration 1 990) .  Although legal 
commentators dismiss intervention of this kind as a paternalistic 
relic of an arbitration system originally establi shed to supervise 
production plans between state enterprises, the practice still 
continues. 
In 1 992, Saigon Jewellery, a company partially owned by the Ho 
Chi Minh City People's Committee, imported gold on behalf of a 
private company. As a condition for issuing a letter of credit, 
Vietcom Bank required Saigon Jewellery to guarantee payment on 
behalf of the private company. As an economic contract, the 
guarantee subsisting between the bank and Saigon Jewellery was 
registered, and became subject to the supervision of the Ho Chi Minh 
City Economic Arbitrators (Articles 6, Ordinance on Economic 
Contracts, 1 989) . When the private company found itself unable to 
pay, Vietcom Bank looked to the guarantor for the funds. To the 
surprise of all parties, even before the bank had formally sought to 
enforce its rights enshrined in the instrument of guarantee, the 
economic arbitrators unilatera lly ordered Saigon Jewellery to 
honour i ts obligations. It is true that no great hardship was 
experienced in this case. Nonetheless, the economic arbi trators 
proactivity usurped the autonomy of individuals, and imposed an 
The evolution of private commercial freedoms in Vietnam 141  
outcome that may have been inconsistent with the rights and wishes 
of both parties. 
Intervention by people 's committees 
Admittedly, direct intervention by Economic Arbitrators is now a 
rarity. But the supervisory powers that have been relinquished by 
Economic Arbitrators have been more then offset by the controls now 
exercised by local government. As previously mentioned, by 
administering a system of business registration (Articles 24 Law on 
Private Enterprise 1 990; arts. 1 5, 2 1 ,  Law on Companies 1 990; 
Articles 1 Decree on Signing and Carrying ou t Economic Con tracts 
1 992 ), people's committees at both the provincial /city and district 
levels regulate entry into the formal commercial sector. 
Bureaucratic control does not stop at registration, but continues to 
varying degrees over the life of a business venture. Take, for 
example, the activities of sub-departments controlled by city level 
people's committees: the Sub-Departmen t of Construction and 
Housing issues building permi ts and may supervise construction; the 
Sub-Department of Trade in conjunction with market control boards 
regulates trade practices; the sub-Department of Health establishes 
and enforces hygiene standards; and the Sub-Department of Land 
determines tariffs for the rent of land and water. Even the sale of 
manufactured products is controlled at the local level . All goods 
destined for the domestic market must be registered and pass quality 
assurance tes ts set by the Sub-Department of Standards, 
Measurement and Quality (The Saigon Times 18 February 1 993 :5) .  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that i f  a people's commi ttee lacks 
direct administrative authority over a particular offensive business 
practice, pressure can be applied through the exercise of a power 
that effects the business in an other area. 
But there is more to administrative supervision of business 
activity then simply the desire to implement government policy. 
Together with thei r regulatory responsibi l i t ies,  peopl e' s  
committees own and operate companies that engage i n  commerce. 
The People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, for example, has gone 
one s tep further and assembled a Japanese-style trading 
conglomerate. This is made up of a series of companies interlinked by 
substantial cross-ownership shareholdings. At its core are finance 
and insurance companies, and these service interests in tourism, 
textiles and transportation. 
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By allowing local au thorities the right to participate in the 
market place, the impartial i ty of their regulatory and 
administrative functions may be compromi sed . The regulatory 
system furnishes many opportunities for a people's commi ttee to use 
its regulatory powers in a self-serving manner to exclude or 
disadvantage competitors. Chief among these is  the power to 
prevent state or private businesses from lawfully entering into 
binding economic contracts without a licence issued by an economic 
arbitrator. This institution is appointed by, and experience suggests 
that i t  rarely acts wi thout the consent of the corresponding 
provincial / city people's committee. 
Once a competi tor has become es tabl ished, the people' s 
committee has the power to fine or close establishments that offend 
heal th, building and market regula tions. I t  is true that most 
provincial / city people's commi ttees are actively competing with 
each other to attra ct investment, and far from d i scouraging 
applicants they may offer attractive inducements. Nevertheless, if 
an investment happens to compete wi th an enterprise owned by a 
people's committee, short of complaining to the prime minister, who 
may now transfer or dismiss recalci trant chairmen and vice 
chairmen of provincial / city people's committee, there is no judicial 
body with the authority to review the abuse of administrati ve 
power. 
Indirect control of property rights 
Rights may also be controlled indirectly. One consequence of making 
access to, and transfer of, commercial rights dependent upon the 
favourable exercise of administra t ive discretion, is that the 
boundaries delineating private commercial rights often become 
blurred. This impreci sion may affect the quality of rights both 
subjectively and objectively. Once received and decoded, priva te 
rights guide individuals in deciding what commercial activi ties 
they think they are permitted to carry out. The conventional test for 
a good law in the West is one that may be easily understood by 
members of the community, with the assistance of a legal adviser. 
On this basis much of Western law fails the grade. Rights are also 
used by adjudicators to lay down minimum acceptable standards of 
commercial behaviour. In both cases, conventional legal theory 
maintains that commercial freedoms are enhanced by stable, 
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predictable rules, and frustrated by vagueness and vacillation (Ogus 
1 983:29-41 ;  Landa 1981; 349-355).  
Some of the indirect consequences of state interference in 
Vietnam are i l lustrated by the uncertainties surrounding the 
'authorized' business of companies and private enterprises. Both of 
these forms of commercial organization must comply strictly with 
the business objectives set out in their respective certificates of 
registration (article 13(1 )  Law on Companies 1990; article 22(7) Law 
on Private Enterprise 1990) . Unfortunately it is not always possible 
to know what activities are authorized by a licensed business 
objective. For example, can a business licensed to operate a tourist 
hotel also lease cars? The incentive to avoid an u ltra vires 
transaction is powerful, for once stripped of the protection of the 
corporate vei l, the person who entered into the unauthorized 
contract on behalf of the company or private enterprise will be held 
personally liable and the business licence may be revoked. 
If the permitted boundaries of legal autonomy are not clearly 
delineated, and commercial customary practices are inaccessible or 
no longer efficacious, the danger is tha t private investors will be 
reluctant to take risks and invest capital . Without precise rules that 
make it easy for people to und erstand their rights and 
responsibilities, individuals may tend to look for guidance outside of 
the formal legal systems; in these circumstances state ideology will 
assume a quasi legal status (Vietnam News 25 March 1 992). Social 
control through ideology exists in all jurisdictions, but is arguably 
particularly effective in countries like Vietnam where the state 
controls the media and publications, and where courts have yet to 
develop a high level of commercial expertise or a robust form of 
independence. 
Rel iance upon abstract  legal concepts and the ability of 
independent and impartial jud icial institutions to delineate and 
adjudicate private rights arose out of the unique cultural, economic 
and poli tical history of Western Europe. There is no reason to 
believe that the formal legal system in Vietnam will follow a 
similar path (Heng Hiang Khng 1 992:225-228; Vecchi et al 1 991 :47-
51 ) .  For the present, at least, the legal process has li ttle to do with 
the strict formal rights set out in commercial legislation. Written 
laws and regulations can only be regarded as general guidelines, 
establishing the rough ambit of bureaucratic discretion. 
Returning to the example of the tourist hotel, the business 
licence does not create immutable rights. The operators of the hotel 
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may be regarded as obstructionist, trouble-makers, or anti-social if 
they insist on leasing cars after the people's committee has decided 
that this is an inappropriate activity. The point in all this is that 
state policy is just as important as formal laws. Indeed, the validity 
of a law is often measured in terms of i ts ability to effectively 
implement policy. Put another way, as soon as a right imbedded in a 
licence or law conflicts with policy, it tends to lose its validity and 
by definition ceases to be a right. 
Conclusions 
An assessmen t of the success of an experiment that borrows cross­
cultural legal rules is a dubious proposition, unless one has the 
luxury of a long period of retrospection. As the process in Vietnam is 
still young and is yet to evolve into a mature form, it  is too early to 
postulate grand theories . Perhaps all that can be said is tha t, 
particularly in the last few years, the spectacular enactment of a 
wide range of  commercial legisla tion, outward ly at least,  
substantia tes the rhetorical adoption of a rights-based legal 
system, and this process will only accelera te as more foreign 
investors enter the economy and domestic enterprises become 
internationalized. In fact, if the laws currently under consideration 
are passed (in particular amendments to the Ordinance on Economic 
Contracts 1 989, Land Law 1 987, and enactment of Tortious Liability, 
Fair Trade Practice and Bankruptcy laws) many of the concerns 
outlined in this article will have been overcome. 
On a more abstruse level, the success of the experiment will 
depend upon the bulk of the population being converted, so that they 
share the values behind the legal reforms. This, of course, leads to 
the question: what are these values? Superficially they might 
resemble those found in Wes tern rights-based law. But delve a bit 
deeper and prevailing legal thought appears to rest upon two very 
di fferent propositions. Both of them are at variance with the 
Anglo-America n creed of natural  righ ts and a to mi s tic 
individualism, which has exal ted private rights in property above 
the good of society as a whole (Philbrick 1 938:723-726; Weber 1 947) . 
The first proposi tion is that the total good is preferable to the 
good of the individual. It is hardly surprising that a legal system 
which evolved in this philosophical context affords the individual 
li ttle real opportuni ty to curb the exercise of state power, or that 
bureaucrats and managers of state-owned enterprises widely believe 
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if there is no law that permits a business activity then that activity 
cannot lawfully be carried out. This attitude can easily translate 
into an obstructionism that stifles innovation. 
The other proposi tion is tha t government, and therefore 
regulation through the exercise of discretionary power, is preferable 
to the rule of abstract law. Commercial law is l ittered wi th 
examples of adminis tra tive di scretion tha t control both the 
availability and transfer of commercial rights. As previously 
discussed, this is most clearly seen in the power vested in people's 
committees to permit only those who meet the requirements of 
business registration to enter economic contracts. 
Although both propositions bear a strong resemblance to the 
underlying principles of socialist law, they are also found in non­
socialist, corporatist economies, for example those of Indonesia (Lev 
1 978) or South Korea (Tae Hee Lee et al. 1 99 1 :1 72-1 75) .  These 
countries share with Vietnam a developing nations' status and an 
attendant belief that the sanctity of private rights and scope of 
commercial freedoms must at times give way to more important 
social imperatives such as national development. Indeed, even in 
the West, governments have a vi tal role to play in curbing 
commercial freedoms, particularly where they lead to unfair trade 
practices or unconscionable behaviour. It is worth emphasizing that 
the debate in Vietnam is one of survival of rights, transcending 
mechanistic economic arguments about the respective merits of a free 
market as opposed to a national industry policy. 
On balance, the differences between the treatment of commercial 
rights in Vietnam and non-socialist Asia, or more particularly the 
West, outweigh the similari ties. The disparity arises not so much 
because of the level of state intervention, although this is more 
pronounced in Vietnam than in most other countries, but because 
individuals cannot rely upon the state to prosecute or defend their 
private rights and preserve commercial freedoms. It will be recalled 
that, except for a tiny Francophone eli te, the jurisprudential notion 
of inalienable rights, which underpins the social obligation of the 
state to protect private interests, never gained wide acceptance in 
Vietnam. The difference is also one of expectation, for practice 
suggests that a Vietnamese right holder tends to view a right as a 
passport to do something that otherwise would be unlawful. If a 
business dispute arises, the inclination is to rely on customary 
practices and not abstract legal rights to resolve the disagreement. 
Likewise, given the lack of 'teeth' in the debt recovery procedure, 
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there is  very little point insisting upon the strict performance of 
one's rights. 
Just because Vietnamese commercial freedoms differ from their 
counterparts in the West does not justify the conclusion that they do 
not exist. In fact, the rapidly expanding private economy indicates 
that private commercial freedoms do exist, if not flourish, in spite of 
the often precarious status of private legal rights. Perhaps all that 
can be meaningfully said is that the link between commercial 
freedoms and private rights does not operate in Vietnam in the way 
that Western mod els  would predict .  For in the Wes t  i t  is 
inconceivable that commercial freedoms could exist in an 
environment where private rights cannot be effectively protected 
against the state, or consistently enforced against individuals. 
It  makes sense that reform of the Vietnamese legal system 
should be slow and incremental, allowing time for wha t are 
essentially Western legal norms to be modified and adapted to suit 
domestic commercial practice . Otherwise there is a risk that a 
facade of superficially Western legislation may hide a cul turally 
mismatched and unpredictable legal system. However, i t  is equal ly 
important that the balance between sta te and private interests 
should not be overwhelmingly til ted in favour of the state. If the 
only benefit of a business license is the privilege of paying taxes or 
supervision by People's Committees and/ or Economic Arbitrators, 
firms are unlikely to seek mcmbership.6 They will tend to conduct 
their business 'underground', creating a covert economy which avoids 
detection. It should be remembered that Vietnamese traders have a 
long history of forming and enforcing commercial transactions 
independent of bureaucratic rule and judicial supervision. 
The other major problem with bureaucratic guidance of private 
rights is that it tends to inhibit commercial innovation, a factor 
already in short supply. A not inappropriate analogy is that of a 
parent instructing a child to be 'independent the way I tell you'. The 
challenge facing law makers is to devise a legal system that fosters 
and protects private rights without jeopardising state planning 
objectives.  Whatever the outcome, Vietnam will quite rightly 
6 After an unenthusiastic reception, the Companies Law 1 990 has attracted 
as many registrations in the first half of 1992 as it did in the previous 
eighteen month s: 215 limited liability companies, 21 shareholding 
companies. Vietnam News, 23 August 1992:3 
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develop its own unique solutions. Bu t for this to happen, the state 
must place more trust in the commercial maturity of individuals and 
devolve legal as well as economic autonomy. There is some reason for 
believing that, in spite of periodic setbacks, this is a trend already 
well in progress. 
7 
Real Estate Laws in Vietnam 
Nguyen Qui Binh 
Under Western common and civil law, real estate is usually 
understood as land and anything permanently affixed to the land, 
such as buildings, fences and fixtures attached to the buildings. In 
Vietnam, property is divided into two parts: land is owned by the 
state, but buildings upon the land can be privately owned. Owing to 
this fact, individual title over the land upon which a building has 
been erected is legalized by law as 'the right of land use'. In a way, 
this is rather close to the western 'leasehold' concept. 
Real estate in Vietnam is governed by two different sets of 
legislation: the Land Law (existing since 29 December 1 987 and 
recently under intense review) and the Law on Residential Housing 
(enacted on 6 April 1991). Both laws are the results of a long process 
of real estate reform, during which a host of problems were 
encountered. Certain corrective actions have been taken, either to 
ensure production output, to settle disputes or to cope with new 
developments. 
Only five years after enactment, the Land Law already proves 
itself to be outdated. Five different drafts of amendments on the 
law have been circulated among various governmental and non­
governmental offices for opinions. Yet, the National Assembly in 
session in late 1991 still decided to postpone its consideration of the 
amended text for further study. In the amended law it is intended 
among other things that land will be given to individual (farmers) 
on a long-term basis, and that the 'right of land use' be saleable, 
mortgaged or rented as a 'special' commodity in the market economy. 
The 1987 Land Law 
Basic principles 
Long before enactment of the 1987 Land Law land in general was 
under state ownership. It had been the practice that citizens 
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possessed and had the right to use land but did not own it. Based on 
this premise, the Land Law does not focus on the ownership of the 
land, the landowners' rights, or land ownership registration and 
transfer. Rather, it concentrates on the land itself and on the rights 
and duties of an individual who occupies or obtains the right to use 
the land. The Land Law classifies land by its usage purposes, directs 
the states as to its administration, and stipulates the terms for land 
users. 
Categories of land 
Depending on the purpose for which the land is to be used, land is 
classified into four categories: ( 1 )  farmland, (2) forestry land, (3) 
land for residential areas, and (4) specialized land. Provisions is 
made for idle land as well. 
Land administration 
Functions of the state as outlined by the Land Law consist of 7 areas: 
Investing, surveying, measuring, mapping and classifying 
the land; 
• Zoning and land use planning; 
• Regulating land administration and land use; 
Allotting and recovering land; 
Registering land and issuing certificates; 
Inspecting the observance of the rules and regulations; 
Settling disputes. 
The right of land use 
(a) The right of land use is granted by the state at certain levels as 
set by the law. Land users rights are protected by the state. 
Land users may use the land on a stable and long-term basis. 
They may enjoy the fruits of their labour and the returns on 
their investment. They may assign or sell their dwelling house, 
other structures and perennial trees on allotted land. If their 
land is recovered by the state for other uses, they are 
indemnified for actual losses and added value. Land users are 
entitled to enjoy the benefits derived from public projects and 
receive information for land protection and improvement. They 
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also enjoy State protection against infringement of their legal 
land use rights. If the land they are currently using is 
expropriated, they will be given compensation. 
(b) Duration of the right to use land: the duration may be life-long, 
limited or temporary. There is no maximum for long-term land 
use set in the law. For foreigners, it can be 50-year rent (the 
maximum period for foreign embassies rent is 99 years). Limited 
term land use is five years and temporary land use is less than 
five years . 
(c) Land certificates will be issued by provincial/city or district 
committees, depending on the type of user: individual, social 
organizations, state farms and enterprises, governmental offices 
in towns or cities, joint venture companies, foreign individuals 
and organizations. District committees shall issue certificates 
to cooperatives, production groups and cooperative members for 
their agricultural and forestry lands. The form of the 
certificate is determined by the Land Administration General 
Department. 
(d ) Payment of fees and taxes are some of the obligations of land 
users . In addition, users shall pay a fee when obtaining a 
certificate . 
(e) Users must register their land when it is given to them, when 
transferring their rights, or when changing the use of their 
land. To register, users apply to the people's committee which 
has jurisdiction over the land. Land users are required to pay a 
fee for registration and, as mentioned above, an additional fee 
for the issuance of the certificate. 
( f )  ·Land users are obligated to use the land allocated to them in 
accordance with zoning regulations and the laws regarding the 
exploitation and conservation of resources. They are obligated 
to protect, improve and fertilize their land, and to refrain from 
all acts harmful to the environment or infringing the legal 
interests of adjacent land users. If the land allotted to them is 
land recovered from others, they are to indemnify preceding 
users for any loss actually incurred and pay compensation for 
the effects of labour as well as investments which have brought 
added value to the land. As long as they posses the land, users 
are to pay taxes and to pay regular fees when proceeding with 
cadastral formalities. 
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Land for foreign investors 
General 
The allotment of land for use by a foreign investor is set out in a 
separate chapter of the Land Law and is a further elaborated in the 
implementing decree of 23 March 1989 of the Council of Ministers. 
Unless treaties between Vietnam and the country of which the 
investors are nationals provide otherwise, foreign investors are 
subject to the same obligations as Vietnamese nationals when using 
land, but the procedure by which they obtain land use rights is 
different from the procedure followed by Vietnamese nationals in 
two respects: in obtaining rights to use land, and in paying rent. 
Process for obtaining the right to use land 
Land for foreign investors is categorized two ways: (a) land for 
plants or warehouse for manufacturing purposes, referred to as land 
for enterprise; and (b) land for building hotels, apartments and the 
like, referred to as land for property development. The former is 
discussed here, the latter will be dealt with in another section. 
Land for enterprise can be obtained in two ways, depending on 
the form of investment selected: (a) business cooperation contract 
(BCC) and joint venture; or (b) wholly (100 per cent) foreign owned. 
Business cooperation contract and joint ventures 
If either one of these forms is selected, foreign investors need not 
worry about obtaining land, as it will likely be contributed by the 
Vietnamese partner as equity. However, the problem for foreign 
investors will be in setting a value on the land contributed by the 
Vietnamese partner, and the equity ratio to be negotiated. 
With respect to valuation, the cost of the land is difficult to 
determine because there is no reliable property market, and the 
price is administratively set according to rates published by the 
Ministry of Finance. However, this rate is for rental, not the selling 
price. The method of valuing is first to determine the land category, 
then to multiply the rental price by the area of land contributed and 
the duration of the project. The figure is then discussed with 
partner, the supervisory office, and unofficially with specialized 
departments concerned with foreign investments before it is offered 
to the foreign investor. 
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The Vietnamese partner feels obliged to obtain no less than 20 
per cent of the equity. Official instructions urge the Vietnamese 
partner to negotiate for 50 per cent of the equity, either by requesting 
the foreign partner to lower her equity, or by obtaining a loan to 
make up the difference. For these reasons, the land price offered is 
likely to be distorted. Additionally, when the application dossier 
is submitted for preliminary approval at the provincial/ city level, 
an assessment committee comprised of different agencies will 
determine the value of the capital contribution, including the land 
price offered. The committee's remarks on the price may contribute 
to the pressure the Vietnamese partner feels to seek an inflated 
value for her contribution. At the State Commission for Cooperation 
and Investment (SCCD, where final approval of the investment is 
made, the land is assessed again, and rejection of the initial 
valuation may well occur. 
The price range set by the Ministry of Finance can be varied by 
provinces and cities. This creates competition between localities 
trying to attract investors by lowering the price. Less competitive 
provinces have complained about the lack of a uniform price. The 
relevant decision allowed that 'valuation of capital contribution 
shall be agreed upon by both parties', which means that foreign 
investors may still propose land prices based on similar land in 
neighbouring countries. 
The law allows land users to pay rent not exceeding 50 per cent of 
the total during the survey and construction phases. Full payment 
will be required after production has begun. Payment is to be made in 
two instalments during a year, and is paid on a yearly basis 
beginning from the time the licence is issued. If the rental duration 
exceeds seven months, the rent must be paid for the entire year. 
Payment may be reduced in cases such as natural calamities, as an 
incentive to encourage projects operating under hardship, in 
promoted fields, or as a rebate for those who prepay three to five 
years rent. The reduction rate may be as much as 50 per cent and will 
be set by the SCCI . Payment is made in US dollars, after a 
declaration and verification of the amount of area to be used to the 
Finance authority. This payment, declaration and verification must 
be done within one month from the date the land is first used. There 
are sanctions for failure to pay and for overdue payment, namely a 
US$10 per day fine on overdue declarations, triple the amount on 
false declarations, and 0.5 per cent interest per day for overdue 
payments. 
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In joint venture projects, where the land is contributed by the 
Vietnamese partners, the rent payment will be taken care of by the 
contributors. In BCC projects, the rent may be included within the 
share given to Vietnamese partners. In such cases, the enterprise is 
no longer required to pay rent, but such rent will be extracted from 
the shares given to the Vietnamese partners and paid to the 
government. 
Residential housing law 
The Law on Residential Housing was enacted on 6 April 1991 to 
consolidate the legislation existing since the sixties . Land for 
residential areas is divided into urban and rural areas. Each is 
treated separately because the former might already have 
structures existing on it, and the latter may be affected by local 
cultivation. The provincial/ city comittee is authorized to allot land 
for residence at the maximum rate of 100 m2 for families living in a 
town, and 200-400m2 for families living in rural, delta and 
mountainous areas. These rates are modified by the committees 
depending on the availabil ity of land . Those that are given 
farmland for residence are to pay an indemnification based on the 
acreage and land category. This payment is put in the national 
budget for new land development. All recipients of land must pay 
fees for mapping, registration and other paperwork required in 
making the allotment. 
The Residential Housing Decree contains 42 articles, separated 
into seven chapters. Its significant provisions can be classified as 
follows: 
Ownership of a residential house 
The ownership of a house is not restricted by quantity, purpose of 
use, locations of construction, or way of procurement, provided such 
ownership is registered at the appropriate people's committee, 
taxes are paid and the house is maintained and repaired. To 
renovate a house one must obtain a permit, and demolition is 
permitted for houses on the verge of collapse or for zoning purposes. 
Owners may use, rent, pledge, or mortgage their houses. The state 
still maintains ownership over houses which have been under its 
management since the revolution; further regulations in this area 
are to be established by the Council of Ministers. 
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Real estate transactions 
Organizations and individuals are allowed to conduct real estate 
transactions, including construction or renovation for habitation, 
sale, rent, or other business purposes in accordance with the law. 
This stipulation abolishes the view that houses are for habitation 
and not a commodity that is saleable for profit. Houses and other 
structures on the land are saleable, but the land i tself is not. 
However, the right of land use is also transferred to the new owners 
through the sale - from the point when the sale is approved by the 
proper authority. The contract must be notarized, registered, and a 
tax must be paid every time the house is sold. Only the owner may 
sell his house. If a house is co-owned, the consent of all owners must 
be obtained. 
Administration of residential houses 
The state represented by different administrative levels supervises 
residential houses as follows: 
Issuing permits for construction and renovation of houses. Permits 
for such activities in districts and towns are to be issued by 
provincial/ city people's committees. 
Registration of houses and issuing ti tle deeds. This will be 
performed by the people's committee that has given the permit 
for construction or renovation. 
Approving destruction of houses in three cases : a badly­
damaged house on the verge of collapse; a house located within 
an area where there is a construction zoning plan; or a house that 
has been constructed or renovated unlawfully. 
Residential houses for foreigners 
Foreigners have the right of ownership of residential houses during 
the time of their investments, or during their settlement, or for long 
term stay in Vietnam. The ownership of houses is not restricted by 
quantity, usage, location of construction or way of procurement. 
Owners may use, rent, pledge or mortgage their houses. Foreigners 
and overseas Vietnamese are allowed to conduct housing business. 
They are subject to the same regulations as local Vietnamese 
regarding ownership, administration, rent and sale of houses . The 
Residential Housing decree has set only general guidelines. For each 
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subject, further decrees will need to be implemented. There is no 
separate law yet dealing specifically with commercial real estate. 
Under the Law on Residential Housing, enacted on 26 March 
1991, private ownership of houses and buildings is protected under 
due process.  Such ownership may be acquired by purchase, 
construction, renovation, gift or inheritance. The owner of a 
residential house may also lease, sell or put the house up as 
collateral .  
Dispute settlements 
Land disputes 
Disputes about the land itself are solved by the people's committee 
which has jurisdiction over the land in question. Proper jurisdiction 
of each level of people's committee depends on the legal capacity of 
litigants involved. Land maps, documents, labour power, living 
conditions of the litigants, and land available in the area are all 
possible types of evidence to be considered by committees in settling 
disputes. Petitioners may seek recourse through an appeal to the 
immediate supervisory committee of the committee that decided 
their case. The decision of the appellate committee is final and 
enforceable. When the disputes involve administrative land 
boundaries, they will be discussed between district/provincial 
committees. Failing an agreement, disputes may be taken to the 
Council of Ministers for resolution if the litigants are from villages 
and districts, or to the National Assembly if they are provinces. 
Housing property disputes 
Disputes about dwelling houses, structures, or perennial trees erected 
on particular plots are handled by courts. They are considered 
disputes on ownership, and disposition of the structures will 
simultaneously determine the right to use the land beneath them. 
The distinction between the two kinds of disputes has been 
clarified by the Supreme People's Court thus: 
the court only handles cases on the right of land use when 
disputes exist on the right of use or the ownership of 
dwelling houses, including garden, pond, yard, well adjacent 
to the houses, or land over which is grown perennial trees. 
As for land that is apart from dwelling houses or without 
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perennial trees and possesses only seasonal vegetables, 
disputes concerning its right of use and inheritance are not 
under the jurisdiction of the Court' (1988 Annual Report of 
the Judiciary) . 
Within this guideline the court has expanded its jurisdiction to 
include: 
Petitions for compensation for labour results, inherited labour 
results, investment returns or added value made to the land, 
crops, and properties presently being used for agriculture which 
are recovered for public needs: 
Petitions for compensation as a result of an infringement of land 
use rights; 
Petitions for inheritance of gardens, aquaculture products, 
constructions on land where said land has been diverted from its 
original purpose for production and commercial purposes. 
Future prospects for real estate legislation 
About three months after enactment of the Residential Housing 
Decree, a decree on Real estate tax was issued and become effective 
from 15 July 1991 . This legislation set a tax rate of 0.3 per cent on the 
value of a house and 0.5 per cent on the value of land per year. The 
value of houses will be set based on the market price of each type of 
house or land and its profitability. This tax is a supplement to the 
residential housing law, it recognizes disputes in the ownership of 
houses, and provides that in such cases the tenant will pay tax. How 
fast the 'ownership gap' is filled will depend on the execution of the 
Land Law, especially interpretations regarding the right of land 
use. 
As for the Residential Housing decree itself, problems will arise 
in the provisions dealing with foreigners, who are now, in principle, 
allowed to own and to transact in real estate, but how will they 
obtain land for construction, are they allowed to sell houses, what 
are the formali ties ? Answers again are dependent on 
implementation and development of the Land Law. Three years 
after its enactment, the implementation of the Land Law was 
appraised in a meeting held in February 1 991 ,  where it was 
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concluded that the Land Law had put in order the administration of 
land performed by the state and, along with other policies, had 
encouraged production and gradually settled the use of land for 
economic development. However, there were three issues discussed 
in that meeting, and the hottest one was the relationship between 
the regime of people's ownership and the right of land use.  
Resolution No 10 of August 1988 of the party allows farmers to 
possess some means of production, such as machinery, buffalo and 
cows. It also permits cooperatives to allot the right of land use to 
farmers. In fact, in some provinces over 90 per cent of total 
agricultural land has been allotted . The allotment was conducted in 
three steps: (1 ) land to farmers on an average basis based on 
manpower with the right to use this land for 5-10 years; (2) 
additional land for those who produce efficiently or are able to 
develop their farming thanks to experience, manpower and capital 
available; and (3) farmers may bid for new land. Under this process 
farmers have been given a certificate of land use right, which makes 
them more comfortable about production in the long run, and is in 
reality a return to them of their land. All of these measures have 
resulted in an increase of agricultural output. 
This allotment, however, does pose several problems. The 
average distribution in step one does not enable mechanization, 
which will be necessary in the long term for higher production. In 
some cooperatives in the northern delta and in central Vietnam, a 
family with four labouring members has only half a hectare. On the 
other hand, this average allotment has forced whose who lack 
experience or capital to accept something that they are not able to 
handle, which has created unlawful sales of land among farmers, 
between those who can and can't till the land effectively. Finally, 
the 5-10 years term is still too short. 
In addition to these problems occurring in the north and centre, 
the south is still faced with land disputes resulting from the 
previous reform and redistribution, which will take some time to 
settle. Such disputes do not only exist in the countryside, but also in 
urban areas like Ho Chi Minh City. In a periodic meeting of the Ho 
Chi Minh City People's Council it was said that over 60 per cent of 
petitions sent to that council involved housing disputes. 
In open discussion, it has been said that some provisions of the 
Land Law now contravene reality. For instance, with the change in 
agricultural cooperative structure, farmsteads now become the core 
of agricultural production and must take care of themselves, yet if 
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they may only have the right to use land under the restrictions of 
the land law this is impractical. It has been argued too that in 
certain localities in the South the land use right and ownership are 
considered as one, as people proceed to transfer and pass on to their 
offspring the right of use. More generally, in an economy possessing 
multiple sectors, ownership will often assume different forms. 
The prevailing trend at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 was to 
state that land belongs to the people as a collective, but the Council 
of Ministers should be in a position to enact further legislation to 
elaborate the transfer of the right of land use, the sale of labour 
results and investment returns, the inheritance of land, and the 
status of mortgages. Subsequently, during discussions among party 
members prior to the Seventh Party Congress in 1991,  the issue was 
raised again and there were three proposals: the first advocated 
that land is a national resource which should belong to the people 
as a whole; the second urged a reversal of this principle; and the 
third proposed sharing of ownership between the state and farmers. 
Those who argued the first proposal pointed out that the land 
had gone through different reforms, not only in this regime but also 
in defunct ones too, not to mention those who received their title 
deeds in French colonial times. Determination of proper title would 
require examination of the origin of the land, and its legal status . 
Such a task would be extremely complicated. What would one do 
when a person submitted a title deed yet that land of his distant 
ancestor on a certain piece of land, had then changed hands through 
several holders? Supporters of the opposite point of view contend 
that since the quantity of certificates of land use right issued so far 
is still small, farmers are not so desirous of participating in new 
arrangements, especially those who cultivate land left by their 
ancestors. Statutes and party resolutions allow mortgages, yet banks 
do not honour land use right certificates. The fact that farmers 
holding land may transfer it and pass it on to their offspring, that 
city dwellers have ownership to houses, and that companies own 
their equipment, begs the question of why farmers should be banned 
from having ownership of their cultivated land. 
At the Seventh Party Congress, 97 per cent of participants 
agreed finally to put into the platform of the party that land is 
under general people ownership, but is allotted to particular people 
for long term use. Other matters, such as the transfer, inheritance 
and mortgage of the right of land use, shall be set by the state. That 
is the position of the party. The duration of long term use was again 
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debated in the National Assembly in August 1991,  with some 
representatives proposing 50 years with renewal, and one 
representative, the chief judge of the People's Supreme Court, even 
suggesting a term of 100 years. Such differences reflect the dilemma 
of ownership versus use, and must be solved in order that land 
institutions become the foundation for a financial market leading to 
a market economy, as resolved by the Party Congress and the 
National Assembly. 
While lawmakers are still puzzling over the duration of the 
land use right, and the Land Administration has only issued about 
10,000 certificates of such right to farmsteads, there have been 
attempts to pledge the land use right certificate as security for loans 
from banks. This trial has been undertaken in one district in An 
Giang Province, in the southern delta, and it has proven successful. 
The same procedure is being expanded to other districts in the 
province. In a subsequent harvest, An Giang had the highest rice 
output nationwide. Prompted by this success, the State Agriculture 
Bank, on 1 2  July 1991,  set procedures to given loans directly to 
farmers with the certificate of land use right being accepted for 
pledge if local people's committees so allowed. This is a departure 
from the old system, where loans were made through cooperatives 
with no collateral. 
This reality puts forward a question of whether the scope of 
land use right should cover other rights beyond the present ones to 
transfer and pass on to offspring? Shall the provision of 'all forms of 
sale, purchase, seizure and lease of land .. are strictly prohibited' 
(Article 5 of the Land Law) be revised? These questions could not be 
answered immediately, but reality will not wait, and if no revision 
is made then there will be a separation between the Land Law and 
its practice. Moreover, the pledge of the certificate of land use right 
will also provoke many potential risks and confusion, due to the 
present lack of a judicial process to foreclose, and to put on auction 
the land pledged, if the bank is allowed to sell it. And what will be 
the political impact when land slips from farmers to non-farmers? 
Transforming a concept suitable to one system into another will 
always dictate a transitional period . Both the Land Law and the 
Residential Housing decree are right in this phase. They will be 
subject to modification, willingly or unwillingly. When and how? 
Only time can tell. 
8 
Problems in the Corporate Income 
Tax Structure of Vietnam 
Nguyen Qui Binh 
The corporate tax system at present 
Under the reformed system, Vietnam still does not possess a unified 
tax on corporate-source income. Corporate earnings that are derived 
from different sources are taxed differently, by different pieces of 
legislation (or laws), at different rates according to business sectors 
and industries. Except for the case of using natural resources, a 
company is subject to one kind of income tax, depending on the source 
from which the income is derived. The division can primarily be 
drawn, for the sake of simplicity, between: 
Income from domestic types of enterprises, comprising 
both industry and commerce in public and private 
businesses, commonly defined as the non-agricultural 
sector; 
Income from foreign investment, ranging from 100 per cent 
foreign-source of capital investment; and 
. Income from agricultural sources, or the agriculture 
sector. 
There are some rational implications behind such division. 
First, it is believed by the government that taxing the agricultural 
sector is more complicated, and that traditionally the agricultural 
tax is such an important tax that it needs to be administered 
separately. Secondly, from the point of development strategy at 
present, there is a need to attract substantial investment capital 
from abroad. And as a matter of incentive, enterprises with foreign 
investment now enjoy much lower tax rates. Thirdly, due to the 
problem of the deficit and the need to raise further revenue, the 
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government may think that it cannot afford to provide tax 
incentives to locally owned corporations. 
Before discussing the problems and shortcomings of the 
aforementioned policy approach, it should be noted that a worthy 
effort has been undertaken in the recent reform to rationalize the 
multi-tax system to avoid double taxation. The method applied is to 
array the various taxes levied on a corporation under the umbrella 
of net profit, by allowing deductions of all other prepaid taxes (such 
as turnover, patent, royalty) when computing taxable income. This 
has made the corporate tax system more acceptable and simpler. 
The tax system is now framed by three pieces off tax laws described 
below. 
The law on Business Profit Tax (promulgated on 30 June 1990) is 
applied to all local corporations, including state-owned enterprises. 
This law replaces the previous tax decrees on profit transfer from 
state enterprises and on private businesses . Tax rates have been 
reduced considerably compared with the past, to one level for each 
schedule. However, multiple tax rates are still applied : 
Tax rates 
30 per cent 
40 per cent 
50 per cent 
Economic sectors 
heavy industries (electricity, mineral 
mineral development, steel, manufacturing, 
chemical, construction aquaculture, 
forestry, communication 
light industries, including food processing 
commerce, services 
Tax reductions or exemptions are allowed for 'encouraged' 
investments (up to 50 per cent of the tax due in a year), when the 
enterprise is located in a mountainous region (with a maximum of 
three years exemption), or in the case of natural disaster. If loss is 
still incurred in the above cases after reduction, it can be carried 
forward to the following years, but in no case beyond three years. For 
the purpose of computing taxable income, other additional taxes 
paid by companies will be considered as deductible expenses -
except for the royalty tax on the use of natural resources. Reinvested 
earnings are tax free in the event of 'encouraged' investment, but such 
a tax exemption shall not exceed 50 per cent of the total tax on 
retained and distributed earnings. The law also provides that small 
businesses with monthly turnovers under certain limits are not taxed 
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by the above rates, but on the presumptive method of assessment (as 
applied to the turnover tax). 
The foreign investment code (adopted in December 1987, and 
amended on 30 June 1990) sets out tax provisions applied to 
enterprises with foreign capital or foreign parties in business . 
Taxable income is computed as total receipts minus expenditures. 
The code provides for very flexible tax rates of between 10 and 25 per 
cent, in three categories, depending on the sector in which the 
investment takes place. The government's implementing regulations 
further divides tax rates as follows: 
Tax rates 
21-25 per cent 
15-20 per cent 
10-14 per cent 
Sectors/criteria 
standard categories 
priority categories (investment projects that 
meet two out of seven prescribed criteria) 
'exceptionally encouraged' (in the priority 
category and operating in remote areas of 
under difficult conditions) 
The code also provides that for oil and gas, and some other 
valuable and rare resources, 'the profit tax shall be levied at higher 
rates in accordance with international practice .'  Reinvested 
earnings are tax exempt (which in a sense implies that the tax only 
applies to dividends).  Upon repatriation or remittance of profits 
abroad, foreign partners (companies or individual) are liable to a 
withholding tax at 5 to 10 per cent of the remitted profits - yet 
exemption or reduction may be granted in 'exceptional cases where 
encouragement for investment is needed'. A maximum two-year full 
tax holiday, counting from the year a joint-venture starts making 
profit, can be provided in certain cases; and a further two years of 50 
per cent tax reduction is negotiable. Loss in any tax year may be 
carried over to the next five years to apply against profits. 
Enterprises may be exempt from import duties if imports are paid for 
them from own-source foreign exchange. 
There is still a sizeable effort being put into taxing agriculture. 
The focal point of the tax reform is to move to a cash-based system 
instead of in-kind collection. However, this has posed many 
practical difficulties - as in the case of taxing income that comes 
from different crops or different activities - unless the multi­
schedule system is eliminated. 
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It should be noted that the newly reformed system also contains 
some other forms of taxation, such as the turnover tax (which now 
acts as a consumption tax on goods and services), or the natural 
resources tax (levied on corporations exploiting natural resources to 
generate private profits). This will be discussed below. 
Structural problems 
Quasi-integration 
As a general matter, the corporate tax structure in Vietnam was 
modelled on the system of taxing different types of income at 
different proportional rates. The tax system recognizes the 
corporation as a juridical person, separate from its shareholders . 
However, one should notice a peculiarity of the Vietnamese tax 
treatment of corporations, in that all business incomes will be taxed 
only once at the corporate level, and the shareholders' distributed 
earnings are not subject to personal income tax. This can be explained 
partly by the absence of a personal income tax, which was abolished 
after the French left. The newly introduced personal income tax that 
went into force in April 1991 (which in fact is more like a wage tax) 
continues to follow the same principle, treating the corporation as a 
separate taxable entity, and considering dividends as a tax-free 
return of capital rather than a taxable event. Employees are subject 
to personal income tax, where shareholders are tax exempt as the 
consequence of paying tax at the corporate level . Self-employed 
businesses or professionals are taxed like private corporations, at 
corporate rates, and enjoy personal tax exemption as shareholders 
do. 
This looks all right at first glance, since integration could be 
accomplished at the corporate level . However in the Vietnamese 
case, this is not so, because of the problem of alignment between 
personal and corporate tax rates. In fact, serious discrimination and 
di stortions have arisen along the following lines . When 
shareholders are not subject to tax at the individual level 
reinvestments are generally tax free, the corporate tax actually 
seems to fall only on distributed earnings, albeit the dividend tax is 
not on the same schedule as personal income tax. Since there has 
been no effective alignment between the present corporate and 
personal tax rates, the equity in the tax system seems to be lost. Tax 
equity problems do not pertain in Vietnam's case to double taxation 
of dividends, but relate to other sorts of discrimination, caused by 
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exemption of shareholders from personal income tax , as we can see 
below. 
Problems of tax equity 
Unfair treatment of corporate and wage earnings becomes the focus 
point of problems in the corporate taxation system in Vietnam. 
Despite wishful thinking or genuine efforts at rationalization of the 
tax treatment, the current tax system remains unfair, due to the fact 
that entrepreneurs, wage-earners and other individuals who are 
equally well off have not been treated equally for tax purposes. And 
those who possess differing ability to pay are not being treated the 
same. Problems of equity arise mainly from the following 
discriminations. 
First, there is discrimination between shareholders and wage­
earners. Serious problems of tax equity can arise from the current 
exclusion of dividends from personal income tax in Vietnam. If one 
compares tax rates on individual wage-earners and on corporations 
(which are at the same time effective rates for shareholders, 
professionals and traders), it can be seen that the tax on the latter 
category of people does not at all conform to the personal income rate 
schedule, which is supposed to be progressive. High income 
shareholders investing in light industries, for example, pay only 30 
per cent tax, while a wage earner in the same bracket might pay 50 
per cent. Generally, capital could be taxed higher than wages and 
salaries, if not at the same rates. The above illustration is just one of 
many instances where the shareholders' tax liabilities turn out to be 
much less than the marginal personal income tax rates . 
Interestingly, the socialist tax system is now in the position of 
discriminating against the labour workforce. To get an overview, we 
first look at the tax rate schedules. 
When the shareholders' tax is paid at the corporate level, the 
alignment of corporate and personal tax rates becomes impractical, 
even if the nominal rates between these two types of taxes are 
relatively set in the same line, as in the Vietnamese case. It is 
impossible to achieve true alignment because the shareholders' tax 
liability is not determined at the individual level, as a personal 
income tax. The essential mistake in Vietnam's approach is to limit 
the personal income tax basically to a tax on wages and salaries, 
while leaving corporate dividends untouched.. This shortcoming is 
quite understandable since Vietnam, in trying for the first time to 
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introduce a personal income tax, has only very brief experience in 
integrating the tax system. The situation becomes even worse for the 
wage-earners when we analyse the real effects of tax exemptions on 
re-invested earnings. If the enterprises or the shareholders decide to 
retain 50 per cent of their earnings for investment, the tax rates 
applied will be then reduced by a half - which means only 15 per 
cent, 20 per cent and 25 per cent effective tax rates respectively on 
incomes from locally-owned corporations; or 5 per cent to 12.5 per cent 
on incomes invested in foreign-owned companies. 
Second, there is discrimination between business sectors. 
Vietnam's tax equity problems also stem from the application of 
multiple tax rates and tax schedules. How can tax neutrality be 
achieved between different sectors, industries or forms of business 
when tax ra tes and schedules are based in essence on a 
discriminatory premise? For instance, agricultural tax schedules 
differentiated by region can lead to a si tuation where a farmer in 
the delta who has a bad crop pays more tax than a farmer from the 
mountains who harvests a relatively good year. The same thing 
happens with different industries or business sectors. Arbitrariness 
inherent in the fixing of tax rates and in the possibility of 
renegotiating one's tax can give rise to serious discrimination among 
various individuals, enterprises and business sectors, and also 
encourage massive corruption. Questions may be raised about 
whether the government should intervene in the first hand into the 
market process, or rather wait until the market does not function 
properly to set a return to unprofitable businesses and correct 
extraneous factors. 
Third, there is discrimination between domestic and foreign 
enterprises. In Vietnam the tax system greatly favours companies 
with foreign investment.  Currently, Vietnam taxes this sort of 
earnings under a separate schedule by only half of the standard 
rates applied to domestically owned corporations, and then a 5 tolO 
per cent additional tax on profits remitted abroad. The whole 
scheme is designed to attract foreign investment. However, this 
creates a lot of problems of both tax equity and economic distortion. 
A person who enters into a joint venture with his foreign counterpart 
will pay a standard rate of between 20-25 per cent, but if he runs the 
business on his own or with a local partner he pays 30 to 50 per cent 
tax out of his earnings. This sacrifice, besides being unfair, often 
leads to inefficiency in production and misallocation of resources. 
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Problems of tax efficiency 
The complexity of Vietnam's corporate tax schedules and the 
proliferation of the rates stem in large measure from a genuine effort 
to treat different sectors of society with 'fairness' . However, 
multiple tax rates have proved to be counter-productive to tax 
equity as well as tax efficiency. Comparative experience confirms 
that a single corporate tax rate is far preferable, in terms of both 
fairness and efficiency. In fact, major problems can be proven as 
regards complex tax rates. 
First, those sectors enjoying tax exemption or lower rates are less 
likely to be efficient producers. On the other hand, those that are 
taxed at higher rates may be driven out of business in sectors which 
otherwise would have been profitable. In the past, due to large 
exemptions, 100 per cent of the trade burden was born by about 20 per 
cent of imports. 
Second, discrimination in tax rates leads also to misallocation of 
productive resources and a serious limitation of tax capacity. When 
the tax burden of supporting government operations is not evenly 
spread over all sectors and individuals, the actual tax base becomes 
narrowed, the government cannot afford to have low tax rates. 
Third, tax evasion and corruption are obvious problems. When 
there is a complex proliferation of assessments, the chance for tax 
evasion becomes greater. It is more difficult for the government to 
restrict corruption occurring during tax collection. Also, the more 
complex the system the higher the collection costs of taxes, becoming 
excessive in relation to effective yield. 
Fourth, another sort of distortion relates to the unpredictability 
of taxation. Producers and investors need to know exactly what their 
tax . liabilities will be, before their planned production or 
consumption, so as better to predict better predict the overall costs of 
their investment decisions and to avoid unintended bankruptcies as a 
result of tax surprises. By the same token, flexible multiple rates 
make it hard for the government to undertake sound budget revenue 
estimates. Without reasonably accurate estimates of available 
resources the government runs the risk of having to resort to 
inflationary bank financing or external borrowings. In the recent 
past, the problem of revenue instability has beset Vietnam's public 
finance. Finally, if companies feel sure that they will be bailed out 
when running into serious financial difficulties, their atti tude to 
risky businesses becomes careless; the possibility of negotiating on 
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tax rates often encourages enterprises to be financially irresponsible, 
with eventual heavy costs for the government budget. 
Tax incentive problems 
Looking at Vietnam's tax system one recognizes the major policy 
motive of attracting investment. Low tax rates on corporate incomes, 
especially those wi th foreign-owned capital and a range of 
preferential tax treatments, are clearly intended to offer attractive 
long-range prospects for investors .  Reluctance to incorporate 
shareholders dividends into the personal income tax might be 
deemed an additional attempt to give advantage to investors. 
Let us now examine Vietnamese tax incentives from the 
standpoints of their effects on resource allocation. Low tax rates are 
of course very important to investment decisions, as they ensure 
higher prospective returns on capital, shorter recovery periods, and 
lower risk when undertaking an investment. The problem of 
Vietnam's preferential tax rates is that they undermine the clarity 
and firmness of the tax rules. A tax system with firm rules and 
adequate safeguards against abuse is far preferable to a system of 
tax elasticity, of individual contracts with investors, requiring 
negotiation in each case. If a spectrum of possible rates is offered, it  
is likely that the majority of investors will bargain and succeed in 
obtaining the minimum rate, and the higher rates wil l become 
redundant. 
The negative effect of varying tax rates on resource allocation is 
also seen in connection with their inefficiencies in investment 
production. Transnational economic activities have shown that very 
low tax rates are not necessarily an incentive for foreign firms which 
enjoy no tax-sparing from their home country; and tax rates may be 
the last thing considered compared to a whole series of investment 
incentives, such as depreciation allowances, reasonable tax 
holidays, investment credits, profit repatriation, low custom duties, 
labour regulation, appropriate skills and adequate infrastructure. 
Efficiency problems also arise in connection with the form of 
incentive specified as tax exemption for reinvested earnings. Other 
than the discrimination effect against wage-earners, illustrated 
above, such exemptions distort decisions on resource allocation and 
open the tax system to wide abuse. Shareholders or companies will 
take advantage of this kind of exemption to minimize their actual 
tax liabilities, at the government's expense. Retention of earnings by 
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no means assures their optimum investment. Yet, investors may 
legally retain earnings at higher levels for the purpose of tax 
deferral, then switch ownership of stocks in case of high income, or 
wait for a low-income years to distribute such earnings. They may 
abuse the exemption by false reinvestment, and it is very hard for 
the tax administration to keep track. For example, a new machine 
may be put in place for the tax authority's verification, then 
disappear when the tax officials have gone. 
Problems of definition 
Current tax legislation does not define, for the purpose of tax 
computation, items of either gross or taxable income. Nor does it 
specify clearly business expenses or exemptions and deductions. 
Legislators feel anxious about including technical provisions in the 
laws, instead of putting them in the implementing regulations. This 
reflects legal tradition and the early stage of legislative 
development in Vietnam. 
Tax laws on corporate profits generally define taxable income as 
the difference between total revenues (to be brought in from 
marketing of products, provision of services or any other business 
activities) and total expenditures (which include costs, expenses, 
standardized depreciation of assets used in production or business, 
most taxes or tax-equivalents already paid, money paid to the 
social insurance fund, loss from previous years) .  While taxable 
income is defined to include bank interest profits, the definition of 
expenditures excludes interest on loans and fringe benefits. To every 
businessman, such exclusion seems very arbitrary. So long as loans to 
an enterprise do not exceed a reasonable debt-equity ratio and are 
made on an arm's length basis, it is difficult to justify the refusal to 
allow the enterprise to deduct interest on its loans as a legitimate 
expense. Similarly, one may feel that bonuses or fringe benefits for 
staff and workers are not treated as deductible expenses; yet 'fringe 
benefits having wage-or-salary character' are subject to personal 
income tax. Such inconsistencies are due to the lack of familiarity 
with world-wide practices in the tax treatment of corporations. 
Except for a concise definition of corporate income, cited above, 
the present tax law basically omits rules on identification of income 
and expenditures . Thus, there is a lot of uncertainty about tax 
treatment regarding incomes imputed or derived, capital gains and 
losses, fringe benefits, gifts, insurance benefits, business expenses, 
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cost allowances, interest on loans, depreciation or investment credits. 
Taxpayers and tax administrators need clear guidance with respect 
to all the constituents to be included or excluded from adjusted gross 
income. This seems to be a major contributing factor to tax 
inefficiency, weakness and confusion. 
Problems of coherence can also be seen in the application of the 
statutory tax rates. For example, royalty tax rates on the 
exploitation of natural resources are stipulated to extend from 2 to 10 
per cent for metallic minerals, 2-12 per cent for coal, 10-1 2 per cent 
for non-metallic resources, 6-20 per cent for oil and gas, 3-15 per cent 
for precious stones, and the specific tax rate for each resource group is 
left to the discretion of the executive branch, namely the Council of 
Ministers. One can imagine the unpredictability and hardship faced 
by companies and the tax authority alike, going from these 
statutory rates to final determination of the actual tax rate for each 
investment project. The same situation is envisaged in regard to 
corporate tax rates applied to foreign investment. Much, if not all, 
will depend not on the virtue of the law provisions but on the 
'goodness' of the State Commission on Cooperation and Investment, 
which has the authority to decide on the actual tax rate applied . In 
plenty of cases, this can undermine the credibility of a tax regime; 
and the discouraging impact of an unstable tax policy on businesses 
and investments may be much greater than the incentive effect of 
obtaining a lower tax rate by bargaining. 
Tax base erosion 
It has become a practice of the government for many years now to 
rely on inflation 'tax' for i ts deficit financing. �owever, the impact 
of inflation on explicit tax revenue can be devastating at times, 
especially when inflation rates are very high and there is a lag in 
tax collection .  During the last few years, with inflation rates 
jumping to two digits per month, the corporate income tax base has 
eroded considerably. Tax laws at present contain no mechanism for 
an inflation index, except for a general provision allowing the 
government to make adjustments when the inflation rate is above 20 
per cent. Since these are newly introduced laws, it is not clear how 
the adjustment system will work in regard to different taxes and to 
different sorts of indexation (threshold allowances, deductions, 
interest and debt payments, depreciation), so as not to further 
exacerbate distortions. Although business firms are required to pay 
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estimated tax each month, one cannot avoid drastic erosion in the 
tax base. The impact on progressivity and fairness of taxes will 
depend on the way indexation is applied. 
Administrative problems 
One of the current issues limiting the efficiency of tax 
administration in Vietnam is a lack of vertical integration in 
management of taxes, due to limited authority given to the tax 
administration and a multi-layered organizational structure. The 
tax administration is not an independent body with full competence, 
as in other countries. At the central level, the head office is placed 
under the Ministry of Finance, which reports to the Council of 
Ministers through the State Planning Committee. Functioning 
primarily as an advisor in the definition of tax policy, the head 
office seems to have very little supervisory power over offices at 
lower governmental levels. Provincial and district tax offices are 
under the control of the local authorities, through the local finance 
bureaus. Tax collection is done through local officials on behalf of 
the government. Such an organizational structure prevents any 
effective harmonization in implementation of tax laws or 
regulations, with each level of local authority pursuing objectives 
that may best serve its particular interests. Corruption and tax 
embezzlement spread further down the grades . No hierarchical 
control is effective. Moreover, when local tax officials have the 
prerogative of assessment, opportunities for harassment of 
taxpayers and for collusion between the parties proliferate. 
Another problem affecting tax administration is the absence of 
an integrated viewpoint or a system of master-files and taxpayer 
identification numbers. Corporate taxes are independently 
stipulated, separately collected and administered. A tax may well 
advance one specific objective at the expense of another. Tax 
arbitrage and loss in revenue are beyond administrative capacity to 
control, due to the present 'separation' approach. Until very 
recently, tax collection relied basically on withholdings applied to 
incomes from state enterprises - where administrative measures are 
monolithic, and accounting methods easier to verify. In new market 
economy conditions, however, with private businesses expanding 
and diversifying, taxpayer identification and record-keeping 
require new administrative techniques to effectively combat non­
compliance, such as underreporting income, overstating costs and 
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credits, failing to declare or to make timely payment. So far, tax 
assessment and verification in the country has been very weak and 
outdated. Most obvious is the administration's inability to assess 
even the magnitude of the revenue-raising capacity of the taxes . 
One can hardly confirm any tax data, except for a rough total of 
collected tax from a past year. 
Voluntary compliance is still new to tax administration in 
Vietnam. Recent tax efforts concentrate on providing incentives not 
to taxpayers but to the tax collectors (government offices , 
enterprises, and local authorities engaged in the service of collecting 
tax), by allowing them to retain 0.5 to 1 per cent of the tax collected. 
The entire tax system is based on official assessments which require 
a lot of administrative effort to determine tax liabilities and a good 
deal of contact between tax administrators and taxpayers . This 
again raises the relative cost of enforcement and allows greater 
opportunity for collusion or for arbitrary determination of tax 
l iabi l i ti es .  
Vietnam is also short o f  a tax litigation system. The tax laws, 
while recognizing the taxpayers' right to peti tion and litigate with 
regard to any tax matter, make no particular mention of the 
resolution of tax disputes in court. This reflects not only traditional 
legal practices but also the weakness of present enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Fina lly, seri ous problems sti l l  exist  with respect to 
administrative facilities and technical staff. There is insufficient 
training of key personnel, absence of motivation, poor morale or 
corruption in some cases, low productivity by a grossly underpaid 
and overstaffed workforce, and lack of infrastructure and expertise -
particularly those required for efficient control, auditing and data 
processing. 
In the last few years there have been growing amounts of tax 
evasion and smuggling, both among small traders and state 
enterprises engaged in underground economic activities (reportedly 
about 50 per cent of their turnover was not declared) .  Tax evasion is 
an endemic problem that stems from lack of control, sanction and 
inefficiency in management of the tax system; it thus signifies an 
increased resistance as well as a warning vis-a-vis the tax 
authorities. Only significant rationalization of the tax treatment, 
as well as systematic introduction of modern measures, will foster 
eventual diminishment in the incentives for tax evasion, and enable 
a dramatic improvement in tax collection. 
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Toward a desirable tax structure 
Objectives in tax reform 
In the near future, major reforms in corporate taxation are required in 
Vietnam because of the pressing need for: (a) further changes and 
improvements in the tax structure and the tax rates to reduce 
economic distortions; and (b) increased revenue mobilization to 
correct macro-economic imbalances in a non-distorting and equitable 
manner. These are very broad themes, comprising both short-term 
interests and long-term requirements. Tax reform measures need to 
balance various objectives: between revenue raising and efficiency, 
equity, and administrative effectiveness. Attention should be paid 
not only to the tax structure itself, but also to institutional features 
or other conditions of the country to ensure the optimal sequence and 
success of the reforms. 
The policy option seen as most practical in the Vietnamese case 
is to adopt a gradual approach and to reconcile both short- and long­
term requirements. E ven though revenue mobilization through 
various tax measures will have to be an essential strategy for the 
government, reform in taxation is bound to be a longer-term 
endeavour, rather than an overnight antidote, somehow tailoring 
the tax system to the new economic environment. 
Conclusion 
We have examined the current Vietnamese approach to taxation of 
corporations, looking in particular at existing problems from the 
standpoint of achieving a sound tax policy. Vietnam now stands at  
an important juncture as it  attempts to introduce basic reforms in the 
economy. During the last few years it has made a formidable start in 
efforts to create a legal environment congenial to investors, through 
the promulgation of a huge body of necessary laws and regulations. 
Its chances for success will be enhanced by removal from the present 
tax system of those provisions or regimes that cause economic 
distortions and inefficiencies. As time passes and experience is 
gained, Vietnam will hopefully be able to obtain a desirable tax 
structure comparable to its development objectives. 
9 
The Creation of a Labour Market in Vietnam: 
Legal Framework and Practices 
Irene Norlund 
Work is the primary right, obligation and privilege of 
citizens. Citizens have the right to work. People fit for work 
must work as provided by the law. The state creates jobs on 
the basis of economic development plans, employs people 
according to both their personal aptitudes and desires, and 
social requirements. It fosters professional skills, preserves 
the health of the workforce, and constantly improves 
working conditions for both mental and physical labour. The 
state institutes and enforces regulations aimed at preventing 
industrial accidents and occupational diseases (Article 5). 
Working people are entitled to rest .  The state regulates the 
conditions relating to work, rest and recreation for workers and 
office employees. Working people are entitled to social insurance 
benefit in retirement, old age, sickness, or disability. The state 
guarantees the working peoples' right to social insurance and 
gradually extends the system as the national economy expands. 
The state guides cooperatives in gradually making social 
insurance benefits available to their members (Article 59). 
The above articles are from chapter five ( 'Basic Rights and 
Obligations of Citizens') of Vietnam's Constitution of December 1980. 
They express the official view of the relationship between workers, 
peasants and the state before the re.form process in Vietnam began. 
The state was the main actor in safeguarding the life and security of 
workers and other working people. The system was consolidated in  
the north and has in  the main lines expanded to the south. 
The wage system was fairly unified, mainly depending on the 
length of time employed in the enterprise. Unemployment did not 
exist as a concept. The state took care of free education and health 
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care, as well as social benefits like retirement benefits, old age 
pensions and sickness benefits. Working hours were limited by law. 
Employees were able to buy cheap goods like rice and other basic 
goods at very low fixed prices. In most cases housing was also 
provided, including almost no cost for electricity and water. No direct 
income tax system existed. 
Employment in the state sector was basically employment for life. 
State employment was attractive because of job security and a certain 
number of privileges. Outside the state sector there was no social 
security. However, the overall problem was a very low level of 
incomes and a system that had little possibility of expanding, because 
of its inability to compete with the fast-developing economies of East­
and Southeast Asia. Economic crisis became the challenge of the 
1980s. 
Already in the early 1980s reforms had started in the state sector. 
Incentives were introduced and the wage system changed, because a 
much more complicated system mixed between fixed basic wages and 
an increasing dominance of piece-rate incomes and extra work of all 
kinds. For a couple of years the economy managed to survive by 
'pulling itself up by its bootstraps' through more work and extra 
work in the factories. 
Quite a large number of new regulations were introduced, but 
most of them of limited scope. When doi moi was introduced in 1987 
the process went further, but it was not until 1989 that fundamental 
reform took place and Vietnam moved to build a market-based 
economy based on cost-accounting as the leading factor. 
In the former system, ideologically speaking, the state was built 
on the working people. Therefore no contradictions existed between 
employers and employees. In the early reform system three interests 
existed, all of which were supposed to be taken into consideration: the 
state, the enterprises and the individual. However, the individual had 
little chance of manifesting his or her interests, and the existing trade 
unions were not of any help in this respect. The role of the unions was 
essentially to educate the workers that there were no contradictions 
between their interests and the state. 
The system also existed without a formal labour market, which 
had to be established along with the other reforms. By 1988 reform 
had gone further in the south than in the north when it came to state 
subventions of rice and other basic goods. The subsidy system still 
predominated in the north, whereas it was almost eliminated in the 
south. 
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However, if the enterprises worked on a cost-accounting basis, it 
would be necessary to close down a substantial number of factories 
and to sack a considerable number of workers in other factories. This 
meant that the lifetime labour system could not function any longer, 
and a free labour force could be created. The concern was that if new 
jobs could not be created at the same time, a new crisis of political 
dimensions might result, with a large number of dissatisfied workers 
turning against the state. 
Obviously it was necessary to create a labour market working on 
rules existing in societies based on the market economy as part of 
broader transformation of the economy. This included both a new 
type of trade union, which would defend the interests of wo:r:kers 
independently of the state, and the establishment of some kind of 
social security system to support workers who were unemployed, 
sick or had to retire. But the main interest was to create a free labour 
market, where wages were also related to a cost-accounting system. 
In 1989 and 1990, discussions took place about how to make 
regulations for the new system of labour relations. In April 1990, 
representatives from the General Confederation of Trade Unions were 
still not sure how the labour law would finally be formulated. The 2.7 
million workers had been working under the old system and they 
were not happy to sign contracts. By this time the government had 
decided that changes into a contract labour system should take place 
step-by-step. At first new workers should be employed in a contract 
system, then workers employed outside the state system included, 
and finally it should be extended to the whole labour force. 
In relation to the question of sacking labour, a number of criteria 
were specified. First of all the workers should be above forty-five 
years of age. Priority was to fire first the weak, the lazy and the 
workers with low productivity or quality of labour. The regulation 
said that an unemployed worker should receive a bonus for leaving in 
proportion to the number of years employed, but at least three 
months income. But interviews in Hanoi did not confirm this was a 
general practice. The number of workers losing their jobs was 
estimated in 1989 by the General Confederation of Trade Unions to be 
seven to 10 per cent of the industrial labour force. More have followed 
in subsequent years, which is one reason for the strong interest in 
foreign investments and job creation. 
In mid and late 1990 a number of laws, decrees and regulations on 
labour questions were adopted and the legal basis for a labour market 
established. During 1991 and 1992, further detailed policies on labour 
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were adopted. The system changed substantially in relation to what 
had existed in 1980. In April 1992, a new constitution was adopted. 
Chapter Five, on 'The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens' : 
Labour is the right and duty of citizens. The state and society 
have plans to create even more jobs for workers. (Article 55) 
The state promulgates policies and systems for labour safety. It 
prescribes the time of work and system of wages, rest and social 
security insurance for state employees and other wage-earners 
and encourages the development of various forms of social 
security insurance for workers. (Article 56.) 
It seems clear enough that the state is no longer taking the same 
responsibility for workers' lives as in the 1980 constitution. In relation 
to health and education, the 1992 constitution does not claim to 
provide free general education and medical care as in the 1 980 
constitution. Now it says that 'elementary education is mandatory 
and free', and that 'the state shall devise a system for hospital 
charges, and for exemption and reduction of hospital charges.' 
An essential point in relation to the female labour force is 
regulation of maternity leave and facil ities in relation to childcare 
(this is considered to be the female sphere and is also established 
practice). 
The 1980 constitution, Article 63, stated: 
Women are entitled to pre- and post-natal paid leave if they are 
workers or office employees, or to maternity allowances if they 
are co-operative members. The state and society ensure the 
development of maternity homes, creches, kindergartens, 
community dining halls and other social amenities to create · favourable conditions for women to produce, work, study and 
rest. 
In the 1992 constitution this was amended to read: 
Women state employees and wage earners are entitled to fully 
paid pre- and post-natal leave as stipulated by law. The state and 
society will create conditions for women to raise the level of their 
knowledge and develop their role in society. It will take care of 
developing maternity homes, pediatrics, creches, and other social 
welfare facilities to alleviate family burdens and create 
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conditions for women to produce, work, study, receive medical 
treatment, rest, and fulfill their duty as mothers. 
The 1992 constitution has not reduced the promises in this field, 
except for the community dining halls. It is a question, however, 
whether this system has been available at any time to more than the 
most privileged workers, mainly in large state-owned enterprises.  
This question is not easy to answer, because some families prefer to 
let relatives take care of the children. In none of the cases is it clearly 
specified who is to pay the expenses . Earlier on creches and 
kindergartens were very cheap, but now this is probably one of the 
heaviest burdens in the family economy, just like school classes above 
fourth grade have to be paid for, and even earlier grades demand 
some payment to support the low incomes of teachers. 
Laws and regulations 
During 1990, several regulations and rules were passed by the 
Council of State, the National Assembly and the Ministry of Labour, 
War Invalids and Social Affairs to follow up the on the 1987 Law on 
Foreign Inves tment (29 December). Two of the most important 
documents concerned workers in enterprises in general: the 
Ordinance on Labour Contracts (10 September 1990), which relates to 
the Articles 58 and 100 of the 1980 constitution., and the Law on Trade 
Unions, passed by the National Assembly on 7 July 1990. 
The decision to establish labour relations based on labour 
contracts is probably one of the most important steps, because it 
eliminates the former practice of life-time employment. The labour 
contract is an agreement between employee and employer. It can be 
either written or oral . In the latter case there is of course the chance 
that the employee is not fully a ware of his or her rights and 
obligations, whereas the written labour contract shall be in the 
standard form published by the ministry. 
Three types of labour contracts are outlined : the definite, the 
indefinite, and the contract for a specific or seasonal job. Specific rules 
relate to each type, as in termination of the job and other measures; 
but it mainly concerns the length of time of employment. Other 
clauses in the ordinance relate to: the legal age of being employed 
(fifteen years, or eighteen years for dangerous jobs); trial period; 
questions related to untimely suspension or termination of contract; 
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when contracts cannot be untimely terminated; and finally 
regulations of resolution of labour disputes. 
The Law on Trade Unions is certainly a step in the direction of 
establishing independent unions which can defend the interests of 
workers vis-a-vis employers and the state. However, it is still 
questionable how independent they are, if  the intentions in the text 
are taken at face value : 
Article 1.1: 
A trade union is a large political and social organization of the 
working class voluntarily established under the leadership of the 
Vietnam Communist Party. It represents Vietnamese workers, is 
part of the political system of Vietnam and brings the benefits of 
socialism to workers. 
The law also contains chapters on rights and obligations of trade 
unions and guarantees concerning trade union activities. It is obvious 
from the articles that unions are considered part of the political 
system and obligations have not changed basically from what they 
were before: 
Article 4 .2 : 
Each union shall promote the constitution and laws, educate 
workers to follow and uphold the law, participate in the building 
of socialism, protect the fatherland, protect socialist property, 
and work with discipline, productivity, quality, and efficiency. 
Article 7: 
Each union shall liaise with the bodies, units and organisations 
concerned in order to create employment, organise training, and 
improve professional standards, culture, and science and 
technology skills of workers. 
Article 9: 
Each trade union shall, within its function, monitor the 
observance of the laws on labour contracts, employment, 
retrenchment, wages, bonuses, labour protection, social 
insurance and policies in relation to the rights, obligations and 
interests of workers. 
The purpose of the unions earlier on was mainly related to 
training and social and cultural affairs. Article 9 opens up for a more 
influential role for the unions, and they are moreover the 
representatives of workers in negotiations and the resolution of 
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disputes. In the 1980s, many workers in state enterprises were not 
always aware of their membership. It has yet to be seen if workers 
themselves are becoming more interested in unions now that their 
daily income is much more threatened than before. 
The General Confederation of Trade Unions has been quite 
enthusiastic about the new trade union law, including the necessity of 
establishing a new regime of social security. There were certainly 
disagreements about the contents of the law, but the General 
Confederation of Trade Unions probably would prefer to see a more 
active role oplayed by the unions. 
Labour in enterprises with foreign-owned capital. 
As a reflection of the importance of obtaining foreign investments for 
Vietnam, regulations on labour for enterprises with foreign-owned 
capital were issued by the Council of Minister on 22 June 1990. This 
was followed by provisions for implementation from the Ministry of 
Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs, (31 December 1990, No. 19-
LDTBXH-TT). 
The two documents are structured similarly in relation to their 
eleven chapters. Although neither documents spells out the exact 
details, which might change over time, both offer basic lines for 
agreements between a foreign employer and employees - either 
Vietnamese or foreigners. The chapters on labour for enterprises with 
foreign-owned capital deal with the following issues: 
1 .  General provisions 
2. Labour recruitment and training 
3. Labour contracts 
4. Collective labour agreements 
5. Trade Unions 
6. Working hours and holidays 
7. Wages and salaries 
8. Social insurance 
9. Occupational health and safety 
10. Labour inspection and control 
1 1 .  Resolution o f  labour disputes. 
One difference compared to the general regulations is that the 
employee has to be aged eighteen years. Only for the purpose of 
training may someone be employed from the age of sixteen. The 
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method of recruitment is specified, and the circular on labour 
specifies who is to pay the cost. 
Collective labour agreements have to be signed no later than six 
months after the start of operation of the enterprise. The local labour 
office shall approve the agreement within fifteen days, so the 
regulations clearly try to speed up the process of a sometimes very 
slow working bureaucracy. Trade unions shall be established 
according to the Trade Union Law. 
The regulation of working hours is specific. Weekly working 
hours shall not exceed 48 hours per week, with one hour less than 
that per day for workers under eighteen years and for heavy or 
dangerous work. All employees are entitled to eighteen days fully 
paid leave per year. 
Women employees have the right of a minimum of twelve weeks' 
maternity leave and may be entitled to twelve more weeks maximum 
in special circumstances. The first twelve weeks should be paid at 100 
per cent of the principal salary. These provisions seem to 
disadvantage women compared to established practices in the 
factories. During the 1980s, maternity leave was extended from two to 
up to six months. The problem with maternity leave and sick leave, 
however, was that the employees were paid only basic wages, which 
represented only a small portion of the real wage. Virtually nothing is 
stipulated about child care facilities. 
Social insurance is organized so that the enterprise contributes 10 
per cent of  total wages and salaries. Of this amount, 2 per cent has to 
be contributed to the local labour office, to go into a fund for 
unemployment benefits. The other 8 per cent shall be contributed to a 
social fund established at the factory to cover sickness, labour 
accidents, pregnancy, maternity and child-care, and burial and 
funeral expenses. The employee has to contribute 10 per cent of the 
monthly salary specified in the labour contract (and not the actual 
amount eventually received) to a local insurance fund to cover old 
age benefits, benefits for permanently disabled, and burial expenses. 
In relation to occupational health and safety, the enterprise is 
obliged to protect labour and health according to laws in Vietnam -
including environmental protection - and according to international 
standards and practices. This is not established practice in Vietnam, 
and may help to improve the level of security and protection. 
The chapter on labour inspection and control is much more 
detailed than can be found in the general regulations; the Ministry of 
Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs is responsible. The labour 
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inspector has quite wide discretion, to request information, but it is 
not clear what he can actually do to change the state of affairs. 
When it comes to complaints, the local office responsible for 
labour matters should first try to manage the problem. If it is not 
resolved, the case goes to the Ministry on Labour, War Invalids and 
Social Affairs. Regarding disputes, the director of the enterprise 
should first try to settle the problem with the trade union or 
employees' representative and a solution achieved within seven days. 
If negotiations are unsuccessful, it goes to the local labour office, or, if 
still unresolved, the ministry can appoint a person to act as arbitrator. 
The last possibility is to go the people's court. 
Wages and salaries are to be calculated in accordance with the 
terms of the collective labour agreement, and shall not be less than 
the minimum wage announced each year by the Ministry of Labour. 
Night shift work is to be paid 50 per cent higher than day rate, 
overtime shall be paid at the same rate and work on festival days 
shall be paid at least 100 per cent above the daily wage. The salary 
shall be denominated in foreign currency, but may be paid in both 
Vietnamese and foreign currency. 
Conclusion 
It seems evident that labour legislation in Vietnam is undergoing 
reformation, and that basic laws concerning an independent labour 
movement - with some modifications - are now established. From 
the point of view of labour, quite fundamental changes have taken 
place in Vietnam, which of course is a reflection of wider economic 
change. In 1992, however, there was no sign of increased activity on 
the labour market in order to defend workers' interests. It seems the 
new legislation is not totally without importance, although the most 
important fact probably is the harsher labour conditions applied in 
foreign-owned enterprises compared to the traditionally more lax 
labour discipline. Moreover, there exist unions in state-owned 
factories that often function as intermediaries in case of dissatisfaction 
among the workers, whereas in foreign-owned enterprises most often 
unions are not established . Therefore, legal provisions are not 
implemented in many cases. 
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